Summary
holding Longshoreman able to recover nonpecuniary damages because of continued vitality of Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 94 S.Ct. 806
Summary of this case from Doxey v. Lake Charles Pil.Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-3689
June 21, 2000
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims for punitive damages pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6). For the following reasons, defendant's motion is denied.
I. Background
While employed as a floorhand aboard Mallard Bay Drilling Rig No. 57, an inland drill barge engaged in an exploration project in Louisiana state waters, Rutherford participated in the transfer of drillpipe from a materials barge to the drilling rig. (Compl. ¶ 4-5.) On December 26, 1997, during the transfer operations, the crane broke from its pedestal, causing a suspended load of 5-inch drillpipe to strike him. (Compl. ¶ 5.)
On December 8, 1999, plaintiff filed this case in the Eastern District of Louisiana, seeking relief under 33 U.S.C. § 905 (b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA") and general maritime law. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that his injuries and damages were the proximate consequence of Parker Drilling's (formerly doing business as Mallard Bay) negligence in its capacity as owner of the drilling rig, as well as Parker Drilling's gross negligence in knowingly causing and requiring plaintiff to work in extremely dangerous conditions with a known defective crane and without adequate safety devices or precautions. (Compl. ¶ 12.) As a result of his alleged injuries, plaintiff first claims damages under the LHWCA, (Compl. ¶ 8), and then claims exemplary or punitive damages under general maritime law. (Compl. ¶ 13.)
Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff's claim for punitive damages on the ground that plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts that would entitle him to punitive damages under general maritime law. Plaintiff opposes this motion.
II. Discussion
A. 12(b)(6) Standard
In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996); American Waste Pollution Control Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 949 F.2d 1384, 1386 (5th Cir. 1991). Dismissal is warranted if "it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch; Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994)).
B. Punitive Damages
Although plaintiff originally pled punitive damages "pursuant to applicable principles of the general maritime law," (Compl. ¶ 14), he now claims that he is entitled to punitive damages under 33 U.S.C. § 905 (b). (Opp'n Mot. Dismiss at 1-2) It is irrelevant, however, whether plaintiff pled punitive damages under general maritime law or section 905(b) because the result is the same under the analytical framework adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496, 1506 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
After examining Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 111 S.Ct. 317 (1990), the Fifth Circuit determined, en banc, in Guevara that the Miles analytical framework "governs [a court's] approach to deciding damages issues in general maritime actions." Guevara, 59 F.3d at 1506. It reasoned:
In order to decide whether (and how) Miles applies to a case, a court must first evaluate the factual setting of the case and determine what statutory remedial measures, if any, apply in that context. If the situation is covered by a statute like the Jones Act or [the Death on the High Seas Act], and the statute informs and limits the available damages, the statute directs and delimits the recovery available under the general maritime law as well. The general maritime law will not expand the available damages when Congress has spoken to the relief it deems appropriate or inappropriate.Id.
Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff's "situation" is covered by the LHWCA. Section 905(b), however, is silent on remedies. When Congress enacted section 905(b), it neither limited the available remedies, nor created a new or broader admiralty remedy. Rather, it "merely preserve[d] an injured worker's right to recover damages from third parties in accordance with nonstatutory negligence principles." Parker v. South La. Contractors, Inc., 537, F.2d 113, 118 (5th Cir. 1976). See also Richtendollar v. Diamond M Drilling Co., 819 F.2d 124, 127-28 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc); May v. Transworld Drilling Co., 786 F.2d 1261, 1263 (5th Cir. 1986); Russell v. Atlantic Gulf Stevedores, 625 F.2d 71, 72 (5th Cir. 1980). Accordingly, any right to punitive damages under this statute emanates from general maritime law, unlimited by statutory constraint. See Robertson v. ARCO Oil Gas Co., 766 F. Supp. 535, 538 (W.D. La. 1991) (A section 905(b) action "is an action under the general maritime law."); Stevenson v. Point Marine, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 285, 288 (E.D. La. 1988) ("In the LHWCA context, a longshoreman's action against a vessel owner for negligence arises under general maritime law — not under the LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 905 (b). This is well-settled."); Giacona v. Capricorn Shipping Co., 394 F. Supp. 1189, (S.D. Tex. 1975) ("[T]he maritime negligence referred to in 33 U.S.C. § 905 (b) is not a creature of Congress, but of the general maritime law.").
The Fifth Circuit, however, has reserved the question whether, as a matter of law, punitive damages are awardable in an action brought under section 905(b). See Casceli v. Martech Int'l, Inc., 774 F.2d 1322, 1331 (5th Cir. 1985). Notwithstanding this reservation, the Supreme Court's analysis in Miles coupled with the Fifth Circuit's recognition of the continuing vitality of Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414, U.S. 576, 94 S.Ct. 806 (1974), compels this Court to recognize the possibility of awarding punitive damages for longshoremen injured in territorial waters.
1. No statutory limitations
In Miles, the Supreme Court reasoned that by "[i]ncorporating [the Federal Employer's Liability Act] unaltered into the Jones Act, Congress must have intended to incorporate the pecuniary limitation on damages as well." Miles, 498 U.S. at 32, 111 S.Ct. at 325. That Congressional limitation precluded the Supreme Court from approving nonpecuniary damages. Id. at 32-33, 111 S.Ct. at 326 ("It would be inconsistent with our place in the constitutional scheme were we to sanction more expansive remedies in a judicially created cause of action in which liability is without fault than Congress has allowed in cases of death resulting from negligence."). In contrast, the LHWCA incorporates no limiting language that precludes punitive damages. See Randall v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 13 F.3d 888, 903 (5th Cir.("[T]he LHWCA does not explicitly limit damages recoverable to pecuniary damages, as do the DOHSA and the Jones Act."), opinion modified on denial of reh'g by 22 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds, Bienvenu v. Texaco, Inc., 164 F.3d 901. (5th Cir. 1999). Therefore, under a Guevara analysis, the LHWCA does not prevent a longshoreman from recovering punitive damages.
