John A. Berkey, for appellant. Cited: Stark v. Shupp, 112 Pa. 395; Kramer v. Slattery, 73 Pa. Super. 361; Grakelow v. Nash, 98 Pa. Super. 321. Joseph Levy, for appellee. Cited: Ryan v. Bruhin, 88 Pa. Super. 61; Christ v. Fleger, 13 Pa. D. C. 169; Mankin v. Painy, 70 Pa. Super. 558; Harrison v. Welsh, 295 Pa. 501. Argued April 12, 1932.
C. A. Blass, of Craig Blass, for appellant. — It is the contention of counsel for defendant that the Act of May 21, 1913, P. L. 285, as amended by the Act of June 1, 1915, P. L. 660, abolished the distinction existing prior thereto between "unseated" and "seated" lands, in the method of collection of delinquent taxes and sale for nonpayment thereof: Peters v. Heasley, 10 Watts 208. Assuming the land in question was "unseated" land at the time of assessment, levy and tax sale, under the Act of June 1, 1915, abolishing the distinction in the procedure in tax sales between "seated" and "unseated" lands, this sale was governed by the Act of April 3, 1804, P. L. 517, and March 13, 1815, P. L. 299, above referred to, and the effect of the sale passes a good title, and the question as to whether a demand for payment of the tax was made upon the owner cannot be raised or considered as affecting the title of the purchaser at the tax sale: Ryan v. Bruhin, 88 Pa. Super. 61; Odegard v. Albert, 3 N.W. Rep. 526. The word "town" is generic and includes cities: Milton Road, 40 Pa. 300.
Nonetheless, that presumption is rebuttable. Although the pleadings raise disputed issues of fact regarding irregularities in the assessment process, the critical question is whether such irregularities in the assessment would, as a matter of law, render the tax sale void and legally insufficient to convey title to the oil and gas. If the answer is in the affirmative, judgment on the pleadings would not be proper. If such irregularities only rendered the sale voidable within the period for challenging the tax sale, a time that has long since expired, they would not provide a basis to deny judgment on the pleadings. SeeRyan v. Bruhin , 88 Pa.Super. 61, 67 (Pa.Super. 1926) ("The Act of March 13, 1815 (sec. 4) is explicit in providing that ‘no alleged irregularity in the assessment, or in the process or otherwise, shall be construed or taken to affect the title of the purchaser, but the same shall be declared to be good and legal.’ ").In granting partial judgment on the pleadings, the trial court relied upon Poffenberger v. Goldstein , 776 A.2d 1037 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2001), for the proposition that a six-year statute of limitations barred Trustees from collaterally attacking the validity of the 1932 tax sale.
Nonetheless, that presumption is rebuttable. Although the pleadings raise disputed issues of fact regarding irregularities in the assessment process, the critical question is whether such irregularities in the assessment would, as a matter of law, render the tax sale void and legally insufficient to convey title to the oil and gas. If the answer is in the affirmative, judgment on the pleadings would not be proper. If such irregularities only rendered the sale voidable within the period for challenging the tax sale, a time that has long since expired, they would not provide a basis to deny judgment on the pleadings. See Ryan v. Bruhin, 88 Pa. Super. 61, 67 (Pa.Super. 1926) ("The Act of March 13, 1815 (sec. 4) is explicit in providing that 'no alleged irregularity in the assessment, or in the process or otherwise, shall be construed or taken to affect the title of the purchaser, but the same shall be declared to be good and legal.'"). In granting partial judgment on the pleadings, the trial court relied upon Poffenberger v. Goldstein, 776 A.2d 1037 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2014), for the proposition that a six-year statute of limitations barred Trustees from collaterally attacking the validity of the 1932 tax sale.
