Opinion
D069732
04-12-2017
In re the Marriage of JAMIE and PAUL RYAN. JAMIE RYAN, Petitioner and Respondent, v. PAUL RYAN, Respondent and Appellant.
Linda Cianciolo for Respondent and Appellant. Jamie Ryan, in pro. per., for Petitioner and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. DN119331) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Michael D. Washington, Judge. Affirmed. Linda Cianciolo for Respondent and Appellant. Jamie Ryan, in pro. per., for Petitioner and Respondent.
Appellant Paul Ryan (Paul) appeals from a postjudgment order denying his request to modify to zero dollars a stipulated child support obligation payable to his ex-wife, respondent Jamie Ryan (Jamie), regarding their now adult son Matthew. Child support was originally set pursuant to a 2002 marital settlement agreement (MSA) that was incorporated into the judgment in their dissolution action, entered when Matthew was five years old. It provided for child support to continue until further order of the court or until the child reached 18 years of age (or died or became emancipated, neither of which applies); "provided, however, that if such child has attained age eighteen (18), is unmarried, is not self-supporting and is attending high school or college on a full-time basis, said support shall continue until the child is no longer attending high school or college on a full time basis, graduates from college, or attains age twenty-three (23), whichever first occurs." (Italics added; Fam. Code, §§ 3587, 3901, subds. (a)-(b) [child support obligation is extended for a student attending high school or until age 19, and can be further extended by agreement].)
We refer to the parties by their first names as is the custom in family law matters. (In re Marriage of Smith (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 469, 475, fn. 1.)
All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless noted. Section 3587 provides authorization for the court to approve a "stipulated agreement by the parents to pay for the support of an adult child or for the continuation of child support after a child attains the age of 18 years and to make a support order to effectuate the agreement."
In 2015, when Matthew graduated from high school and was about to turn 18, Paul sought declaratory relief that he was entitled to terminate or modify his child support obligation. Paul contended that the MSA provision for support was a contingent one and that the first of several contingencies (child reaches 18), had occurred, wholly terminating his obligation to pay support or educational expenses. The family court interpreted the MSA differently and denied the motion, leaving in place an existing MSA-based child support order for $725 per month.
On appeal, Paul contends the family court abused its discretion or failed to follow applicable legal principles by refusing to terminate support upon the "first terminating event," as prescribed by the MSA, to occur. Paul also assigns error to the court's decision to leave an existing April 2014 support order in place, because it contained an outdated time-share provision, and because the court arguably made a related oral finding that Jamie was retaining "primary physical responsibility" for their adult son. (§ 4055, subd. (b)(1)(D) [child support guideline includes component of time percentage of parents' respective primary physical responsibility for child].) Representing herself on appeal, Jamie defends the ruling in lengthy factual detail.
We view the appeal as presenting basic issues of law which require de novo contractual interpretation of the parties' MSA, in light of statutory provisions governing the permissible duration of parental child and adult support obligations. (In re Marriage of Iberti (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1439 (Iberti) [such MSA documents shall be construed under general contract interpretation rules].) The family court correctly determined that the MSA support provision must be read as a whole, including its "provided, however" clause. In that clause, the parties agreed that an exception to the usual duration of child support would be allowed, to provide continuing adult educational support past the child's attainment of age 18, where certain identified qualifications remain in force. When the first of the identified qualifications has lapsed (child is no longer a full time college student, has graduated or reached the age of 23), the support obligation is properly terminable.
Accordingly, the continuing educational support obligation established by the MSA remains enforceable until Matthew "is no longer attending . . . college on a full time basis, graduates from college, or attains age twenty-three (23), whichever first occurs." (Italics added.) This reading comports with applicable statutory provisions. (§§ 3587, 3901, subd. (b) [child support obligation can be extended by agreement]; Kamper v. Waldon (1941) 17 Cal.2d 718, 720 (Kamper) ["Upon sufficient consideration the parent may agree and be bound to do more than the statute requires, so long as the additional obligation is not contrary to nor inconsistent with the statutory provision."].) We affirm the order.
