Opinion
No. 58877-0-I.
August 27, 2007.
A common law easement by necessity is only available over land severed by the grantor. Ingress or egress can be acquired over the land of strangers only by an action for private condemnation. Rogelio and Elaine Ruvalcaba brought an action under common law seeking to quiet title in easements of necessity against strangers to the severed property. As such, their complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. That portion of the trial court's summary judgment is affirmed.
However, the trial court determined that the statute of limitations barred actions for both a common law easement by necessity and one for private condemnation. The trial court should have declined to address the limitations issue in the summary proceeding. That portion of the judgment, including dismissal with prejudice based on the statute of limitations, is reversed.
Motions to join necessary parties and to amend the complaint are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Given the posture of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions to join or amend. The summary judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
FACTS
Rogelio and Elaine Ruvalcaba purchased land in 1965. The property's topography had a definite lower portion and upper portion, separated by a steep slope. The lower portion of the property abutted, and had access to, 42nd Avenue N.E. In 1971, the Ruvalcabas sold the lower portion of the property to Melvin and Arlene Desermeaux. However, at that time the Ruvalcabas failed to reserve access to the upper portion of the property. They believed such access was impractical both physically and economically due to the natural features of the land.
The record reveals Melvin and Arlene Desermeaux are no longer the owners of the property. However, it is not clear who currently owns the property. We will refer to the property owners as Desermeaux or their successors.
Prior to the conveyance of the lower portion, the Ruvalcabas attempted to negotiate a number of easements for access to the upper portion of the property. They succeeded in procuring easements from some of their neighbors but did not complete access to a public right of way. The Ruvalcabas were unable to negotiate other easements to gain access to the upper portion. In March 1972, the conveyance from the Ruvalcabas to Desermeaux was filed. As a result, the upper portion of the land became landlocked. The Ruvalcabas neither obtained a declaratory judgment that ingress or egress over the Desermeaux' property was unreasonable, nor did they seek an easement by necessity over the severed parcel owned by Desermeaux or their successors.
The land remained undeveloped for more than thirty years. The Ruvalcabas claim they discovered the property was amenable to development in 2005, so once again they decided to seek access. After self-rendering the property landlocked and failing to procure sufficient easements some thirty years before, the Ruvalcabas asked for the grant of easements over neighboring property, but their requests were denied by a number of the neighboring property owners. Eventually the Ruvalcabas sued a number of the adjoining and non-adjoining property owners to the north for the easements. The complaint alleged a single cause of action, one in common law, seeking to quiet title in an implied easement by necessity across properties of neighbor-defendants.
The neighbor-defendants brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the claim. They initially argued the law does not recognize an easement by necessity except over the parcel actually severed. In addition, the defendants argued the common law claim was time-barred and that any condemnation action, had one been raised, would also be barred by the statute of limitations.
In response to the defendants' motion, the Ruvalcabas sought to amend their complaint to add as additional parties other neighbors whose properties, in conjunction with the other defendants, would reach a public thoroughfare. However, they did not seek to add Desermeaux or their successors. In addition, the Ruvalcabas sought to amend the complaint to add a statutory private condemnation claim for a way of necessity.
The trial court granted summary judgment dismissal for the neighbor-defendant landowners. In its order, the trial court found that the Ruvalcabas knew all of the elements of a claim for a common law implied easement by necessity and a statutory private condemnation for necessity, and that those claims fully accrued as of June 1971. Accordingly, the trial court held that both claims were time barred due to the Ruvalcabas delay in bringing an action. Thereafter, the trial court denied the Ruvalcabas' motion to amend their complaint and dismissed the action with prejudice. From the order, the Ruvalcabas appeal.
