Rynar v. Lincoln Transit Co., Inc.

29 Citing cases

  1. Bullock v. BNSF Ry. Co.

    399 P.3d 148 (Kan. 2017)   Cited 14 times
    Finding that evidence of post-accident employee discipline was a subsequent remedial measure that could not be admitted to show negligence or culpable conduct under Kansas law but that the railroad's post-accident investigation that preceded the disciplinary action was not a subsequent remedial measure

    We observe, for example, in one of the law review article's cited cases, the Washington Supreme Court stated in 1893 that, "We are also of the opinion that the court should not have permitted the respondent to show that the car driver was discharged by appellant soon after the accident occurred." Christensen v. Union Trunk Line , 6 Wash. 75, 83, 32 P. 1018 (1893) ; see also, e.g. , Hewitt v. Taunton St. Ry. Co. , 167 Mass. 483, 486, 46 N.E. 106 (1897) (employer's taking precaution of a virtual discharge of employee driver after accident is not admissible as employer's implied admission for purpose of showing negligence; "[t]o hold otherwise would tend to discourage the adoption of additional safeguards, by improving the quality and raising the standard of the service"); accord Rynar v. Lincoln Transit Co. , 129 N.J.L. 525, 30 A.2d 406, 410 (1943) ("Evidence that a driver has been discharged soon after an accident is not competent as an implied admission that the driver had been careless."); cf. Turner v. Hearst , 115 Cal. 394, 401, 47 P. 129 (1896) (error to allow plaintiff to prove newspaper's discharge of reporter in libel case; analogous to proof of precaution taken post-accident). Based upon the well-settled common law rule incorporated in Rule 51—and thus incorporated in Kansas' adoption of Rule 51, i.e. , K.S.A. 60-451 —we conclude post-accident employee discipline constitutes a subsequent remedial measure barred by the statute when used to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with Bullock's event.

  2. Robertson v. Richards

    115 Idaho 628 (Idaho 1989)   Cited 36 times
    In Robertson v. Richards, 115 Idaho 628, 769 P.2d 505 (1987), the trial court refused to give an instruction based on IDJI 205, Instead, the trial court instructed the jury according to I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013.

    Prior to allowing the testimony to show bias or inconsistency in Bjornson's testimony, the Court should have required defense counsel to establish some prima facie basis that an actual bias against Dr. Richards existed, and that Dr. Bjornson's trial testimony was actually inconsistent with his deposition. Rynar v. Lincoln Transit, Co., 129 N.J.L. 525, 30 A.2d 406 (N.J.App. 1943). But the trial court required neither.

  3. Roberts v. Miss. Rep. Party State Exec. Comm

    465 So. 2d 1050 (Miss. 1985)   Cited 43 times
    Recognizing that intent of Public Records Act is to provide all citizens with access to the records of all public governmental bodies

    In Latin "commensurate" means literally "equal in measure". See also Rynar v. Lincoln Transit Co., 129 N.J.L. 525, 534, 30 A.2d 406 (1943), Succession of Correjolles, 206 La. 581, 600, 19 So.2d 259, 265 (1944). The intent of the legislature in enacting the Mississippi Public Records Act of 1983, Mississippi Code Annotated section 25-61-1, et seq. (Supp.

  4. Earl v. Tulsa County Dist. Court

    1979 OK 157 (Okla. 1980)   Cited 21 times

    The word "commensurate" is "one of relative measurement" and, for its exact meaning, it needs an object of comparison. When that object is certain, "commensurate with" means "equal to", Rynar v. Lincoln Transit Co., 129 N.J.L. 525, 30 A.2d 406, 412 [1943]; Nissen v. Miller, 44 N.M. 487, 105 P.2d 324, 326 [1940]; Succession of Correjolles, 206 La. 581, 19 So.2d 259, 265 [1944]; Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 351 [Tex. 1976]. The object of comparison provided in § 138.4(a) for ascertainment of defense functionaries' compensation level is the statutorily fixed salary structure for the prosecutorial service.

  5. Bravo v. Lacz

    183 N.W.2d 924 (Neb. 1971)

    In an automobile accident case it is not ordinarily prejudicial error for the court to exclude cross-examination of a witness for defendant to prove these facts: The witness made a claim against defendant for damage sustained in the accident, and defendant paid the claim. See, Shanowat v. Checker Taxi Co., Inc., 48 Ill. App.2d 81, 198 N.E.2d 573 (1964); Esser v. Brophey, 212 Minn. 194, 3 N.W.2d 3 (1942); Rynar v. Lincoln Transit Co., Inc., 129 N.J. Law 525, 30 A.2d 406 (1943). The judgment is affirmed.

  6. Ambrose v. Cyphers

    29 N.J. 138 (N.J. 1959)   Cited 47 times
    In Ambrose, the trial court found that there was “no evidence” of contributory negligence where the passenger-plaintiff was unaware of any peril or that the driver was about to conduct an unexpected and dangerous U-turn during which the automobile was struck by another.