I
BACKGROUND
A. MSA Support Provision; April 2014 Motion to Modify Amount
In the parties' 2002 dissolution judgment, child support payable by Paul to Jamie was set at $600 per month, based on their respective incomes at the time and a time share of 25 percent for Paul and 75 percent for Jamie. The MSA states in relevant part that such child support "shall continue until the further order of the Court or until said child reaches the age of majority under California law, dies or becomes emancipated; provided, however, that if such child has attained age eighteen (18), is unmarried, is not self-supporting and is attending high school or college on a full-time basis, said support shall continue until the child is no longer attending high school or college on a full time basis, graduates from college, or attains age twenty-three (23), whichever first occurs."
In 2013, Jamie requested that the child support amount be modified, and at a scheduled hearing on April 8, 2014, the parties reached a stipulation to modify the amount upward to $725 per month. The parties were not disputing that their current time share was 65 percent for Jamie and 35 percent for Paul. During the hearing, counsel for Paul indicated that in the future, he might be contesting the MSA provision for child support. The stipulation reached was read into the record, including a provision that "all other orders not in conflict would remain in full force and effect." In the course of accepting the stipulation and making it into an order, the court explained to Jamie, at her request, that the stipulated support amount was not set pursuant to guideline, meaning that it was not computer generated but reached by agreement of the parties. Matthew graduated from high school in June 2015 and at all relevant times has remained unmarried. No showing has been made that he is self-supporting.
B. July-September 2015 Motion Proceedings; October 2015 Ruling
Paul filed a request in July 2015 to obtain declaratory relief that would terminate his child support obligation as of September 5, 2015, when Matthew turned 18 and was anticipating going to college and living in Arizona. A hearing date was set for October 20, 2015. Paul was not seeking to set aside the entire MSA, but to enforce a condition within it through a judicial declaration that his obligation to pay child support would be terminated and superseded when Matthew was no longer a child (over 18 and out of high school). Paul made an ex parte request on September 9, 2015 to require existing support amounts to be paid into an attorney trust account, on the grounds that it should no longer be paid directly to Jamie. The court denied relief as it was not an emergency matter, and the scheduled hearing remained on calendar.
In his points and authorities, Paul relied on Edwards v. Edwards (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 136, 138, 143 (Edwards) to argue that any guideline support calculation became inapplicable to Matthew as an adult child, in part because there was no longer any time-share percentage in effect. Paul argued that the child support order from the MSA would require continuing support only if Matthew continued to live locally with his mother while he attended college, claiming that it "mentions attendance at college only as a precondition for [Jamie] to continue to receive it. It does not state that any specific college costs are to be the subject of support."
In her opposition papers, Jamie argued that she still had primary physical responsibility for Matthew's support, after he turned 18, and therefore sought an order establishing her continuing entitlement to receive support payments in the existing amount. She lodged extensive exhibits with the family court, mainly correspondence between the parties and financial documents about college-related expenses. These documents have been lodged here as well, and we granted her augmentation request to add to the record her responsive papers from the September 9, 2015 ex parte hearing.
On October 20, 2015, the family court heard argument about the effect upon the existing MSA orders from recently developed, undisputed facts, that Matthew was now attending and living at college out of state, and not with either parent. Although the court orally addressed the issue of whether Jamie retains primary physical responsibility for him, its discussion on the record is somewhat inconclusive on the issue. Specifically, the court originally made a finding that Jamie has primary physical responsibility, but then seemed to retreat from that conclusion by saying that support payable for an adult child, as here, is a different situation from support payable for a minor child, who has to be physically overseen every day (e.g., taken to and from school). (DaSilva v. DaSilva (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1030, 1033-1035 [under § 4055 guidelines, burden is on parent who seeks time-share credit for periods that minor child is not physically present in the home (e.g., at school), to show primary responsibility for child during such time].)
The record does not contain a minute order from the hearing. After competing proposed rulings were submitted to the court, the December 4, 2015 written ruling was issued to deny the motion for declaratory relief to terminate child support. The order states, "Although the court finds that [Jamie] has no timeshare with the parties' adult son, the child support will remain on the same terms and conditions as previously ordered by the Court." The order does not contain any express finding on whether Jamie retains primary physical responsibility for Matthew, even though the briefs on appeal seem to claim that it does. (See pt. II.B, post, on scope of order.) Paul appeals.
