Opinion
No. 5:17-cv-218-MTT-CHW
10-25-2018
MARCUS RUTLEDGE, Plaintiff, v. Deputy GEORGE HORNE, et al., Defendants.
Proceedings Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Before the U.S. Magistrate Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Doc. 23. Plaintiff has not responded to Defendants' motion. For the reasons set forth below, it is RECOMMENDED that the Defendants' motion be GRANTED. As an alternative basis for decision, Plaintiff's claims are subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The Court mailed its routine notice of motion for summary judgment to Plaintiff at his address of record (Doc. 27), but the notice was returned as undeliverable on July 23, 2018 (Doc. 29). Although the Court has instructed Plaintiff of his responsibility to advise the Court of any address change (Doc. 6, p. 9), Plaintiff has failed to provide the Court with such notice. As Plaintiff has failed to apprise the Court of his current address, he has effectively abandoned the action. Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, this recommendation is made on the merits of Defendants' motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Marcus Rutledge, a pretrial detainee housed at Houston County Detention Center during all times relevant to the action, brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants nurse Jody Holtzclaw and nurse Anna West. Plaintiff claims that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
On screening pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), the Court dismissed without prejudice Plaintiff's excessive force and deliberate indifference claims against Defendant Ivey and his claims against Defendants Horne, Lester, Krauter, Filipovich, Wrobel, Ranson, and McDuffie for failure to state a claim. Doc. 19, adopting Docs. 6 and 13 Report and Recommendations.
The pertinent facts as alleged by Plaintiff in his complaint are as follows. On May 17, 2016, at around 1:30 in the morning, Plaintiff, a diabetic, suffered a drop in his sugar levels, causing him to fall on his face and knock his front teeth out. Doc. 1, p. 6. Plaintiff claims that Deputy Ivey performed CPR to revive him from his near-death state, but in doing so "cracked the bone in [his] chest." Doc. 1, p. 6. Plaintiff was revived, but he now "can't stand up for [more than] five minutes at a time," suffers from high blood pressure, has vision problems, and is mentally unstable. Doc. 1, p. 6. Plaintiff claims that nurses Holtzclaw and West "neglected their duties as . . . nurses and refused to check [his] sugar knowing that [he] was a diabetic." Doc. 1, p. 6. He claims that his injuries were a result of the nurses' neglect. Doc. 1, p. 6.
The allegations Defendant presented in his amended complaint (Doc. 9) are essentially identical to those made in his original complaint (Doc. 1).
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment shall be granted if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party; however, "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the position will be insufficient." Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Georgia, 263 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting City of Delray Beach v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 85 F.3d 1527, 1530 (11th Cir. 1996)).
The moving party must meet its burden even if the nonmoving party fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment. Courts "cannot base the entry of summary judgment on the mere fact that the motion was unopposed, but, rather, must consider the merits of the motion." United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). In considering the merits of an unopposed motion for summary judgment, a court:
need not sua sponte review all of the evidentiary materials on file at the time the motion is granted, but must ensure that the motion itself is supported by evidentiary materials. At the least, the district court must review all of the evidentiary materials submitted in support of the motion for summary judgment.Id. at 1101-02 (citations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) ("The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record." (emphasis added)). In other words, the court cannot simply accept the facts as stated in a moving party's statement of material facts as true, but must also review the movant's citations to the record and confirm that there are no issues of material fact. See One Piece of Real Prop., 363 F.3d at 1103 n.6; see also Moton v. Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2011).
There are, however, potential consequences under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court's Local Rules when a nonmovant fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment. Rule 56(e)(2) of the Federal Rules provides that if a party "fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c)," then the Court may "consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion." Similarly, this Court's Local Rule 56 provides: "All material facts contained in the movant's statement which are not specifically controverted by specific citation to particular parts of materials in the record shall be deemed to have been admitted, unless otherwise inappropriate." "[I]f the motion and supporting materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to [summary judgment]," the Court may grant summary judgment on that basis. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3); see also Urdaneta v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 734 F. App'x 701, 704 (11th Cir. 2018).
