See Doc. 17, at 5. As the Commissioner's memorandum notes, this Court, in Rutherford v. Astrue, 2011 WL 4014431, *7 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 9, 2011), said that where "the ALJ confirmed that Plaintiff had read, understood, and signed the waiver of right to representation, and ... confirmed that Plaintiff intended to represent [himself] at the hearing and wanted to proceed, the ALJ complied with Duncan and is not required to do more." There is no evidence in the record to support the claim that Plaintiff's waiver of the right to representation was not knowing or voluntary. Plaintiff was given a clear choice between proceeding that day and obtaining a continuance so that he could continue with his efforts to obtain counsel.
); Fletcher v. Astrue, 2011 WL 2222058, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. May 13, 2011) (rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the DOT conflicts with a sit/stand option simply because "the DOT does not address the issue of sit/stand options"); Manners v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 2011 WL 820653, at *8 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 2, 2011) (Wiseman, J.) ("While the DOT does not recognize any particular job's amenability to a sit/stand option as such, it has been held that no conflict between the testimony of the expert and the DOT is created by the mere imposition of a sit/stand option, such that would require resolution by the ALJ in order to pass muster."). See also Report and Recommendations entered in Rutherford v. Astrue, 2011 WL 4014431, at *19-20 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 9, 2011) and Seay v. Astrue, 2011 WL 780693, at *11-12 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 28, 2011), and adopted by the Court. Accordingly, the plaintiff is not entitled to relief on this ground.