ANALYSIS
This is a review of a summary judgment. The usual standard of review applies. CR 56(c); Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wn.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982) (summary judgment appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and moving party entitled to judgment as a matter of law); Degel v. Majestic Mobile Manor, Inc., 129 Wn.2d 43, 48, 914 P.2d 728 (1996) (reviewing summary judgment by engaging in same inquiry as trial court); Michak v. Transnation Title Ins. Co., 148 Wn.2d 788, 794, 64 P.3d 22 (2003) (viewing facts of case and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in light most favorable to nonmoving party); Young v. Key Pharms., Inc., 112 Wn.2d 216, 225-26, 770 P.2d 182 (1989) (nonmoving party must set forth specific facts to defeat motion for summary judgment); Wendle v. Farrow, 102 Wn.2d 380, 382, 686 P.2d 480 (1984) (sustaining trial court's judgment on any theory established by pleadings and supported by proof).
The Ruvalcabas' initial complaint alleged only a common law implied easement by necessity. "The doctrine of easement by necessity is based on the policy that landlocked land may not be rendered useless and the landlocked owner is entitled to the beneficial uses of the land."
Kennedy v. Martin, 115 Wn. App. 866, 868, 63 P.3d 866 (2003) (citing Hellberg v. Coffin Sheep Co., 66 Wn.2d 664, 666-67, 404 P.2d 770 (1965)).
But, under the common law, an implied easement by necessity is found only across a parcel of land that has been severed from a larger parcel by a common owner because the easement is based on a legal fiction that the owner of the entire parcel would have recorded an easement before severing the parcel. An easement implied from necessity may exist only between parcels of land that were once one parcel and were severed from each other. Thus, in this case an action seeking a common law easement implied from necessity could only have been brought by the Ruvalcabas against Desermeaux or their successors. Desermeaux or their successors are not, however, named as defendants in the original complaint. For that reason, the original cause of action fails to state a proper claim, and the trial court's dismissal of the action was appropriate.
17 William B. Stoebuck and John W. Weaver, Washington Practice: Real Estate: Property Law 2.5, at 93-94 (2d ed. 2004) (citing Todd v. Sterling, 45 Wn.2d 40, 273 P.2d 245 (1954)); Leinweber v. Gallaugher, 2 Wn.2d 388, 98 P.2d 311 (1940).
The common law claim for a way of necessity should not be confused with the statutory procedure for a way of necessity. It is evident from the record that the claims were confused. The original complaint sought only to gain a common law easement of necessity. The easement sought was over land owned by neighbors who were strangers to the original parcel owned by the Ruvalcabas. But to accomplish a way of necessity over land owned by strangers to the severed land an action must be brought pursuant to statute, RCW 8.24.010. Here, it was not.
Private condemnation to establish a way of necessity is allowed by the Washington State Constitution article I, section 16 (amend. 9) and implemented by statute, RCW 8.24.010.
The Ruvalcabas' argument that an easement of necessity through the severed parcel is not reasonable or economically feasible due to the topography is misplaced. Even with appropriate supporting geological and engineering reports the Ruvalcabas' argument that this easement is unreasonable does not automatically render it so. The determination whether access is "reasonable" necessarily has to be adjudicated through declaratory judgment, or averred and proved in conjunction with a private condemnation action, before any way of necessity is granted to benefit the landlocked property through properties other than the severed parcel.
17 William B. Stoebuck and John W. Weaver, Washington Practice: Real Estate: Property Law 2.5, at 96 (2d ed. 2004) ("private condemnation statute is a remedy of last resort, a fallback for a landowner who has no other reasonable means of access").
In response to the motion for summary judgment, the Ruvalcabas requested to amend their complaint to add parties and to add a claim for private condemnation under the statute. The trial court denied the motion to amend and dismissed the case with prejudice. The Ruvalcabas contend the trial court abused its discretion by denying their motion to amend.
Generally, Civil Rule (CR) 20 allows for amendment of a complaint to join necessary parties. Further, CR 15(a) permits a party to amend a pleading by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party, and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires, except where prejudice to the opposing party results. The decision to grant leave to amend the pleadings is left to the discretion of the trial court. Therefore, when reviewing the court's decision to deny the motion to amend, we apply a manifest abuse of discretion test.