B. Summary Judgment Analysis
Because Defendants properly supported their factual assertions with specific citations to the record, and because Plaintiff failed to respond to the motion, Defendants' facts are accepted as undisputed. The undisputed facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, see Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970), show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Plaintiff claims that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff has brought his claims before this Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking monetary relief.
As a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim falls under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. See Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1331 n.1 (11th Cir. 2013). The Fourteenth Amendment's standards "are identical to those under the Eighth," however. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Goebert v. Lee Cty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007)).
i. Undisputed Material Facts.
For purposes of Defendants' motion for summary judgment, the pertinent undisputed facts are as follows. Defendants Jody Holtzclaw and Anna West were nurses providing inmate care services at the jail at the time of the incident. Doc. 23-2, ¶ 3. Upon admission at Houston County Detention Center on April 17, 2016, Plaintiff was immediately assessed, Plaintiff's status as a diabetic was noted in his medical records, and medical services began monitoring Plaintiff's blood sugar. Doc. 23-2, ¶¶ 5-6. At least twice a day from then on, Plaintiff's blood sugar was checked, the results were recorded, and Plaintiff received medication, including insulin. Doc. 23-2, ¶ 7. The only occasions on which Plaintiff's blood sugar was not monitored were when Plaintiff himself refused to permit medical staff to do so. Doc. 23-2, ¶ 8; see, e.g., Exhibit 12: Set 1, pp. 203, 237, 247, 259, 293. On May 16, 2016, the night immediately preceding the incident at issue in this case, Defendant Holtzclaw checked Plaintiff's blood sugar levels. Doc. 23-2, ¶ 9. Around 1:30 in the morning on May 17, 2016, Holtzclaw responded to a call for medical assistance. Doc. 23-2, ¶ 10-11. Upon arriving at Plaintiff's cell, Holtzclaw found Plaintiff lying on the floor, unresponsive and having difficulty breathing. Doc. 23-2, ¶ 11. Officers reported that Plaintiff had fallen from the top bunk of the bed in his cell. Doc. 23-2, ¶ 12. After he was provided with glucose gel, Plaintiff was transported to medical, where Defendant West monitored Plaintiff's blood sugar while Holtzclaw administered chest compressions to assist Plaintiff's breathing. Doc. 23-2, ¶¶ 13-15. Emergency services arrived shortly thereafter and transported Plaintiff to a nearby hospital for treatment. Doc. 23-2, ¶ 16. Plaintiff returned to the jail from the hospital on May 18, 2016. Doc. 23-2, ¶ 17.
ii. Qualified Immunity.
To the extent that Plaintiff has brought suit under Section 1983 against Defendants in their individual capacities, qualified immunity precludes his claim against them. "The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials 'from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). "Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.
A threshold matter in deciding whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity is whether the defendant has established that "the allegedly unconstitutional conduct occurred while he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority." Harbert Int'l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). "To establish that the challenged actions were within the scope of his discretionary authority, a defendant must show that those actions were (1) undertaken pursuant to the performance of his duties, and (2) within the scope of his authority." Id. at 1282. Here, it is undisputed that, on the day of the incident, Defendants were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority as nurses in the jail when they monitored Plaintiff's blood pressure, provided him with medical care, and administered medications.
"Once the defendant establishes that he was acting within his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate." Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). The plaintiff must show: (1) "that the official's alleged conduct violated a constitutionally protected right"; and (2) "that the right was clearly established at the time of the misconduct." Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1221 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). "A plaintiff must satisfy both prongs of the analysis to overcome a defense of qualified immunity." Id. (citing Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1254 (11th Cir. 2010)).
1. Violation of a Constitutionally Protected Right.
As discussed, Plaintiff claims that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when they allegedly refused to check Plaintiff's blood sugar levels.
To establish a jail official's deliberate indifference to the medical needs of an inmate, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective and a subjective component. Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). See generally Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Regarding the objective component, a plaintiff must allege (1) an objectively serious medical need that, if left unattended, poses a substantial risk of serious harm, and (2) that the prison official's response to that need was poor enough to constitute "an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, and not merely accidental inadequacy, negligence in diagnosis or treatment, or even medical malpractice actionable under state law." Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotations, alterations, and citations omitted).
