Opinion
No. CV-03-4712 (FB).
August 31, 2004
JODIE RYANS, Pro Se, Eastern NY Correctional Facility, Napanoch, NY, for the Petitioner.
CHARLES J. HYNES, ESQ., District Attorney, Kings County, By: SHOLOM J. TWERSKY, ESQ., Brooklyn, NY, for the Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pro se petitioner Jodie Ryans ("Ryans") seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 following his conviction in the New York Supreme Court, Kings County for criminal possession of a weapon. Ryans presents two claims: (1) that he was pursued and arrested in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (2) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Ryans' Fourth Amendment claim was presented to and rejected by the Appellate Division, Second Department, People v. Ryans, 716 N.Y.S.2d 877 (2d Dep't 2001), and was fully exhausted when the New York Court of Appeals declined review, People v. Ryans, 96 N.Y.2d 806 (2000); Ryans' ineffective assistance claim was presented as a New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.10 petition and rejected by the New York Supreme Court, People v. Ryans, No. 5478-98 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. Aug. 5, 2002), and was fully exhausted when the Appellate Division declined review. People v. Ryans, No. 5478-98 (2d Dep't Aug. 12, 2003). For the reasons set forth below, Ryans' petition is denied.
I.
Only federal issues may be raised on habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), when a federal claim has been "adjudicated on the merits" by a state court, the state court's decision is entitled to substantial deference. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). For such claims, habeas relief may not be granted unless the state court decision (1) was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) was "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law "if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth" in Supreme Court precedent or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives" at a different conclusion. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state court decision involves an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law if it unreasonably applies Supreme Court precedent to the particular facts of a case. See id. at 409. This inquiry requires a court to "ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable," not whether the application was erroneous or incorrect. Id. In that respect, the standard to be applied "falls somewhere between merely erroneous and unreasonable to all reasonable jurists." Jones v. Stinson, 229 F.3d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations and quotations omitted). "We caution, however, that the increment [of incorrectness beyond error] need not be great; otherwise, habeas relief would be limited to state court decisions so far off the mark as to suggest judicial incompetence." Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations and quotations omitted).
A. Fourth Amendment Claim
In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Supreme Court held that "where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial." Id. at 494-95. Thus, Stone bars habeas review of claims that evidence seized should have been suppressed as fruit of an illegal arrest. See Pina v. Kuhlmann, 239 F.Supp. 2d 285, 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) ("It is well settled that [Fourth Amendment] claims are not cognizable for habeas corpus review where a State has provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate this issue.").
Following Stone, review of Fourth Amendment claims in habeas petitions is permissible only: "(a) if the state has provided no corrective procedures at all to redress the alleged fourth amendment violations; or (b) if the state has provided a corrective mechanism, but the defendant was precluded from using that mechanism because of an unconscionable breakdown in the underlying process." Capellan v. Riley, 975 F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1992).
New York has a corrective procedure for Fourth Amendment violations, which is facially adequate. See id. at 70 n. 1 ("[F]ederal courts have approved New York's procedure for litigating Fourth Amendment claims . . . as being facially adequate.") (citations omitted). Indeed, Ryans availed himself of this state procedure when he was afforded a Dunaway/Mapp/Huntley hearing in which the circumstances of Ryans' arrest were thoroughly explored upon his motion to suppress evidence. Second, having reviewed the record, the Court concludes that there was no "unconscionable breakdown in the underlying process." Ryans' Fourth Amendment claim for habeas relief, therefore, is barred by Stone.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
Though Ryans does not elaborate on the bases for his ineffective assistance claim, presumably he intends to reiterate the bases that he raised in his prior pro se § 440.10 motion. There, he argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine a police officer at the suppression hearing and trial about (1) conflicting testimony given to the grand jury, and (2) information contained in a report obtained through discovery. In ruling on his motion, the state court held that the claim was both procedurally barred and without merit. Ryans, No. 5478-98, at 3.
In evaluating the merits of Ryans' ineffective assistance claim, the state court correctly invoked the proper two prong standard in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Ryans v. Miller, No. CV-03-4712, at 5 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. Aug. 5, 2002) (citing People v. Henry, 95 N.Y.2d 563 (2000), which sets forth the Strickland standard). Therefore, only if the state court's application of Strickland was "objectively unreasonable" could this Court grant habeas relief.
Under Strickland, a defendant must show that counsel's representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" based on "prevailing professional norms," and that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694. The state court found that Ryans was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel because the discrepancies alleged by Ryans were only minor, if discrepancies at all. The court commented that the minor discrepancies easily could be explained by the fact that the "incident is deemed to have taken no more than two minutes and the testimony reflects that the entire incident occurred in a one-square-block area." Ryans, No. 5478-98, at 4. The Court agrees. Based on the Court's review of the trial record, the Court concludes that the state court's analysis was not "objectively unreasonable."