See Wells v. Aetna Ins. Co., 60 Wn.2d 880, 882, 376 P.2d 644 (1962) (purpose of permitting liberal joinder is to encourage adjudication of rights and claims of all parties in one proceeding).
Del Guzzi Constr. Co. v. Global Northwest, Ltd., 105 Wn.2d 878, 888, 719 P.2d 120 (1986).
Wilson v. Horsley, 137 Wn.2d 500, 505, 974 P.2d 316 (1999).
McDonald v. State Farm Fire § Cas. Co., 119 Wn.2d 724, 737, 837 P.2d 1000 (1992) (citing Herron v. Tribune Publ'g Co., 108 Wn.2d 162, 165, 736 P.2d 249 (1987)); State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971) (trial court's decision "will not be disturbed on review except on a clear showing of abuse of discretion, that is, discretion manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons").
The touchstone for the denial of a motion to amend is the prejudice an amendment would cause to the nonmoving party. Factors that courts have considered in determining whether permitting amendment would cause prejudice include undue delay, unfair surprise, and jury confusion. Here the record shows that permitting the amendment would substantially prejudice the neighbor-defendants. First there would be an additional delay. The Ruvalcabas would need to get a declaratory judgment holding that a common law way of necessity over the Desermeaux' property was not reasonable, or further amend to include that contention. Yet, here, the Ruvalcabas have not sought to add Desermeaux or their successors to the action. Granting the motion would have the effect of broadening the issues and necessitating expensive discovery and other potential legal fees and costs to the neighbor-defendants as well as to the Ruvalcabas. The dollars behind these expenses are likely better spent by the Ruvalcabas to negotiate the purchase of easements needed to gain access, something they would be required to do in a private condemnation action in any event. Only if they fail to reach mutual agreement on a purchase of a way of access should they consider a private condemnation action. But before they file a private condemnation action, the Ruvalcabas must first seek a declaratory judgment determining that access through the property severed from their once owned parcel is unreasonable.
Herron, 108 Wn.2d at 165-66.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the joinder of additional parties or the Ruvalcabas' motion to amend their complaint.
That said, however, we disagree with the basis used by the trial court to grant portions of the summary judgment and the reason for dismissal with prejudice. The trial court should not have determined the issues on the basis of the application of the statute of limitations. It was unnecessary to determine the limitations issue in order to dismiss the original action or the motions to join or amend. Application of the limitations issue is best left to another day. While the delay here in bringing a statutory action seeking a private way of necessity was egregious, the public policy to prevent landlocked property from being rendered useless may override the application of any limitations statute. But this is an issue of first impression in the state and it deserves a fully developed record as well as argument and briefing. We decline to determine the issue on this summary record as it is inappropriate. Therefore we hold the trial court erred in dismissing the actions with prejudice.
See Brown v. McAnally, 97 Wn.2d 360, 367, 644 P.2d 1153 (1982) ("[Washington Constitution article I, section 16] (amend. 9) and RCW 8.24.010 declare a public policy against rendering landlocked property useless.").
The summary judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
I concur. The majority is correct that it was unnecessary for the trial court to reach the statute of limitations issue in this case.
I write separately because the issue of laches is also likely to be raised in the future. The doctrine of laches prohibits unreasonably delayed litigation that harms a defendant if the plaintiff had earlier knowledge of the underlying facts of the claim. Here, as the majority notes, the delay in seeking relief after knowing all the relevant facts was egregious. Whether the policies underlying the statute of limitations, laches, or both are outweighed by the public policy to prevent landlocked property from being rendered useless deserves a fully developed record and briefing. Because we have neither in this case, we decline to determine those issues here.
Neighbors § Friends of Viretta Park v. Miller, 87 Wn. App. 361, 373-74, 940 P.2d 286 (1997) (barring a claim under the doctrine of laches).
For these additional reasons, I concur.