Case law indicates that although the power of sequestration has been exercised most often for nonpayment of maintenance where the defendant has been cited for contempt ( Rochford; Factor v. Factor (1975), 27 Ill. App.3d 594, 327 N.E.2d 396; Wightman v. Wightman (1867), 45 Ill. 167), a contempt finding is not a prerequisite. ( Ryan v. Ryan (1978), 56 Ill. App.3d 483, 371 N.E.2d 1199.) What does appear to be necessary is merely a finding that a valid judgment of dissolution is in existence, and defendant has failed to comply with its orders regarding payment of maintenance and child support.

( Victor v. Victor.) Respondent's charge that the order reaches property held by persons not subject to the court's jurisdiction is also unavailing inasmuch as sequestration runs against the property of a contumacious defendant and is a proceeding in rem. Manning v. Mercantile Securities Co.; Ryan v. Ryan (1978), 56 Ill. App.3d 483, 371 N.E.2d 1199. • 26 Finally we disagree with respondent's contention that the sequestration order ceased to have any force and effect because the judgment of dissolution subsequently entered did not contain an appointment of a sequestrator.