I
RULES OF REVIEW
A. Contractual and Statutory Interpretation Principles
As the appellant, Paul argues for a modified abuse of discretion standard of review for this child support order, in recognition of the issues of law presented by the required statutory interpretation. (In re Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1150-1152, 1160-1161 (Drake) [statutory scheme permits child support guideline to apply to disabled adult children, including parental time-sharing consideration].) Paul contends that the family court abused its discretion in this case, on the given set of facts, by failing to follow the applicable legal principles as to nondisabled adult children. (In re Marriage of Braud (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 797, 827.)
Although ordinarily, a request to modify a final child support order requires the moving party to show that there were changed circumstances, this is not an ordinary case regarding statutory support for a minor child that is payable according to established guidelines. (In re Marriage of Rosenfeld and Gross (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 478, 490-491 (Rosenfeld).) As a matter of law, the MSA provisions were merged into the terms of the judgment. (See In re Marriage of Corona (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1220-1221.) They are to be construed under the statutory rules governing the interpretations of contracts generally. (Iberti, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1439; Rosenfeld, supra, at pp. 485, 488; In re Marriage of Davis (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1015-1018 (Davis) [MSA interpretation of spousal support rights is a mixed question of law and fact that is predominantly one of law, requiring application of legal principles to the given facts].) Statutory interpretation issues of law arising from the parties' agreement are likewise subject to independent analysis on appeal. (Edwards, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 141.)
In the context of stipulated parental support, the Supreme Court has long recognized: "There is nothing in the law to prevent a parent from contracting to support a child, minor or adult, married or unmarried. And when the agreement . . . is founded upon sufficient consideration, the contractual obligation is not measured by legal duties otherwise imposed. No principle of public policy intervenes to prevent such a contract and the courts have no right by a process of interpretation to release one of the contracting parties from disadvantageous terms actually agreed upon." (Kamper, supra, 17 Cal.2d 718, 721.)
Accordingly, our inquiry should be whether there is anything in the law that should prevent the stipulated adult educational support obligation from being enforced here. The facts are not in dispute. The support provisions in the MSA must be read in conformity with governing statutory principles that regulate parental support for minor and adult children. (Kamper, supra, 17 Cal.2d 718, 720; Drake, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1156-1157 [Legislature has differentiated between "minor" children and "adult" children, as well as disabled adult children].)
Where support responsibilities are being adjudicated for a disabled adult child under section 3910, the trial court is authorized to utilize support guidelines and to credit one parent with "full physical responsibility" in setting an award, even where the adult child lives away from the parents. (Drake, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 1160.) Matthew is not disabled and we need not discuss the separate statutory scheme for support of a disabled indigent adult child. (§ 3910.)
"When, as here, no conflicting extrinsic evidence is offered of an interpretation as to which the language of [an MSA] is reasonably susceptible, and the facts are otherwise undisputed, we apply the unambiguous contract terms to the undisputed facts as a matter of law." (Iberti, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1439.) " 'Under statutory rules of contract interpretation, the mutual intention of the parties at the time the contract is formed governs [its] interpretation. [Citation.] Such intent is to be inferred, if possible, solely from the written provisions of the contract.' " (Davis, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1018.)
B. Scope of Order; "Primary Physical Responsibility" Issue
Before addressing Paul's claims about the enforceability of the MSA terms in light of statutory provisions, it is first necessary to outline the nature and effective scope of the December 4, 2015 ruling to deny the motion for declaratory relief to terminate child support. At the October 20, 2015 hearing, the court discussed with the parties whether Jamie retained "primary physical responsibility" for Matthew, within the meaning of child support guidelines applicable to minor children. Later, the parties filed competing versions of the proposed order. Ultimately, the court omitted any express findings about primary physical responsibility from the December 4, 2015 written order. The court stated that "[a]lthough the court finds that [Jamie] has no timeshare with the parties' adult son, the child support will remain on the same terms and conditions as previously ordered by the Court."
Under section 4055, subdivision (b)(1)(D), child support guidelines include a component of a time-share percentage of the parents' respective primary physical responsibility for a minor child. In calculating the section 4055 guideline amount, the guideline formula takes into account "physical responsibility," not "physical custody." (In re Marriage of Schopfer (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 524, 533-534 (Schopfer).)