This Court said in Brew v. Sharer, 42 Pa. Super. 89, that the Act of July 8, 1885, P.L. 268, 72 P. S. § 6111 et seq., applied to unseated lands and repealed the Act of March 13, 1815, and that therefore the Act of May 9, 1889, P.L. 141, § 1, 72 P. S. § 6113, which amended section three of the Act of 1885 reduced the period of redemption of unseated lands purchased by the commissioners to two years. This case was cited with apparent approval in Sugden v. Rothschild, 304 Pa. 365, 155 A 864, which decided that a county treasurer was without authority to sell property for delinquent city taxes assessed against it. The continued vitality of parts, at least of the Act of 1815 has been recognized, since Brew v. Sharer, supra, in Long v. Phillips, 241 Pa. 246, 88 A. 437; Ellis v. Houseknecht, 57 Pa. Super. 55; Ryan v. Bruhin, 88 Pa. Super. 61; O'Hay v. Tormey, 98 Pa. Super. 237; Carns v. Matthews, 114 Pa. Super. 528, 174 A. 840; and Andrews Land Corp's. Appeal, 149 Pa. Super. 212, 27 A.2d 700. The legislature also has recently recognized the existence of the Act of 1815 by amending it by the Act of April 13, 1933, P.L. 34, § 1, 72 P. S. § 6043, and by the Act of July 12, 1935, P.L. 663, § 1, 72 P. S. § 6091, 6093. The sweeping language used in Brew v. Sharer, supra, was not necessary to the decision of that case, as the only question raised on the appeal related to the right of redemption, and section nine of the Act of 1815, pertaining to the form and method of acknowledgment of treasurer's deeds, was neither involved nor discussed.
The situation is, however, sufficiently analogous to be controlled by the principles set forth in the cases involving sheriff's sales of real estate under an ordinary judgment. In an ejectment action or an equity proceeding all the facts may be presented, the rights of the parties strictly guarded, and the controversial issues determined so that the appellant is not without a remedy if his rights have been infringed upon. For the substantive law applicable to an action of ejectment by a former owner of land claiming right of possession against the purchaser at the tax sale see the comprehensive opinion of Judge KELLER (now President Judge) in Ryan v. Bruhin, 88 Pa. Super. 61. The order of the court below is affirmed.
ctors of any school district shall have taken any action, performed any duty or exercised any power, which by law required the affirmative vote of a majority, or greater proportion, of all the members of the board of school directors, and which by law was required to be recorded so as to show how each member of the board voted thereon — if such action or vote was actually taken, or duty performed, or power exercised by the board as required by law, the same shall be deemed and is hereby made valid and legal to all intents and purposes, notwithstanding the fact that the secretary of the school board, or the board, did not actually record on the minutes of the board the vote showing how each member voted as required by law." If any irregularity did occur in the assessment of any of said taxes for the years in question, such irregularity was cured under the Act of March 13, 1815, 6 Smith L. 299; Cuttle v. Brockway, 24 Pa. 145; Stewart v. Trevor, 56 Pa. 374; Heft v. Gephart, 65 Pa. 510; Ryan v. Bruhin, 88 Pa. Super. 61. The Act of 1815 provides: "Irregularities in tax assessments or in process, or otherwise, shall not affect the title of a purchaser at a tax sale." Under the stipulation, supra, there admittedly being a valid levy of tax, the first, second and third assignments of error must be overruled.
Israel Krohn, for appellant. — It is not required to allege matters of evidence in a pleading: Stark v. Shupp, 112 Pa. 395; Brown v. Gourley, 214 Pa. 154; Brankin v. Philadelphia etc. R.R. Co., 286 Pa. 331; Smith v. Miller et al., 289 Pa. 184. Calvin F. Smith, of Smith Paff, for appellee. — The pleadings were defective and insufficient: Simpson v. Meyers, 197 Pa. 522; Kramer v. Slattery, 73 Pa. Super. 361; Norris v. Delaware, Lackawanna Western R.R. Co., 218 Pa. 88; Weaver v. Meadville Lumber Mfg. Co., 61 Pa. Super. 167; Ryan v. Bruhin, 88 Pa. Super. 61; Pomfret Realty Company v. Hochman et al., 21 Northampton 294; Weaver v. Williams, 14 Northampton 302; Westcott v. Crawford, 210 Pa. 256. Argued December 10, 1929.
We first inquire what was the law concerning county treasurer's tax-sale deeds immediately prior to the Act of 1911 in the respect now involved. That inquiry of course takes us to the Act of April 3, 1804, 4 Sm. L. 201, and supplementary legislation and decisions under it (see Ryan v. Bruhin, 88 Pa. Super. 61). Section 2 required that the treasurer's deed be acknowledged in open court; that requirement still exists, and as the acknowledgment of such deed is a judicial act, it is necessary that the court make some record of the fact; the making of such record is inherent in the work of the court. It has never been questioned that a court must keep records of its judicial acts (compare Dougherty v. Com., 69 Pa. 286). Such records import verity and serve many purposes.