Opinion
24A-JV-1687
11-25-2024
R.W., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ERNEST P. GALOS PUBLIC DEFENDER SOUTH BEND, INDIANA ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA KATHY BRADLEY DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the St. Joseph Probate Court The Honorable Graham C. Polando, Magistrate Trial Court Cause Nos. 71J01-2405-JD-156 71J01-2202-JD-61
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ERNEST P. GALOS PUBLIC DEFENDER SOUTH BEND, INDIANA
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA KATHY BRADLEY DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
MEMORANDUM DECISION
WEISSMANN, JUDGE.
[¶1] Fifteen-year-old R.W. was committed to the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC) after being adjudicated a delinquent for acts that would constitute Level 6 felony auto theft if committed by an adult. On appeal, R.W. argues that his best interests would be better served by a less restrictive placement. The record, however, reveals that R.W. absconded while placed at a residential facility for a prior delinquency adjudication. He also committed the acts underlying this second delinquency adjudication while on probation for the first. And despite a prior DOC commitment, R.W.'s disobedience and misbehavior continue. We affirm the trial court's commitment of R.W. to DOC.
Facts
[¶2] R.W. was the subject of seven delinquency referrals in a six-year span. He was first adjudicated a delinquent at age 13 after he admitted to acts that would constitute Class A misdemeanor theft if committed by an adult. The juvenile court placed R.W. at Hillcrest Academy, an out-of-state residential facility with behavioral programming. But R.W.'s "ability and motivation to participate in treatment [at Hillcrest] were variable." App. Vol. II, p. 36. "[He] complied with behavior contracts when given adequate incentives and support," but he also engaged in "aggressive and/or violent behaviors." Id. at 36-37. R.W. eventually absconded from the facility, prompting the juvenile court to modify its dispositional decree and commit R.W. to DOC.
[¶3] After 17 months in DOC, R.W. was released into his father's custody to serve probation. But less than a month later, R.W. ran away from home and stole a car before being arrested. The juvenile court authorized the State to file a new delinquency petition and ordered R.W. detained in the interim. The State soon filed a petition alleging R.W. was a delinquent for conduct that would constitute Level 6 felony auto theft if committed by an adult. The State also petitioned to modify R.W.'s probation in the original delinquency matter.
[¶4] R.W. admitted to the new delinquency allegation, after which the juvenile court held a joint hearing on the issues of disposition and probation modification. At this hearing, R.W.'s probation officer advised the court that R.W. tested positive for marijuana upon his recent detention and had been the subject of five incident reports while detained. According to the probation officer, these reports involved behaviors such as lying, disorderly conduct, failure to follow instructions, staff manipulation, possession of contraband, and gang promotion.
[¶5] The probation department and R.W.'s father both recommended that the juvenile court commit R.W. to DOC. After the hearing, the court did just that. In both its dispositional decree and its nearly identical probation modification order, the Court observed:
Given the statutory mandate to consider the least restrictive disposition consistent with community safety, the Court is generally reluctant to impose DOC commitment, especially when the Probation Department presents evidence of amenability.
But the Court simply does not find that evidence to be credible. Rather, [R.W.] has given every indication that he will reject-violently and categorically- every attempt at rehabilitation. He did so at his residential treatment facility, and he has done so while detained. While it is likely that . . . further psychological and/or psychiatric diagnoses and treatment would prove valuable, there is no plan for safely providing it within a community, or even a detention, setting. [R.W.] must be incapacitated.
Given his lengthy stay at [DOC] and his reoffending soon after, the Court must again find that residential treatment, even if available, would not sufficiently protect [R.W.] or [the] community.App. Vol. pp. 20, 24.
Discussion and Decision
[¶6] R.W. appeals his DOC commitment, characterizing it as a "punishment" and seemingly arguing that his best interests would be better served by a less restrictive placement. Appellants' Br. p. 15. We are not persuaded.
[¶7] "A juvenile court has wide latitude and great flexibility in dealing with juveniles," but "its goal is to rehabilitate rather than punish." D.S. v. State, 829 N.E.2d 1081, 1085 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005). To this end, Indiana Code § 31-37-18-6(1)(A) provides: "If consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional decree that is in the least restrictive and most appropriate setting available." (cleaned up). The statute "requires placement in the least restrictive setting only if consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child." J.S. v. State, 881 N.E.2d, 26, 29 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008) (internal quotation omitted). Thus, it "recognizes that in certain situations the best interest of the child is better served by a more restrictive placement." Id.
[¶8] The disposition of a juvenile adjudicated a delinquent is a matter committed to the trial court's discretion, subject to the statutory considerations of the child's welfare, community safety, and the policy favoring the least harsh disposition. R.H. v. State, 937 N.E.2d 386, 388 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010). We review the trial court's disposition for an abuse of discretion, which occurs if its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. Id. "In determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility." J.S. v. State, 110 N.E.3d 1173, 1175 (Ind.Ct.App. 2018).
[¶9] R.W. claims the juvenile court abused its discretion by committing him to DOC because his prior DOC commitment "did not rehabilitate him to a sufficient degree to avoid a further delinquent act." Appellant's Br., p. 14. R.W. also claims that a residential facility would have been a more appropriate placement because, while placed at Hillcrest, "he complied with behavior contracts when given adequate incentives and support." Id. at 13. Both claims invite this Court to reweigh the evidence, which is not our role. J.S., 110 N.E.3d at 1175.
[¶10] The record reveals that R.W. has been the subject of seven delinquency referrals and two adjudications. When placed in a residential facility following his first delinquency adjudication, R.W. engaged in aggressive and violent behavior and eventually absconded. He was then committed to DOC for nearly 1% years. Shortly after his release from DOC, R.W. violated his probation by stealing a car and testing positive for marijuana. His disobedience and misbehavior then continued while detained during the subsequent delinquency and probation modification proceedings. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the juvenile court abused its discretion by again committing R.W. to DOC.
[¶11] Affirmed.
Pyle, J., and Felix, J., concur.