Paul attacks the order by referring to the colloquy in the reporter's transcript about who has primary physical responsibility for Matthew. As acknowledged in Drake, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1170, the trial court's oral ruling on a motion becomes effective when filed in writing with the clerk or entered in the minutes. "Accordingly, the trial court may properly file a written order differing from its oral rulings when the rulings have not been entered in the minutes of the court." (Ibid.)
The record before us requires us to construe the written order as the effective one, and it makes a finding that there is no time share in effect for this adult child. (See People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599 [when the record is in conflict and cannot be harmonized, " 'that part of the record will prevail, which, because of its origin and nature or otherwise, is entitled to greater credence.' "]; People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 768 [written order prevails over reporter's transcript under some circumstances].)
We accordingly construe the written order in view of the undisputed facts established as of the time of the hearing, which were that Matthew was living elsewhere while attending college, and no time-share factor was being applied. The family court's discussion at the hearing of primary physical responsibility for a minor child, as compared to an adult child, does not itself undermine the validity of the order. We turn to Paul's other contentions that the trial court's interpretation of the MSA was somehow contrary to statute.
III
DURATION OF SUPPORT UNDER MSA
Paul contends that a correct reading of the MSA would have established that his child support obligation expired when the first terminating event identified in the MSA occurred, such as when Matthew turned 18 after graduating from high school. Paul further contends that the current order erroneously incorporated a prior child support ruling that included a time-share arrangement that has now expired, since Matthew is no longer a minor.
A. Bases For Enforcement of MSA Support Clause
In Rosenfeld, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th 478, 487-488, the appellate court exhaustively analyzed different principles on the enforcement of MSA support provisions regarding minor or adult children. The specific questions presented in Rosenfeld at page 482 were jurisdictional and therefore somewhat different from the interpretive questions we face here. However, its statement of the underlying contractual and statutory framework is instructive. With respect to minor children (or disabled adult children), the family court's authority to order support for minor or disabled children "derives from the parents' law-imposed duty to support children until adulthood under sections 3900 and 3901, or the authority to order support for an incapacitated adult child, which derives from the parents' law-imposed duty to 'maintain . . . a child of whatever age who is incapacitated from earning a living and without sufficient means' under section 3910." (Rosenfeld, supra, at p. 487.) As such, an agreement concerning a minor child's support is always modifiable, because the parties cannot contract away the court's continuing authority to enforce child support statutes. (Rosenfeld, supra, at pp. 486-487.) Under sections 3585 and 3651, a minor or disabled child support provision of an MSA is "severable," and its implementing order is imposed by law, "such that it remains subject to the court's continuing jurisdiction to modify." (Rosenfeld, supra, at pp. 486-488.)
Section 3585 provides, "The provisions of an agreement between the parents for child support shall be deemed to be separate and severable from all other provisions of the agreement relating to property and support of either spouse. An order for child support based on the agreement shall be imposed by law and shall be made under the power of the court to order child support."
However, a different view has been developed on the extent of allowable modifications to an MSA support provision regarding adult children who are not disabled. As set forth in Rosenfeld, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th 478, "the court's authority to order adult child support under section 3587 derives entirely from the parents' agreement to pay such support. Because the court's authority is rooted in the parents' contractual agreement, it follows that the parents' agreement also may restrict the court's authority to modify an order for adult child support made under section 3587." (Rosenfeld, supra, at p. 487.) The court reached these conclusions by interpreting the relationship of the various statutes allowing parents to agree to provide for adult child support (e.g., §§ 3587, 3651). (Rosenfeld, supra, at pp. 486-488.) After this lengthy analysis, the court in Rosenfeld, supra, at pages 483 and 486 through 489 decided there was no such express parental agreement that restricted modification of adult child support, so the trial court was not deprived of jurisdiction to consider modifying the contractual support provision, and further proceedings were required.
In our case, there is no dispute that the family court retained jurisdiction to order continuing support for an adult child. We are instead required to decide whether the family court properly interpreted the particular MSA provisions in this case, in light of governing statutory law, to require continued payment of adult educational support.
