" Charles, 165 Ill. 2d at 489-90, 651 N.E.2d at 158.¶ 27 In the instant case, we find that plaintiffs' common law causes of action for negligent retention based on defendants' provision of alcohol to a minor are preempted by the Dramshop Act. Two cases relating to the circumstances of this case that support our finding are Puckett v. Mr. Lucky's Ltd., 175 Ill. App. 3d 355, 529 N.E.2d 1169 (4th Dist. 1988); and Ruth v. Benvenutti, 114 Ill. App. 3d 404, 449 N.E.2d 209 (3d Dist. 1983).¶ 28 In Puckett, the plaintiff's guardian brought suit against a tavern alleging it negligently hired an unfit person to sell liquor.
It may be that statistics justify making all those who furnish alcoholic beverages to minors financially responsible for the injuries resulting from the alcohol use. However, we feel bound by the decisions of our supreme court which have long limited liability relating to furnishing alcohol to the coverage of the Illinois Dramshop Act. Cunningham v. Brown (1961), 22 Ill.2d 23, 28-29, 174 N.E.2d 153, 157; see also Hopkins v. Powers (1986), 113 Ill.2d 206, 497 N.E.2d 757; Wimmer v. Koenigseder (1985), 108 Ill.2d 435, 484 N.E.2d 1088; Demchuk v. Duplancich (1982), 92 Ill.2d 1, 440 N.E.2d 112; Graham v. General U.S. Grant Post No. 2665 (1969), 43 Ill.2d 1, 248 N.E.2d 657; Ruth v. Benvenutti (1983), 114 Ill. App.3d 404, 449 N.E.2d 209; Gora v. 7-11 Food Stores (1982), 109 Ill. App.3d 109, 440 N.E.2d 279. In Miller v. Moran (1981), 96 Ill. App.3d 596, 598, 421 N.E.2d 1046, 1049, our court refused to create a common law cause of action against a social host who wilfully and wantonly served liquor to a guest, holding the Dramshop Act was the exclusive source of liability.
In addition, the Fifth District of the Appellate Court in Harrel noted that it is not the province of appellate courts to create new causes of action, but rather the responsibility of our supreme court and/or the Illinois legislature. See Harrel, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 548, 644 N.E.2d at 455, citing Ruth v. Benvenutti, 114 Ill. App. 3d 404, 499 N.E.2d 209 (1983). Against the weight of this authority, plaintiff nevertheless contends that we should reject the majority view and extend the tort of defamation to apply to situations, such as her own, where an employee is effectively "compelled" to restate the false reasons for her termination to prospective employers.
The same question has been answered adversely in a similar factual scenario. In Ruth v. Benvenutti (1983), 114 Ill. App.3d 404, 449 N.E.2d 209, the court held that a common law cause of action does not exist against tavern owners or operators for the willful, wanton, and intentional violation of the Liquor Control Act's prohibition against selling alcohol to minors, even though the minor in that case severely injured himself after consuming alcohol at defendant's tavern and even though the tavern owner knew that he was selling alcohol to a minor who was very susceptible to the effects of alcohol. A violation of the happy hour prohibition, such as that alleged by plaintiff's complaint, is not so different from the prohibition against selling alcohol to minors.
As many Illinois authorities have held, the Act provides the only remedy against tavern operators and owners of tavern premises for injuries to person, property or means of support by an intoxicated person. Cunningham v. Brown (1961), 22 Ill.2d 23, 30-31, 174 N.E.2d 153; Puckett v. Mr. Lucky's Ltd. (1988), 175 Ill. App.3d 355, 357, 529 N.E.2d 1169 (collecting authorities); see also Hopkins v. Powers (1986), 113 Ill.2d 206, 210, 497 N.E.2d 757; Demchuk v. Duplancich (1982), 92 Ill.2d 1, 5, 440 N.E.2d 112; Ruth v. Benvenutti (1983), 114 Ill. App.3d 404, 406, 449 N.E.2d 209. Claiming that the $40,000 ceiling on damages now available under the Act is almost worthless by virtue of inflationary erosion and the unrealistic limitation articulated in the Act on the types of damages offered (Ill.
• 2 The liability imposed on a tavern owner and the nature of the damage recoverable is of statutory origin and is expressly and exclusively derived from the Dramshop Act. ( Cunningham v. Brown (1961), 22 Ill.2d 23, 174 N.E.2d 153; Howlett v. Doglio (1949), 402 Ill. 311, 83 N.E.2d 708; Ruth v. Benvenutti (1983), 114 Ill. App.3d 404, 449 N.E.2d 209.) The Dramshop Act is restricted in its application to situations where a third party suffers damages as a result of actions of an intoxicated person.
