The only significant distinction between Johnson and this case is that Kennebrew was represented on his motion for new trial not by his trial counsel but by another member of the same public defender's office that represented Kennebrew at trial. The result is the same, however, because counsel, whether retained or appointed, cannot reasonably be expected to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel against himself or any member of his firm or office where one member represents the defendant at trial and the other represents the same defendant on a motion for new trial or on appeal. Ryan v. Thomas, 261 Ga. 661, 662 ( 409 S.E.2d 507) (1991). Accordingly, we hold the trial court erred in addressing the merits of Kennebrew's motion for new trial on the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel without first appointing new counsel.

We have held that the potential for a conflict of interest exists when appellate counsel from the same public defender's office as trial counsel represents a defendant during his motion for new trial proceeding or on direct appeal, because such appellate counsel cannot properly assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel against another member of his own office. See, e.g., Ryan v. Thomas , 261 Ga. 661, 661, 409 S.E.2d 507 (1991). See also Davis v. Turpin , 273 Ga. 244, 248, 539 S.E.2d 129 (2000) ("Counsel prosecuting an ineffective assistance claim must be free to operate independently of the attorney whose performance is in question.").

As such, different attorneys from the same public defender's office are not to be considered ‘new’ counsel for the purpose of raising ineffective assistance claims. Delevan , 345 Ga. App. at 52 (2), 811 S.E.2d 71 ; accord Ryan v. Thomas , 261 Ga. 661, 662, 409 S.E.2d 507 (1991) ; see Kennebrew v. State , 267 Ga. 400, 402 (2), 480 S.E.2d 1 (1996) ("[C]ounsel, whether retained or appointed, cannot reasonably be expected to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel against himself or any member of his firm or office[.]"). Cf. State v. Butler , 301 Ga. 814, 818 n.3, 804 S.E.2d 414 (2017) ("Because [the defendant's] fourth counsel was privately retained and not an attorney in the public defender's office, we do not treat him as one of a succession of attorneys from the same public defender's office, who are not to be considered ‘new’ counsel for the purpose of raising ineffective assistance claims[.]").

Because Butler’s fourth counsel was privately retained and not an attorney in the public defender’s office, we do not treat him as one of “a succession of attorneys from the same public defender’s office,” who “are not to be considered ‘new’ counsel for the purpose of raising ineffective assistance claims under White v. Kelso, supra. ” Ryan v. Thomas, 261 Ga. 661 , 662 (409 SE2d 507 ) (1991).

However, where the same attorney represented the petitioner at trial and on direct appeal, the petitioner may raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for the first time in a habeas corpus proceeding. See Turpin v. Christenson, 269 Ga. 226, 231 ( 497 SE2d 216) (1998); Ryan v. Thomas, 261 Ga. 661, 661 ( 409 SE2d 507) (1991). See also OCGA § 9-14-48 (d) (stating that ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be procedurally barred "in the event the petitioner had new counsel subsequent to trial").

"[D]ifferent attorneys from the same public defender's office are not to be considered `new' counsel for the purpose of raising ineffective assistance claims. . . ." Ryan v. Thomas, 261 Ga. 661, 662 ( 409 SE2d 507) (1991). See also Shadron v. State, supra. "Thus, it must be concluded that this issue is being raised at the first practicable moment.

The record indicates that original trial counsel and counsel who filed the amended motion for new trial were not part of the same firm or public defender's office. See Ryan v. Thomas, 261 Ga. 661 ( 409 SE2d 507) (1991) (counsel cannot be expected to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claim against coworker in same law firm or public defender's office).White v. Kelso, 261 Ga. 32, 32 ( 401 SE2d 733) (1991).

Turpin v. Todd, 268 Ga. 820, 825 (2) (a) ( 493 SE2d 900) (1997). The habeas court reasoned that Phillips could not have asserted in this Court the issue of the delay in the post-trial handling of Mancill's appeal because of "the same policy reason" behind this Court's opinion in Ryan v. Thomas, 261 Ga. 661 ( 409 SE2d 507) (1991). In Ryan, we recognized that one member of a public defender's office could not reasonably be expected to assert or argue the ineffective assistance of a fellow member from the same office.

"[D]ifferent attorneys from the same public defender's office are not to be considered `new' counsel for the purpose of raising ineffective assistance claims. . . ." Ryan v. Thomas, 261 Ga. 661, 662 ( 409 S.E.2d 507) (1991). See also Kennebrew v. State, 267 Ga. 400(2) ( 480 S.E.2d 1) (1996).

Properly raised allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel are routinely addressed by habeas courts in this State, and present a colorable claim for habeas corpus relief. See Ryan v. Thomas, 261 Ga. 661 ( 409 S.E.2d 507) (1991). Accordingly the habeas court's order denying filing of petitioner Hick's petition for habeas corpus relief is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the habeas court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.