B. Contractual Interpretation of MSA Contingency Clause
1. Terms and Contentions
According to Paul, the MSA provision for continuation of child support past age 18 contains numerous possible conditions that may terminate his obligation to pay support, and he identifies the first such condition occurring as Matthew's attaining the age of 18. Paul argues: " 'Whichever first occurs' isn't suggesting that you can actively choose which condition to apply, but that child support ends as soon as one of the alternative conditions occurs. Here, the first alternative condition that happened was Matthew graduated from high school and turned 18. At the time of the hearing in October 2015, Matthew was a freshman [living at an Arizona university]."
The MSA terms must be examined for their contractual effect. A contract may state an express condition, the effect of which is determined by the intention of the parties as disclosed in the agreement. (1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Contracts § 777, p. 867.) "A condition is a fact, the happening or nonhappening of which creates (condition precedent) or extinguishes (condition subsequent) a duty on the part of the promisor. If the promisor makes an absolute or unconditional promise, he or she is bound to perform when the time arrives; but if the promisor makes a conditional promise, he or she is bound to perform only if the condition precedent occurs, or is relieved from the duty if the condition subsequent occurs. The condition may be the happening of an event, or an act of a party." (Id., § 776, p. 866.) "The words 'provided' and 'upon the condition' are appropriate methods of stating express conditions, but they do not necessarily have this effect, where the intention of the parties, gathered from the whole instrument, is otherwise." (Id., § 777, p. 867.)
"A condition subsequent is one referring to a future event, upon the happening of which the obligation of the other party ceases. [Citations.] This type of condition is unusual, and frequently a condition subsequent in form may be interpreted as precedent in fact." (1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Contracts, § 793, p. 884, citing to Civ. Code, § 1438.) --------
Our preliminary reading of the MSA is that it imposes a support obligation for an adult child, under certain conditions. The MSA support clause has three components: (a) the standard pre-18 child support provision, (b) a "provided, however" exception that provides for continued adult educational support; and (c) a continuing qualification condition that enunciates several potential terminating events and contains the disputed language, "whichever first occurs." This two-part "provided, however" educational support exception within the MSA support provision must be read together to distinguish between the various events identified, to determine the applicability of the "whichever first occurs" language. The intent of the parties in the educational support exception was evidently to allow for the continuation of support past age 18 for educational purposes, so long as the adult child continues to qualify by meeting the specified conditions. (Civ. Code, § 1436 ["A condition precedent is one which is to be performed before some right dependent thereon accrues, or some act dependent thereon is performed."].) Matthew must qualify for continuing educational support by remaining in full time college attendance before graduation, up until the age of 23. Should he fail to meet these conditions, Paul will be relieved from the duty of paying continuing educational support.
2. Effect of Incorporation of Previous Order Regarding Time-Share
As outlined above, we have rejected Paul's position that the family court relied on a current finding of parental primary physical responsibility for this adult child. (Pt. II.B, ante.) The family court also declined to utilize a time-share consideration in its ruling, except to the extent that the previous April 2014 order was continued in force. Paul nevertheless argues that the order is reversible simply because it adheres to the same terms and conditions for child support as previously ordered in April 2014, at a time when Matthew was under 18 and there was a time share in effect.
It is true that the previous order included a time-share allocation made pursuant to guideline principles, under section 4055. However, Paul cannot show that the current family court order included a time-share component, when the court expressly rejected one. The amount of child support was established in April 2014 pursuant to a stipulation for a nonguideline amount, $725 per month. The previous order that interpreted the MSA was not founded on a guideline calculation applicable only to a minor child, but rather on contract principles.
In construing the current order, we take some guidance from section 3585, which provides that child support agreements are severable from spousal support or property agreements. (See Rosenfeld, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th 478, 488-489 [utilizing modification principles from the spousal support context for a child support issue]; fn. 4, ante.) A proper reading of the previous support ruling allows its support amount to be enforced under contract principles, independent of any outdated time-share considerations. The family court's decision to carry over the established terms of support into the current proceeding was not procedurally incorrect. We next examine the merits of the order denying the declaratory relief request to make a contractual interpretation as Paul requested.