2. The continuing vitality of Gaudet
Despite the absence of any limitations in the LHWCA, defendant maintains that the uniformity principle enunciated in Miles and embraced by the Fifth Circuit precludes any punitive damages under general maritime law. See, e.g., Guevara, 59 F.3d at 1506 ("[I]t should be clear that actions under the general maritime law for personal injury are also subject to the Miles uniformity principle. . . ."). Moreover, defendant quotes this Court for the proposition that "punitive damages . . . are not recoverable post-Miles under the general maritime law." Hyden v. Acadian Gas Pipeline Sys., 1997 WL 382059, *3 (E.D. La. July 9, 1997). The numerous authorities that defendant cites, however, predominantly involved Jones Act seamen. The remaining cases addressed nonseamen under the general maritime law. None of the cases involved longshoremen. (See Mot. Dismiss at 4-6.) Furthermore, defendant's reasoning neglects to account for the Fifth Circuit's explicit recognition of the continuing vitality of Gaudet. See, e.g., Nichols v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 17 F.3d 119, 122-23 (5th Cir. 1995) (recognizing the vitality of Gaudet); Randall, 13 F.3d at 903 (" Gaudet remains good law, even though its application has been severely limited.").
In Gaudet, the Supreme Court held that a longshoreman's wife could recover for loss of consortium in a maritime wrongful death action. Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 590. Four years later, the Supreme Court limited its holding in Gaudet to deaths occurring in territorial waters because DOHSA limits recovery for death on the high seas to pecuniary losses. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 98 S.Ct. 2010 (1978). This limitation created an inconsistency, allowing recovery of loss of consortium for longshoremen's deaths occurring in territorial waters but not for deaths occurring on the high seas. Further muddying the waters of uniformity, a plurality held two years later in American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274, 100 S.Ct. 1673 (1980), that the wife of a harbor worker injured in state waters could recover for loss of consortium under general maritime law. The plurality noted that there was "no apparent reason to differentiate between fatal and nonfatal injuries in authorizing recovery of damages for loss of society." Alvez, 446 U.S. at 281, 100 S.Ct. at 1677.
The Supreme Court attempted to remedy this anomaly in Miles by restoring `a uniform rule applicable to all actions for the wrongful death of a seaman, whether under DOHSA, the Jones Act, or general maritime law.'" Nichols, 17 F.3d at 12 (quoting Miles, 498 U.S. at 32, 111 S.Ct. at 326). The Miles Court, however, did not overrule Gaudet. Instead, it limited Gaudet to its facts and held that "[t]he holding of Gaudet applies only in territorial waters, and it applies only to longshoremen." Miles, 498 U.S. at 31, 111 S.Ct. at 325.
Confronted with the Supreme Court's refusal to overrule Gaudet, the Fifth Circuit has not only affirmed the continuing vitality of Gaudet, but also concluded that "we are unable to extend the uniformity rule of Miles to longshoremen killed or injured in territorial waters." Nichols, 17 F.3d at 123. Despite the obvious lack of uniformity that results, the Fifth Circuit felt compelled to conclude that "[u]ntil such time as the Supreme Court resolves this inconsistency with regard to longshoremen, we must apply the law as it exists today." Id.
As this case presents a longshoreman injured in territorial waters, this Court is compelled to conclude that the Miles uniformity principle is inapplicable. Accordingly, uniformity considerations do not preclude an award of punitive damages here.
3. The continuing viability of punitive damages
Although the Fifth Circuit has observed that "the Supreme Court has never affirmed an award of punitive damages in an admiralty case, despite suggestions to the contrary," Galveston County Navigation Dist. No. 1 v. Hopson Towing Co., 92 F.3d 353, 358 n. 12 (5th Cir. 1996), the Fifth Circuit has done so. See, e.g., PE Boat Rentals, Inc. v. Ennia Gen. Ins. Co., Inc., 872 F.2d 642, 652 (5th Cir. 1989) ("[P]unitive damages are recoverable under the general maritime law."); Merry Shipping, Inc., 650 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[I]n this Circuit punitive damages may be recovered under general maritime law upon a showing of willful and wanton misconduct by the shipowner."), overruled by Guevara, 59 F.3d at 1507. But with the advent of Miles, the Fifth Circuit overruled Merry Shipping, the legal foundation for punitive damages under general maritime law in the Fifth Circuit. Guevara, 59 F.3d at 1507 ("It is clear that Merry Shipping has been effectively overruled."). Merry Shipping, however, was a Jones Act case, and the effect of overruling it is that punitive damages are not available under general maritime law to Jones Act seamen. Further, the Fifth Circuit observed in Galveston that punitive damages may still be available in some admiralty contexts. See Galveston, 92 F.3d at 358 (noting that Guevara left open the possibility of punitive damages in certain maritime scenarios). This fact, combined with the Gaudet line of cases allowing longshoremen injured in territorial waters to recover nonpecuniary damages, precludes this Court from holding that punitive damages are unavailable here as a matter of law. The Court is aware that this holding perpetuates a situation in which longshoremen injured in territorial waters may recover nonpecuniary damages while Jones Act seamen (and longshoremen killed on the high seas) may not. Nevertheless, this lack of uniformity results from the continued vitality of Gaudet, which this Court has no authority to overrule. The Court does note, however, that if it were writing on a blank slate, it would see no principled ground for treating longshoremen better than Jones Act seamen when it comes to remedying maritime injuries under general maritime law.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.