Pafford v. Biomet, 264 Ga. 540, 544(2) ( 448 S.E.2d 347) (1994); Precise v. City of Rossville, 261 Ga. 210, 212(3) ( 403 S.E.2d 47) (1991); Garrett v. NationsBank,, 228 Ga. App. 114, 115-116 ( 491 S.E.2d 158) (1997). If the nonmoving party on summary judgment motion successfully produces rebuttal evidence, the burden of persuasion shifts back to the movant to establish the nonexistence of a genuine issue of fact, because the burden of proof is always on the movant, even though the movant may not have such burden of proof at trial. Gentile v. Bower, supra; Fugate v. Gayfers Mercantile Dept. Stores, 201 Ga. App. 867, 869 ( 412 S.E.2d 617) (1991); S. S. Kresge Co. v. Blount, 162 Ga. App. 404, 405 ( 291 S.E.2d 728) (1982). In this case, the trial court failed to follow such rules where Five Star presented some evidence to create material issues of fact, both as to the amount owed and as to its defenses.

[Cits.]" S. S. Kresge Co. v. Blount, 162 Ga. App. 404, 405 ( 291 S.E.2d 728) (1982). "In the case sub judice, [appellee] has failed to make any showing that it was not negligent in the materials used in treating the floor or in the application thereof. . . . Compare the . . . cases in which the respective defendants presented evidence they were not negligent in the choice of materials used in treating the floors or the application of them, and the respective plaintiffs did not produce any evidence as to the quality of the material or methods used by the respective defendants in maintaining the floor.

In the case sub judice, defendant has failed to make any showing that it was not negligent in the materials used in treating the floor or in the application thereof. Therefore, no burden was cast on plaintiff to show that there was a genuine issue of material fact for trial. S. S. Kresge Co. v. Blount, 162 Ga. App. 404 ( 291 S.E.2d 728). Additionally, plaintiff's evidence that the floor was slick and felt like wet wax is some evidence of negligent application. Martin v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 253 Ga. 337 ( 320 S.E.2d 174); Dykes v. Toombs County, 192 Ga. App. 856 ( 386 S.E.2d 730); Artesiano v. K-Mart Corp., 184 Ga. App. 895 ( 363 S.E.2d 177). The superior court erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment against plaintiff.

See Martin v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 170 Ga. App. 791 ( 318 S.E.2d 144) (1984); Wolling v. Johnny Harris Restaurant, 166 Ga. App. 630 (1) ( 305 S.E.2d 168) (1983). Compare S. S. Kresge Co. v. Blount, 162 Ga. App. 404 ( 291 S.E.2d 728) (1982). Our decision is unchanged by appellees' inclusion into the record of a number of depositions taken from others who had previously slipped and fallen in the same store. Initially, we note that the circumstances in only one incident are even similar to those asserted by appellees.

We do not find these differences sufficient to distinguish Alterman, which was properly applied by the trial court. Other similar cases following Alterman are: Mahaffey v. First Nat. Bank, 157 Ga. App. 844 ( 278 S.E.2d 729); Pound v. Augusta National, 158 Ga. App. 166 ( 279 S.E.2d 342); Tolliver v. Hollingsworth, 161 Ga. App. 118 ( 289 S.E.2d 272); Key v. J. C. Penney Co., 165 Ga. App. 176 ( 299 S.E.2d 895). Compare, S. S. Kresge Co. v. Blount, 162 Ga. App. 404 ( 291 S.E.2d 728), which is distinguishable. 2.

The trial court did not err in granting appellee summary judgment on the issue of its negligent maintenance of the entryway floor. Compare S. S. Kresge Co. v. Blount, 162 Ga. App. 404 ( 291 S.E.2d 728) (1982). We turn next to the question of whether genuine issues of material fact remain with regard to appellee's negligence in failing to provide mats for customers entering with rain-wet shoes.