3. MSA Is Not Contrary to Statute Regarding a Guideline Component
Paul claims the denial of his motion was equivalent to imposing a guideline formula on him pursuant to section 4055, and further, that enforcement of it would be unjust or inappropriate. (§ 4057, subd. (b)(5).) He points out that the court in Edwards, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at pages 138 through 139 found to be unenforceable a comparable MSA clause that extended child support beyond the age of majority. Paul says the essential issue in Edwards was "whether guideline child support is applicable to a competent adult child who has moved away to college." (Italics added.)
In Edwards, the first portion of the parties' support agreement provided for "extended child support," as follows: " 'Subject to the power of the court to modify the same, [the father Oscar] shall pay to [Sharon] as and for child support . . . and shall continue for the Minor child until further order of this court or until he marries, dies, becomes self-supporting, emancipated, reaches the age of 25, or completes 4 years of post-secondary education, whichever occurs first." (Edwards, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 138.) In a prior nonpublished appeal in Edwards, the court upheld a trial court decision that denied the father's motion to terminate child support, because there was a stipulated judgment to pay child support to age 25 and he could not then challenge the validity of the judgment. However, the father was allowed to seek a modification of support based on an alleged change of circumstances, giving rise to the published appeal. (Id. at p. 139.)
In Edwards, the appellate court interpreted a related "educational support provision" in the parties' MSA, which, in addition to their provision for "extended child support," stated: "In addition, during the term of the support obligation for Minor Child, the parties shall equally share in the entire cost of books, tuition [etc.] for the Minor Child if he attends an accredited college, university, or private school. Such obligation shall end for the Minor Child either upon completion of four years of post-secondary schooling or at age 25, whichever comes first." (Edwards, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at pp. 138-139; some italics omitted.) The appellate court determined that "[i]n this fact situation," there was no support in the record for the trial court's finding that the mother retained "primary physical responsibility" for the adult, self-supporting son for any percentage of time, within the meaning of section 4055, subdivision (b)(1)(D). The court's determination seems to include an implied finding that the term of the support obligation ceased once the son became self-supporting on a full scholarship, within the meaning of that related "extended child support" clause. (Edwards, supra, at pp. 138, 140.) The court thus concluded that the guideline formula, by its terms, was inapplicable to a competent, self-supporting adult child, and further, that application of the guideline formula "would be unjust or inappropriate" due to the particular circumstances of this case. (§ 4057, subd. (b)(5); Edwards, supra, at p. 144.)
In reaching its conclusions, the court in Edwards, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th 136, 138-139, 144 chiefly relied on the fact that the adult son was self-supporting and did not live with either parent. A separate MSA educational support provision in that case applied and remained in effect only "during the term of the support obligation for Minor Child." (Id. at p. 139.) The appellate court was utilizing a changed circumstances analysis, and determined that once the adult son reached 18 and was self-supporting, "there is nothing in the record to show that Oscar Jr. is anything but a competent adult." (Id. at p. 144.) Since neither parent had physical responsibility, no factual basis remained to require the payment of guideline child support. (Id. at p. 144.)
Paul seeks to extend the reasoning of Edwards, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th 136 to his case. He argues that there was a change of circumstances because Matthew reached age 18 and is a full time adult student in college, under the age of 23. No parent has primary physical responsibility for him and Paul argues there is no longer any basis for any support order that is a guideline amount. This claim does not withstand scrutiny, when the terms of the MSA are taken into account. Nothing in section 3901, subdivision (a) (usual duration of support) limits "a parent's ability to agree to provide additional support or the court's power to inquire whether such an agreement has been made." (§ 3901, subd. (b).) As stated by a commentator, termination of support is not "keyed to the age of majority where the order is based on the parents' agreement to support adult children. [¶] The court is expressly empowered to approve the parents' stipulated agreement to pay for the support of an adult child (or to continue a minor child's support after age of majority) and to 'make a support order to effectuate the agreement.' [§ 3587.] In such event, the parents' liability continues per the terms of the order (i.e., as provided in their underlying agreement)." (Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide, Family Law (The Rutter Group 2016) § 6:705, p. 6-379; Rosenfeld, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th 478, 487 [family court's authority is rooted in the parents' contractual agreement].)
