On October 7, 1986, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment noting that Super America was privately owned and arguing that "the taking of a vehicle from a private lot is inactionable as there is no statute because [ sic] there is no common law liability." Defendant cited Childers v. Franklin (1964), 46 Ill. App.2d 344, 197 N.E.2d 148, and Ruyle v. Reynolds (1976), 43 Ill. App.3d 905, 357 N.E.2d 804, as supporting authority. • 1 Defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied on the condition that plaintiff file an amended complaint. Specifically, the court directed plaintiff to amend paragraph eight of her original complaint.

In analyzing the liability of the defendants, the courts determined that the statutory violations were prima facie evidence of negligence and thus confined their discussion to the existence of proximate cause. As noted in Ruyle v. Reynolds, 43 Ill. App. 3d 905, 907 (1976), the rule in Ney, and consequently Kacena, and the statute therein have been limited to cases involving public streets. The second class of cases involves a claim of common law negligence where the defendant leaves his keys in the ignition of his vehicle on private property rather than public property, thus negating the application of the statute at play in Ney and Kacena.

Village of Mundelein v. Franco, 317 Ill. App. 3d 512, 517 (2000) (quoting Village of Bolingbrook v. Citizens Utility Co., 158 Ill. 2d 133, 138 (1994)). ¶ 30 Concerning traffic ordinances specifically, "[p]rior to the adoption of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, units of municipal government were empowered to regulate motor vehicles in only those ways permitted by a specific act of the General Assembly." Ruyle v. Reynolds, 43 Ill. App. 3d 905, 907 (1976) (citing Watson v. Chicago Transit Authority, 12 Ill. App. 3d 684 (1973)). "Under the new constitution, however, home rule units are allowed to make any and all regulations not specifically prohibited by the General Assembly."

Claims involving vehicles left unattended with the keys and parked on public streets constitute prima facie negligence by way of statute. Ruyle v. Reynolds, 43 Ill. App. 3d 905, 907, 357 N.E.2d 804, 806 (1976); 625 ILCS 5/11-1401 (West 2004) (Illinois Vehicle Code). In Lorang v. Heinz, 108 Ill. App. 2d 451, 452, 248 N.E.2d 785, 785 (1969), the defendant left his vehicle in the privately owned parking lot of a shopping center with the keys in the ignition and the motor running.

The liability of owners of vehicles which are stolen by a third party has been discussed in a number of cases. Ney v. Yellow Cab Co. (1954), 2 Ill.2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74; Hensler v. Renn (1988), 166 Ill. App.3d 819, 520 N.E.2d 1110; Ruyle v. Reynolds (1976), 43 Ill. App.3d 905, 357 N.E.2d 804; Harper v. Epstein (1974), 16 Ill. App.3d 771, 306 N.E.2d 690; Lorang v. Heinz (1969), 108 Ill. App.2d 451, 248 N.E.2d 785. • 2 Most recently, in Hensler, the trial court granted defendant's summary judgment motion in an action for damages for the personal injury and property damage plaintiff sustained when her car was struck by defendant's van.

In such cases, courts look for "special circumstances" which would put the owner on notice that the car was likely to be stolen. In Ruyle v. Reynolds (1976), 43 Ill. App.3d 905, 357 N.E.2d 804, the defendant parked his car in a food store parking lot and left his doors unlocked and the keys in the ignition. The court reversed the dismissal of plaintiff's negligence count, holding that plaintiff's allegation that "given the neighborhood of the parking lot it was foreseeable that a thief would steal" the car was sufficient to allege "special circumstances which, if proved, may have made the theft here foreseeable."

1978).See also Itami v. Burch, 59 Or. App. 400, 650 P.2d 1092 (1982); Enders v. Apcoa, Inc., 55 Cal.App.3d 897, 127 Cal.Rptr. 751, 756 (1976); Ruyle v. Reynolds, 43 Ill. App.3d 905, 2 Ill. Dec. 584, 357 N.E.2d 804 (Ill.4th Dist. 1976); Zinck v. Whelan, 120 N.J. Super. 432, 294 A.2d 727 (1972). In formulating this "special circumstance" rule, courts balance competing interests.

Ruyle v. Reynolds, 43 Ill.App.3d 905, 908 (1976).

Kacena v. George W. Bowers Co., 63 Ill. App. 2d 27, 33 (1965). See also Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 Ill. 2d 74 (1954) (holding that violation of a similar parking ordinance established prima facie negligence on the part of the vehicle owner) and Ruyle v. Reynolds, 43 Ill. App. 3d 905 (1976) (same). "The injury must have a direct and proximate connection with the violation of the statute before liability will be held to exist."

Id.¶ 15 Prior to the adoption of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, municipalities could regulate motor vehicles only in ways specifically authorized by the General Assembly. Ruyle v. Reynolds, 43 Ill. App. 3d 905, 907 (1976). The 1970 constitution, however, allowed home rule units "to make any and all regulations not specifically prohibited by the General Assembly.