Regarding the subjective component, a plaintiff must prove three facts: "(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; and (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence." Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1351 (11th Cir. 2004). A jail official's conduct is more than mere negligence where a plaintiff can show: "(1) grossly inadequate care; (2) a decision to take an easier but less efficacious course of treatment; and (3) medical care that is so cursory as to amount to no treatment at all." Barnes v. Martin Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 326 F. App'x 533, 535 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Brown, 387 F.3d at 1351).
First, it is undisputed that Plaintiff's diabetes constitutes a "serious medical need." Doc. 23-1, p. 10; see also Davis v. City of Montgomery, 220 F. Supp. 3d 1275, 1286 n.5 (M.D. Ala. 2016) ("It is common sense that a failure to treat diabetes may be severely detrimental to a person's health, making it a serious medical condition . . . ."). However, Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendants' response to his condition constituted even slight negligence, let alone "grossly inadequate care" as required by the subjective component of the test.
Plaintiff's entire claim against Defendants Holtzclaw and West is premised on their alleged failure to check his blood sugar levels the evening before the incident. Doc. 1, p. 6. Plaintiff does not claim that Defendants either negligently performed the blood-sugar check or that they intentionally misinterpreted the results. Instead, Plaintiff claims only that Defendants "refused to check [his] sugar [levels]" on the evening in question. Doc. 1, p. 6. Defendants, citing to the medical record (Exhibit 12), show that Plaintiff's blood sugar levels were checked that evening. Doc. 23-2, ¶ 9. By failing to respond to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, this fact is undisputed. See United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d 1099, 1101-02, 1103 n.6 (11th Cir. 2004). In light of the undisputed fact that Defendants checked Plaintiff's blood sugar levels the evening prior to the incident, a reasonable jury could not hold that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical needs. Therefore, Defendants should be granted judgment as a matter of law.
2. Clearly Established Law.
Because Defendants did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights, they necessarily have not violated clearly established law. See Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1225 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Hudson v. Hall, 231 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2000)) ("Because Dr. Fowler did not violate Melton's constitutional rights, we need not reach the second prong of the qualified immunity inquiry."). Even in the case that Plaintiff's rights were violated, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy his burden under this prong of the qualified immunity analysis. "[T]he burden is on the plaintiff to show that, when the defendant acted, the law established the contours of a right so clearly that a reasonable official would have understood his acts were unlawful." Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). A plaintiff can make this showing by demonstrating that "the binding precedent set forth in the decisions of the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the highest court of the state (Georgia, here)," Melton, 841 F.3d at 1221 (citing Amnesty Int'l, USA v. Battle, 559 F.3d 1170, 1184 (11th Cir. 2009)), "either establishes a broad, applicable principle of law or has materially similar facts such that it would put [the official] on notice that his actions were unlawful," Galvez v. Bruce, 552 F.3d 1238, 1244 (11th Cir. 2008). Because Plaintiff failed to point to any evidence or caselaw that might show that Defendants' conduct was in violation of clearly established law, he has not satisfied his burden at this stage.
In conclusion, because Defendants properly supported their factual assertion that Plaintiff's blood sugar levels were checked with specific citations to the medical record, and because Plaintiff failed to respond to the motion, this fact is properly accepted as undisputed. The undisputed facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
III. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
As an alternative basis for decision, Plaintiff's claim is subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Because exhaustion is "a matter in abatement and not generally an adjudication on the merits," however, it is "not ordinarily the proper subject for a summary judgment; instead, it should be raised in a motion to dismiss, or be treated as such if raised in a motion for summary judgment." Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1374-75 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although Defendants have raised Plaintiff's failure to exhaust in a motion for summary judgment, the defense should therefore be treated as if it were raised in a motion to dismiss. Id. at 1374-75. As with other matters in abatement, courts may consider facts outside of the pleadings when determining whether a prisoner properly exhausted his available administrative remedies. Id. at 1376.
A. The Prison Litigation Reform Act
Before bringing a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a prisoner plaintiff must exhaust all available administrative remedies in accordance with the PRLA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1372-78 (noting that exhaustion is "a precondition to an adjudication on the merits"). The PLRA provides that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983] . . . by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). An inmate, therefore, must exhaust all available remedies before filing a claim with the courts. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002); Pearson v. Taylor, 665 F. App'x 858, 866 (11th Cir. 2016).