As outlined above (pt. III.A.1, ante), we read the educational support exception as including a separate qualification condition, requiring the adult child to continue to qualify for support by meeting the specified conditions (remaining in college full time until graduation or until age 23). We disagree with Paul that the disputed "whichever first occurs" language can refer to the educational support exception, without regard to the follow-up qualification condition. The disputed "whichever first occurs" language properly refers only to its immediately preceding "continuing qualification" condition, which enunciates terminating events applicable to the continuing educational support exception. Paul remains obligated by the MSA to continue to pay the extended educational support expenses until such time as Matthew no longer qualifies for them, for one of the specified reasons, "whichever first occurs." This reading is consistent with the terms of section 3901, subdivision (b), as outlined above. It also comports with the statutory authority under section 3587 that allows parents to stipulate to pay "for the support of an adult child or for the continuation of child support after a child attains the age of 18 years."
We think the manner in which the support clause is worded and punctuated shows that the contingency, "whichever first occurs," applies only to the latter, continuing qualification condition within the continuing educational support exception. This extended support obligation will remain in force until the first of a terminating event occurs, which is identified as leaving or graduating from college, or reaching age 23. The "whichever first occurs" terminology does not properly refer back to the basic support obligation or to the educational support exception period, but instead, refers only to the qualification terminating events. That terminology immediately follows the enumerated qualification conditions. It is not a reasonable reading of the entire provision to interpret its final "whichever first occurs" terminology as applicable to anything but the final qualification conditions, which may someday fail in some sequence and operate to terminate Paul's continued educational support obligation.
The court in Schopfer, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th 524, applied the analysis of Edwards, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th 136, to conclude the trial court did not err in continuing the father's guideline support order until the child graduated from high school. Although she was attending boarding high school, her stepfather who was receiving the support payments was still primarily responsible for her well-being, and it was still possible to take time share into account under those circumstances. (Schopfer, supra, at p. 533.) But here, there is no guideline amount in force. Instead, there is an enforceable stipulation to pay continuing adult educational support in a nonguideline amount, until the first of the specified qualification conditions is not met. The record does not show that any of those relevant terminating events had occurred (Matthew reaching age 23 or leaving or graduating college). The rationale of Edwards about the end of guideline support eligibility is not controlling here. The continuing support exception amounts are properly payable directly to Jamie, according to the MSA terms, and such funds are specified to be used only for his support purposes.
4. MSA Is Not Contrary to Statute Regarding a Support-Ending Contingency
From the MSA's language, Paul reads in a statutory support-ending contingency, that once Matthew turned 18, any contractual support obligation terminated by operation of law. Under section 4007, a child support order may contain "a support-ending contingency," discussed in Drake, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1163-1164 as follows: "[I]n cases involving minor children, it is settled that, absent the occurrence of a support-ending contingency cited in the pertinent child support order, such 'support survives the death of the noncustodial parent and becomes a charge on his or her estate.' "
Subdivision (a) of section 4007 provides, "If a court orders a person to make specified payments for support of a child during the child's minority, or until the child is married or otherwise emancipated, or until the death of, or the occurrence of a specified event as to, a child for whom support is authorized under Section 3901 or 3910, the obligation of the person ordered to pay support terminates on the happening of the contingency. The court may, in the original order for support, order the custodial parent or other person to whom payments are to be made to notify the person ordered to make the payments, or the person's attorney of record, of the happening of the contingency." (Italics added.)
Under section 4007, subdivision (b), "[If the payee fails to comply], and continues to accept support payments, the person shall refund all monies that accrued after the happening of the contingency, except that the overpayments must first be applied to any support payments that are then in default." The purpose of this section appears to be keeping the parties informed of the operative facts about the support obligation. (See 10 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Parent & Child, § 424, pp. 530-531.) This purpose has no application here, and section 4007 did not operate to terminate the MSA support obligation, where it was otherwise contractually authorized, so long as the adult child continues to qualify for its coverage (attending college full time before graduation and while under the age of 23).
In light of the above analyses, we need not reach Jamie's lengthy substantial evidence arguments that attempt to defend nonexistent court findings that an existing time-share arrangement still remains in effect, and/or that findings were made under section 4055, continuing to place on her the primary physical responsibility for this adult child. We do not interpret the challenged order as including any erroneous statutory findings, and uphold its provisions as contractually authorized.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the motion for declaratory relief is affirmed. Costs on appeal to Respondent.
/s/_________
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
NARES, J. /s/_________
AARON, J.