Ryan v. Thomas

29 Citing cases

  1. Kennebrew v. State

    267 Ga. 400 (Ga. 1996)   Cited 57 times
    Concluding that a tape-recorded statement was introduced into evidence when the defendant "played the entire recording," even if the "tape-recorded statement was not 'introduced' as it was not marked for identification or formally tendered into evidence"

    The only significant distinction between Johnson and this case is that Kennebrew was represented on his motion for new trial not by his trial counsel but by another member of the same public defender's office that represented Kennebrew at trial. The result is the same, however, because counsel, whether retained or appointed, cannot reasonably be expected to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel against himself or any member of his firm or office where one member represents the defendant at trial and the other represents the same defendant on a motion for new trial or on appeal. Ryan v. Thomas, 261 Ga. 661, 662 ( 409 S.E.2d 507) (1991). Accordingly, we hold the trial court erred in addressing the merits of Kennebrew's motion for new trial on the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel without first appointing new counsel.

  2. Hall v. Jackson

    310 Ga. 714 (Ga. 2021)   Cited 12 times
    Explaining that "remedies for Sixth Amendment violations must neutralize the taint of constitutional violation, while at the same time not grant a windfall to the defendant or needlessly squander the considerable resources the State properly invested in the criminal prosecution"

    We have held that the potential for a conflict of interest exists when appellate counsel from the same public defender's office as trial counsel represents a defendant during his motion for new trial proceeding or on direct appeal, because such appellate counsel cannot properly assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel against another member of his own office. See, e.g., Ryan v. Thomas , 261 Ga. 661, 661, 409 S.E.2d 507 (1991). See also Davis v. Turpin , 273 Ga. 244, 248, 539 S.E.2d 129 (2000) ("Counsel prosecuting an ineffective assistance claim must be free to operate independently of the attorney whose performance is in question.").

  3. Shelton v. State

    350 Ga. App. 774 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019)   Cited 6 times

    As such, different attorneys from the same public defender's office are not to be considered ‘new’ counsel for the purpose of raising ineffective assistance claims. Delevan , 345 Ga. App. at 52 (2), 811 S.E.2d 71 ; accord Ryan v. Thomas , 261 Ga. 661, 662, 409 S.E.2d 507 (1991) ; see Kennebrew v. State , 267 Ga. 400, 402 (2), 480 S.E.2d 1 (1996) ("[C]ounsel, whether retained or appointed, cannot reasonably be expected to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel against himself or any member of his firm or office[.]"). Cf. State v. Butler , 301 Ga. 814, 818 n.3, 804 S.E.2d 414 (2017) ("Because [the defendant's] fourth counsel was privately retained and not an attorney in the public defender's office, we do not treat him as one of a succession of attorneys from the same public defender's office, who are not to be considered ‘new’ counsel for the purpose of raising ineffective assistance claims[.]").

  4. State v. Butler

    301 Ga. 814 (Ga. 2017)

    Because Butler’s fourth counsel was privately retained and not an attorney in the public defender’s office, we do not treat him as one of “a succession of attorneys from the same public defender’s office,” who “are not to be considered ‘new’ counsel for the purpose of raising ineffective assistance claims under White v. Kelso, supra. ” Ryan v. Thomas, 261 Ga. 661 , 662 (409 SE2d 507 ) (1991).

  5. Henderson v. Hames

    287 Ga. 534 (Ga. 2010)   Cited 50 times
    Holding that the habeas court correctly ruled that the defendant’s conviction for felony murder based on misuse of a firearm while hunting must be vacated because his counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to argue that the indictment did not allege an essential element of that crime

    However, where the same attorney represented the petitioner at trial and on direct appeal, the petitioner may raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for the first time in a habeas corpus proceeding. See Turpin v. Christenson, 269 Ga. 226, 231 ( 497 SE2d 216) (1998); Ryan v. Thomas, 261 Ga. 661, 661 ( 409 SE2d 507) (1991). See also OCGA § 9-14-48 (d) (stating that ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be procedurally barred "in the event the petitioner had new counsel subsequent to trial").

  6. Hung v. State

    282 Ga. 684 (Ga. 2007)   Cited 8 times
    Remanding to consider ineffectiveness claims raised on appeal because it was the first opportunity to raise such claims where counsel on motion for new trial and trial counsel were from the same public defender's office

    "[D]ifferent attorneys from the same public defender's office are not to be considered `new' counsel for the purpose of raising ineffective assistance claims. . . ." Ryan v. Thomas, 261 Ga. 661, 662 ( 409 SE2d 507) (1991). See also Shadron v. State, supra. "Thus, it must be concluded that this issue is being raised at the first practicable moment.

  7. Simmons v. State

    281 Ga. 437 (Ga. 2006)   Cited 8 times
    Holding that the defendant waived his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim where appellate counsel did not raise the claim in the amended motion for new trial or address the issue at the motion for new trial hearing

    The record indicates that original trial counsel and counsel who filed the amended motion for new trial were not part of the same firm or public defender's office. See Ryan v. Thomas, 261 Ga. 661 ( 409 SE2d 507) (1991) (counsel cannot be expected to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claim against coworker in same law firm or public defender's office).White v. Kelso, 261 Ga. 32, 32 ( 401 SE2d 733) (1991).

  8. Chatman v. Mancill

    280 Ga. 253 (Ga. 2006)   Cited 64 times
    Determining that constitutional speedy appeal claims in criminal cases in which a death sentence was not imposed should be evaluated by application of the following “modified Barker factors”: length of the delay, reason for the delay, defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice, i.e., whether there was a reasonable probability that, but for the delay, the result of the appeal would have been different

    Turpin v. Todd, 268 Ga. 820, 825 (2) (a) ( 493 SE2d 900) (1997). The habeas court reasoned that Phillips could not have asserted in this Court the issue of the delay in the post-trial handling of Mancill's appeal because of "the same policy reason" behind this Court's opinion in Ryan v. Thomas, 261 Ga. 661 ( 409 SE2d 507) (1991). In Ryan, we recognized that one member of a public defender's office could not reasonably be expected to assert or argue the ineffective assistance of a fellow member from the same office.

  9. Shadron v. State

    275 Ga. 767 (Ga. 2002)   Cited 17 times
    Rejecting defendant's “construction of the jury instruction [which] would require reading it in disjointed portions, without context”; reaffirming that the jury charge must be viewed “as a whole”

    "[D]ifferent attorneys from the same public defender's office are not to be considered `new' counsel for the purpose of raising ineffective assistance claims. . . ." Ryan v. Thomas, 261 Ga. 661, 662 ( 409 S.E.2d 507) (1991). See also Kennebrew v. State, 267 Ga. 400(2) ( 480 S.E.2d 1) (1996).

  10. Hicks v. Scott

    273 Ga. 358 (Ga. 2001)   Cited 11 times
    In Hicks and Capote, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that before a habeas appeal will be dismissed for procedural irregularities, it must be established that the pro se prisoner was informed of the proper appellate procedure.

    Properly raised allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel are routinely addressed by habeas courts in this State, and present a colorable claim for habeas corpus relief. See Ryan v. Thomas, 261 Ga. 661 ( 409 S.E.2d 507) (1991). Accordingly the habeas court's order denying filing of petitioner Hick's petition for habeas corpus relief is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the habeas court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.