    And so as to the situation before us, a line of cases spanning some 30 years has found that a U-turn presents an unusual hazard, that overall the risk of harm inherent in that maneuver is high, and hence, as a rule of the road, a driver must exercise great care and seek an opportune moment. In chronological order, those cases are: Day v. Beyer, 5 N.J. Misc. 1069 ( Sup. Ct. 1927); Senofsky v. Frecker, 10 N.J. Misc. 505 ( Sup. Ct. 1932); Felix v. Adelman, 113 N.J.L. 445 ( E. A. 1934); Andersonv. Cassidy, 119 N.J.L. 331 ( Sup. Ct. 1938); Rynar v.Lincoln Transit Co., Inc., 129 N.J.L. 525 ( E. A. 1943); Oliver v. Leonardo, 135 N.J.L. 210 ( Sup. Ct. 1947); Wadellv. Public Service Coordinated Transport, 3 N.J. Super. 132 ( App. Div. 1949); Politi v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,Inc., 5 N.J. Super. 364 ( App. Div. 1949); The MotorleaseCorporation v. Mulroony, 13 N.J. Super. 556 ( App. Div. 1951), affirmed 9 N.J. 82 (1952); O'Neil v. Bilotta, 18 N.J. Super. 82 ( App. Div. 1952), affirmed on opinion below, 10 N.J. 308 (1952); Pignatore v. Public Service CoordinatedTransport, 26 N.J. Super. 234 ( App. Div. 1953); Liberatoriv. Yellow Cab Co. of Philadelphia, 35 N.J. Super. 470 ( App.Div. 1955). In Felix v. Adelman, supra ( 113 N.J.L., at page 448), the court agreed there is a duty to seek an opportune time, but made some inconclusive observations with respect to "great care" or "high degree of care."

  7. Honey v. Brown

    22 N.J. 433 (N.J. 1956)   Cited 10 times
    In Honey v. Brown, 22 N.J. 433 (1956), plaintiff brought suit for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident which occurred one dark foggy night when her car struck a trailer parked on the shoulder of a highway as she pulled off the road to stop until fog lifted.

    3 Jones onEvidence, Civil Cases (4 th ed.), sec. 898 a et seq.; 2 Wigmore on Evidence (3 d ed.), sec. 664. Our law is to the same effect, as pointed out by the Appellate Division, that the weight to be accorded testimony in such a situation is a matter for the jury, unhampered by any fixed formula. Napodensky v.West Jersey, etc., R. Co., 85 N.J.L. 336, 339 ( E. A. 1913); Rynar v. Lincoln Transit Co., Inc., 129 N.J.L. 525, 533 ( E. A. 1943); 2 Wigmore on Evidence (3 d ed.), sec. 664, p. 777. Cf. Niles v. Phillips Express Co., supra, and Rapp v. Public Service Coordinated Transport, Inc., 15 N.J. Super. 305 ( App. Div. 1951), affirmed 9 N.J. 11 (1952).

  8. Judson v. Peoples Bank Trust Co. of Westfield

    17 N.J. 67 (N.J. 1954)   Cited 892 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Discussing a New Jersey statute providing for contribution where injury or damage is suffered by any person as result of wrongful act, neglect, or default of joint tortfeasors, which indicates legislative policy of allowing contribution even among intentional, including fraudulent, joint wrongdoers

    This would have a stifling effect upon efforts at compromise and settlement, contrary to the policy of our law which strongly favors disposition of disputes by compromise and settlement. Rynar v. LincolnTransit Co., Inc., 129 N.J.L. 525, 528 ( E. A. 1942). If, then, as said by Justice Rutledge, "The problem is to blend the themes of compromise and contribution, maintaining the essential integrity of each as far as possible," McKenna v.Austin, supra, the first alternative is clearly preferable.

  9. Stein v. Schmitz

    137 N.J.L. 725 (N.J. 1948)   Cited 12 times

    The evidence complained of was introduced for that purpose. It was said by Mr. Justice Case in Rynar v. Lincoln TransitCo., Inc., 129 N.J.L. 525, 528: "If the evidence is legal for one purpose but incompetent for another, it will be admitted and the party disadvantageously affected may summon the court's assistance by request to charge or other appropriate means. Perry v. Levy, 87 N.J.L. 670.

  10. Dukett v. Mausness

    546 N.E.2d 1292 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 3 times

    While the question is one of first impression in Indiana, persuasive extra-jurisdictional authority holds that the discharge of an employee apparently at fault in an accident is a remedial measure which should not be admitted into evidence. See Armour and Co. v. Skene (1st Cir. 1907), 153 F. 241 (discharge of driver one year after accident erroneously admitted); Rynar v. Lincoln Transit Co. (1943), 129 N.J.L. 525, 30 A.2d 406 (severance of relationship between driver and bus company improperly admitted into evidence); Engel v. United Traction Co. (1911), 203 N.Y. 321, 96 N.E. 731 (ruling that motorman should state whether or not he was discharged subsequent to the accident was erroneous). Cf. Turner v. Hearst (1896), 115 Cal. 349, 47 P. 129 (in libel case, error to permit plaintiff to prove discharge of reporter; analogous to proof of precaution taken after an accident).