Ryan v. Bruenger M. Trucking

5 Citing cases

  1. Schultz ex rel. Schultz v. Pojoaque Tribal Police Dep't

    484 P.3d 954 (N.M. 2013)   Cited 8 times
    Explaining that "when the Legislature includes a particular word in one portion of a statute and omits it from another portion of that statute, such omission is presumed to be intentional"

    (10th Cir. 1957) (considering employee's argument that employer's conduct tolled the statute of limitations under previous codification of Section 52-1-36 ); Stasey v. Stasey , 77 N.M. 436, 439-40, 423 P.2d 869, 871-72 (1967) (recognizing that "[t]his section of our statutes provides the only reason or excuse for tolling or extending the time within which suit must be filed" under the Act); Lucero , 60 N.M. at 269, 291 P.2d at 310 (determining whether what is now codified as Section 52-1-36 tolled the one-year limitations period in which to file a workers’ compensation complaint); Hutcherson v. Dawn Trucking Co., 107 N.M. 358, 360, 758 P.2d 308, 310 (Ct. App. 1988) (recognizing that Section 52-1-36 functions as a tolling statute); Howie v. Stevens , 102 N.M. 300, 305, 694 P.2d 1365, 1370 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing Section 52-1-36 and stating that "[m]isrepresentation that the employee will receive benefits remains the only reason the workmen's compensation limitation period is tolled"); Ryan v. Bruenger M. Trucking , 100 N.M. 15, 17, 665 P.2d 277, 279 (Ct. App. 1983) (describing Section 52-1-36 as containing a tolling provision); Saenz v. McCormick Constr. Co. , 95 N.M. 609, 610, 624 P.2d 551, 552 (Ct. App. 1981) (describing Section 52-1-36 as a "tolling provision"), holding modified on other grounds by Ryan , 100 N.M. at 17, 665 P.2d at 279 ; Owens v. Eddie Lu's Fine Apparel , 95 N.M. 176, 178, 619 P.2d 852, 854 (Ct. App. 1980) (stating that "52-1-36 ... is a tolling provision"), abrogation recognized on other grounds in Schultz , 2012-NMCA-015, ¶ 26, 269 P.3d 14. {28} Although our courts have used the term "tolling" to describe Section 52-1-36, this Court's seminal opinion interpreted Section 52-1-36 differently—without the limitations of tolling.

  2. Robert Burton Ass. v. Morris

    999 So. 2d 927 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007)   Cited 4 times

    New Mexico also follows a version of the Auslander rule, holding that whether payments of compensation from another state toll the statute of limitations depends on whether the worker was reasonably led to believe that in-state benefits would nevertheless be paid. See Ryan v. Bruenger M. Trucking, 100 N.M. 15, 17, 665 P.2d 277, 278 (1983) (citing Reed v. Fish Eng'g Corp., 74 N.M. 45, 390 P.2d 283 (1964)). Based on the foregoing reasoning and authority, we reject the employer's contention that the language of § 25-5-80 absolutely precludes the receipt of out-of-state benefits from ever tolling the Alabama statute of limitations.

  3. Montoya v. Kirk-Mayer, Inc.

    120 N.M. 550 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 4 times
    Holding that disputed factual issue existed as to whether claimant knew, or by exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known prior to running of statute of limitations existence of compensable claim

    Where evidence exists from which different inferences may be drawn concerning when the worker knew or should have known that he had suffered a disability at an earlier date and where the employer failed or refused to pay further compensation benefits, determination of when the worker first knew of the existence of his disability cannot be decided as a matter of law. See Trujillo v. Treat, 107 N.M. 58, 59-60, 752 P.2d 250, 251-52 (Ct.App. 1988) (even where basic facts are undisputed, if equally logical but conflicting inferences can be drawn, summary judgment is improper); National Excess Ins. Co. v. Bingham, 106 N.M. 325, 328, 742 P.2d 537, 540 (Ct.App. 1987) (same); cf. Ryan v. Bruenger M. Trucking, 100 N.M. 15, 17, 665 P.2d 277, 279 (Ct.App.) (whether worker was reasonably led to believe compensation would be paid so as to toll statute of limitations is factual question that can be decided on summary judgment only when the material facts are not in dispute), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 53, 665 P.2d 809 (1983). 16.

  4. Ranville v. J.T.S. Enterprises, Inc.

    101 N.M. 803 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 9 times

    The appeal having been successful, defendants are to pay the $20 docket fee to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals, and are to pay to the Clerk of the District Court $46.75 for the cost of the record, and any charges of that Clerk for duplication of tapes. Gantt v. L G Air Conditioning, 101 N.M. 208, 680 P.2d 348 (Ct.App. 1983); Ryan v. Bruenger M. Trucking, 100 N.M. 15, 665 P.2d 277 (Ct.App. 1983). IT IS SO ORDERED.

  5. Beckham v. Estate of Brown

    100 N.M. 1 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 10 times
    In Beckham v Estate of Brown, 100 N.M. 1; 664 P.2d 1014 (1983), cert quashed 100 N.M. 192; 668 P.2d 308 (1983), the decedent was killed in a plane crash during a trip that was given as a prize by the decedent's employer following a sales contest.

    In addition, Basin is to pay for the cost of the record on appeal, either by reimbursement to Beckham or directly to the clerk of the district court. Ryan v. Bruenger M. Trucking, 100 N.M. 15, 665 P.2d 277 (Ct.App.) (1983). Cause No. 7037