"To exhaust administrative remedies in accordance with the PLRA, prisoners must properly take each step within the administrative process." Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1378 (internal quotation marks omitted). This rule applies even where the administrative process is "futile and inadequate." Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1325-28 (11th Cir. 1998). That said, administrative remedies must be "available" for the exhaustion requirement to apply. See, e.g., Goebert v. Lee Cty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1322-26 (11th Cir. 2007).
In ruling upon motions to dismiss based upon the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust, courts in this Circuit follow a two-step process established by Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2008). First, courts look to the factual allegations in the defendant's motion to dismiss and those in the plaintiff's response, and if they conflict, the court takes the plaintiff's version of the facts as true. Id. at 1082. "If, in that light, the defendant is entitled to have the complaint dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, it must be dismissed." Id. If the complaint is not subject to dismissal based on the plaintiff's version of the facts, the court must proceed to the second step, where it makes specific findings of fact in order to resolve the disputed factual issues related to exhaustion. Id. At the second step, it is the defendant's burden to prove that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies. Id.
B. Available Administrative Remedies
Defendants have provided Houston County Detention Center's Inmate Handbook, revised May 12, 2016, which details the procedure inmates must follow when filing a grievance. Doc. 26-6. First, inmates are encouraged to resolve the dispute informally, either with the person responsible for the issue or through the chain of command. Doc. 26-6, p. 5. If that effort fails, inmates may file a written grievance within five working days of either the date of the incident or the date of the last attempt at an informal resolution. Doc. 26-6, p. 5. A grievance form is available to inmates, and inmates are required to "put as much detailed information in the narrative part [of the form] as possible," including "[d]ates, times, full names of those involved, [and] possible witnesses." Doc. 26-6, pp. 4-5. Inmates may request the assistance of staff members in completing the form. Doc. 26-6, p. 3. Alternatively, the inmate may request the assistance of another inmate, so long as that inmate does not file the grievance on the griever's behalf. Doc. 26-6, p. 3.
The page number cited here corresponds to the page number of the document as filed with the Court, not the page number of the handbook itself.
C. Failure to Exhaust
Because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing suit under Section 1983, the action is subject to dismissal. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). At the first step of Turner, "the court looks to the factual allegations in the defendant's motion to dismiss and those in the plaintiff's response, and if they conflict, takes the plaintiff's version of the facts as true. If, in that light, the defendant is entitled to have the complaint dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, it must be dismissed." Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 2008).
None of the documents submitted to the Court in this case contains evidence that Plaintiff fully availed himself of the administrative remedies available to him. In fact, Plaintiff himself states that he did not file a grievance. Doc. 1, p. 3. Plaintiff provides an excuse for his failure to file, however: "I was in medical and d[ue] to my injuries I could not write nor could I move at the time and I was told after three days I could not file a grievance about the incident." Doc. 1, p. 3. However, Plaintiff has not explained why he was not able to obtain assistance in completing a grievance form, as provided for by the Inmate Handbook (Doc. 26-6, p. 3), especially in light of the oral reports he made to other staff members on May 24, May 30, and August 5, 2016 regarding the incident (Doc. 1, p. 4). Regardless, the mandatory language of the PLRA "means a court may not excuse a failure to exhaust, even to take [special] circumstances into account." Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856-57 (2016). Furthermore, by failing to respond to Defendants' motion, Plaintiff has not disputed the assertions made by Defendants. As the record shows that Plaintiff has failed to avail himself of all available administrative remedies, his claims are subject to dismissal under the PLRA.
Although dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies is ordinarily without prejudice, such a dismissal may effectively constitute a dismissal with prejudice, where further administrative remedies have become unavailable due to the passage of time. Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1375 n.11. --------
CONCLUSION
After a careful review of the record, and for the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Defendants' motion for summary judgment be GRANTED and that judgment be entered in favor of Defendants.
In the alternative, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's claims be DISMISSED for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, pursuant to the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. The District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made. All other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
The parties are further notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, "[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice."
SO RECOMMENDED, this 25th day of October, 2018.
s/ Charles H. Weigle
Charles H. Weigle
United States Magistrate Judge