Our appellate court has generally adhered to this fundamental rule and has declined to create a new cause of action, regardless of whether the case involved adults, underage persons, or minors; liquor vendors or social hosts. See, e.g., Estate of Ritchie v. Farrell (1991), 213 Ill. App.3d 846 (social host furnished alcohol to a minor); Goodknight v. Piraino (1990), 197 Ill. App.3d 319 (vendor allowed alcohol to be furnished to an underage person); Flory v. Weaver (1990), 196 Ill. App.3d 149 (social host furnished alcohol to minors); Martin v. Palazzolo Produce Co. (1986), 146 Ill. App.3d 1084 (social host furnished alcohol to a minor); Zamiar v. Linderman (1985), 132 Ill. App.3d 886 (social host furnished alcohol to a minor); Heldt v. Brei (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 798 ( social hosts permitted son to serve alcohol to friends); Thompson v. Trickle (1983), 114 Ill. App.3d 930 (social host furnished alcohol to an adult); Ruth v. Benvenutti (1983), 114 Ill. App.3d 404 (vendor sold alcohol to a minor); Coulter v. Swearingen (1983), 113 Ill. App.3d 650 (minor social host furnished alcohol to a minor); Gora v. 7-11 Food Stores (1982), 109 Ill. App.3d 109 (vendor sold alcohol to a minor); Lowe v. Rubin (1981), 98 Ill. App.3d 496 (social host furnished alcohol to a minor); Miller v. Moran (1981), 96 Ill. App.3d 596 ( social hosts furnished alcohol to an adult); Camille v. Berry Fertilizers, Inc. (1975), 30 Ill. App.3d 1050 (social host furnished alcohol to an adult); Shepherd v. Marsaglia (1961), 31 Ill. App.2d 379 (vendors sold alcohol to an underage person); see also Fitzpatrick v. Carde Lounge, Ltd. (1992), 234 Ill. App.3d 875 (vendors sold alcohol to a minor). But see Cravens v. Inman (1991), 223 Ill. App.3d 1059; Colligan v. Cousar (1963), 38 Ill. App.2d 392 (discovering a common law cause of action for furnishing liquor to an intoxicated person), overruled by Wimmer v. Koenigseder (1985), 108 Ill.2d 435, 442.
; Miller v. City of Portland, see note 7, 604 P.2d at 1265, supra; Sheehy v. Big Flats Community Day, Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 629, 543 N.Y.S.2d 18, 541 N.E.2d 18, 21-22 (1989) (It would be incompatible with the enforcement mechanism chosen by the Legislature to judicially create an action where legislation has not previously addressed it.); Some jurisdictions refuse liability on the theory that dram shop acts provide exclusive remedies; therefore, no cause of action exists. Nutting v. Zieser, 482 N.W.2d 424, 425 (Iowa 1992); Ruth v. Benvenutti, 114 Ill. App.3d 404, 70 Ill.Dec. 335, 449 N.E.2d 209, 210-11 (1983); Verdusco v. Miller, 138 Mich. App. 702, 360 N.W.2d 281, 283 (1984); Other courts refuse to vary from the common law rule of non-liability, even though the state has statutes prohibiting the sale of alcoholic to minors. Mills v. City of Overland Park, 251 Kan. 434, 837 P.2d 370, 374-75 (1992); Pelzek v. American Legion, 236 Neb. 608, 463 N.W.2d 321, 323 (1990); Milligan v. County Line Liquor, Inc., 289 Ark. 129, 709 S.W.2d 409, 410 (1986); Bell v. Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 98 Nev. 109, 642 P.2d 161, 162 (1982); Steedley v. Huntley's Jiffy Stores, Inc., 209 Ga. App. 23, 432 S.E.2d 625, 626 (1993).
(e) In some jurisdictions the state's dram shop act is deemed to be the exclusive remedy. Ruth v. Benvenutti, 114 Ill. App.3d 404, 70 Ill.Dec. 335, 337, 449 N.E.2d 209, 211 [1983]; Martin v. Palazzolo Produce Co. Inc., 146 Ill. App.3d 1084, 100 Ill.Dec. 703, 710, 497 N.E.2d 881, 882 [1986]; Rosas v. Damore, 171 Mich. App. 563, 430 N.W.2d 783, 784 [1988]; Jackson v. PKM Corp., 430 Mich. 262, 422 N.W.2d 657 [1988]. A. Sui Juris Persons Whose Will Cannot Be Freely Exercised
However, the majority of cases, like Miller [ v. City ofPortland, 288 Or. 271, 604 P.2d 1261 (1980)], makes no distinction between minors and adults and rules that, under common law and/or statute, neither minors nor adults who hurt themselves after becoming intoxicated possess a cause of action against whoever provided them with liquor. See Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 327 S.E.2d 716, on remand, Sutter v.Turner, 174 Ga. App. 743, 332 S.E.2d 175 (1985); Ruth v. Benvenutti, 114 Ill. App.3d 404, 449 N.E.2d 209 (1983). In Trujillo, the New Mexico court in denying a cause of action to an adult patron of a tavern who injured himself stated that "concerns of public policy do not extend to protect an intoxicated adult patron from the results of his intoxication under Section 60-7A-16 [prohibits sale of alcohol to an intoxicated person]."