Hudson v. Hudson, 52 Cal.2d 735, 344 P.2d 295 (1959); Sorrells v. Sorrells, 82 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1955); Pope v. Pope, 2 Ill.2d 152, 117 N.E.2d 65 (1954); Miller v. Miller, 200 Iowa 1193, 206 N.W. 262 (1925); Kram v. Kram, 52 N.J. 545, 247 A.2d 316 (1968); Estin v. Estin, 296 N.Y. 308, 73 N.E.2d 113 (1947), aff'd., 334 U.S. 541, 68 S.Ct. 1213, 92 L.Ed. 1561 (1948). Our resolution of this issue in Rhode Island was foreshadowed by this court's decision in Rymanowski v. Rymanowski, 105 R.I. 89, 249 A.2d 407 (1969). There a Massachusetts court had ordered the husband to pay monthly support while at the same time denying his prayer for divorce.
Thus, the sole issue is whether the ex parte Illinois divorce decree was valid and therefore entitled to full faith and credit. See Rymanowski v. Rymanowski, 105 R.I. 89, 93-94, 249 A.2d 407, 409 (1969) (citing Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 63 S.Ct. 207, 87 L.Ed. 279 (1942)). Because it was alleged that the Illinois decree was entered without defendant's having litigated the Illinois Court's jurisdictional basis, he was permitted to have the Rhode Island Family Court determine that issue.
Section 9-19-26 does not violate the equal protection clause. [3,4] In his claim that the Family Court has refused to afford full faith and credit to his Nevada decree, Donald ignores our holding in Rymanowski v. Rymanowski, 105 R.I. 89, 249 A.2d 407. There we repeated the oft-stated rule that, although full faith and credit must be given to an ex parte divorce decree, all states are entitled to determine for themselves the jurisdictional basis upon which the foreign decree is founded and to withhold full faith and credit if not satisfied that the party asserting the foreign divorce was properly domiciled within the divorce-decreeing state at the time the decree was entered.
Rheaume v. Rheaume, 107 R.I. 500, 504, 268 A.2d 437, 440 (1970). See Rymanowski v. Rymanowski, 105 R.I. 89, 94, 249 A.2d 407, 409 (1969). These cases, however, involved ex parte decrees.
Indeed, in the cases which held that the forum would apply its own law, the courts were merely applying well-established majority principles.See KEM Manufacturing Corp. v. Howland, supra, (upholding validity of restrictive covenant); Gaines v. Jacobsen, 308 N.Y. 218, 124 N.E.2d 290 (1954) and Rymanowski v. Rymanowski, 105 R.I. 89, 97, 249 A.2d 407, 412 (1969) (concerning support obligations under divorce decrees). In the case at bar, it is clear that not allowing an employee to bring suit for the entire contract term is by far the minority position โ it is accepted by only 9 states. At least 27 states do allow an employee to bring suit for the entire contract term.
In reviewing plaintiffs' complaint, we have been guided by the ancient equitable maxim that directs us "to look to the substance rather than the form of the right asserted." Rymanowski v. Rymanowski, 105 R.I. 89, 100, 249 A.2d 407, 413 (1969). Very significantly, however, plaintiffs do not claim title to that office.
Such interpretation would create the possibility of retroactive application to thousands of divorce cases either wherein the questions of alimony and support were specifically left open or wherein no decision in regard to alimony was made. Since there is no time limit upon an application for alimony, other than such limitation as might be imposed by the doctrine of laches, see Rymanowski v. Rymanowski, 105 R.I. 89, 100, 249 A.2d 407, 412-13 (1969); Brown v. Brown, 48 R.I. 420, 424, 138 A. 179, 181 (1927); Wilford v. Wilford, 38 R.I. 55, 57, 94 A. 685, 686 (1915), the number of cases to which such a retroactive application might be applied could only be the subject of the merest speculative approximation. We cannot attribute any such retroactive intent to the language used by the Legislature in P.L. 1979, ch. 279, ยง 4. Consequently, we are of the opinion that the trial justice of the Family Court was correct in his interpretation of the word "petition" as being applicable to a petition for divorce that was either pending at the time of the effective date of passage or to be brought thereafter.
We have therefore made no investigation of the law of that state. Rymanowski v. Rymanowski, 105 R.I. 89, 99, 249 A.2d 407, 412 (1969); Potemkin v. Leach, 65 R.I. 1, 8, 13 A.2d 250, 254 (1940). The record discloses that the parties entered into an employment contract on January 23, 1970.
This court has recognized that today's mobile society creates problems for a judicial tribunal such as the Family Court as it attempts to insure compliance with its orders. Rymanowski v. Rymanowski, 105 R.I. 89, 249 A.2d 407 (1969). Thanks to jet propulsion, Ecuador is now but a proverbial hop, skip and jump away from Rhode Island.
The Family Court justice held that since there was no provision for "support" in the Florida judgment, the decision of the Florida court should be considered as a non-suit rather than a final judgment. In Rymanowski v. Rymanowski, 105 R.I. 89, 100-01, 249 A.2d 407, 413 (1969), we said "it makes little difference whether petitioner's claim is designated as one for `support' or `alimony.'" The fact that different courts use different nomenclature is of no legal significance.