OCGA § 5–6–35(a)(2). See Avren v. Garten, 289 Ga. 186, 192, 710 S.E.2d 130 (2011) ( “Where both OCGA § 5–6–34(a) and § 5–6–35(a) are involved, an application for appeal is required when ‘the underlying subject matter’ of the appeal is listed in OCGA § 5–6–35(a)....” (citation omitted)); Russo v. Manning, 252 Ga. 155, 156, 312 S.E.2d 319 (1984) (“A judgment of contempt regarding a domestic relations decree is appealable only by application for discretionary appeal.”). Thus, when Husband's appeal of the June 27 order arrived at this Court, we dismissed the appeal for failure to file an application to appeal.

When "the underlying subject matter, i.e., the issues sought to be appealed, clearly arises from or is ancillary to divorce proceedings, or is derived from a marital relationship and divorce, the appeal is within the ambit of [OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2)]." Russo v. Manning , 252 Ga. 155, 155 (312 S.E.2d 319) (1984); see Rebich v. Mles, 264 Ga. 467, 468 (448 S.E.2d 192) (1994) ("[T]he underlying subject matter generally controls over the relief sought in determining the proper procedure to follow to appeal"). Moreover, any party, including a third-party defendant, who seeks to appeal an order entered in a domestic relations case must follow the discretionary appeal procedure.

As for "domestic relations" cases, we have held: "Where the underlying subject matter, i.e., the issues sought to be appealed, clearly arises from or is ancillary to divorce proceedings, or is derived from a marital relationship and divorce, the appeal is within the ambit of [OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2)]." Russo v. Manning, 252 Ga. 155 ( 312 S.E.2d 319) (1984). See also CS Nat. Bank v. Rayle, 246 Ga. 727 ( 273 S.E.2d 139) (1980) (the legislative intent in enacting OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2) was to give appellate courts the discretion not to entertain appeals from decisions involving divorce, alimony, child custody or contempt).

Here, to appeal the contempt order entered in this custody modification action, Danny was required to file an application for discretionary appeal pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2). Massey v. Massey, 294 Ga. 163, 164-165 (2) (751 S.E.2d 330) (2013)(explaining that, although contempt order was "immediately appealable," a discretionary application was required under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2)); Russo v. Manning, 252 Ga. 155, 155-156 (312 S.E.2d 319) (1984) ("A judgment of contempt regarding a domestic relations decree is appealable only by application for discretionary appeal."). See also Voyles, 301 Ga. at 47 (dismissing direct appeal filed in action for contempt and modification because party failed to file a discretionary application and custody was not an issue raised on appeal).

Here, to challenge the incarceration order, Reid was required to file an application for discretionary appeal pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2). See Norman v. Ault, 287 Ga. 324, 330-331 (6) (695 S.E.2d 633) (2010); Russo v. Manning, 252 Ga. 155, 155-156 (312 S.E.2d 319) (1984). "[C]ompliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional." Fabe v. Floyd, 199 Ga.App. 322, 332 (1) (405 S.E.2d 265) (1991).

Where the issue on appeal is child support, the case is a domestic relations case within the meaning of the statute. See Booker v. Ga. Dept. of Human Resources, 317 Ga.App. 426, 427 (731 S.E.2d 110) (2012); see also Russo v. Manning, 252 Ga. 155, 156 (312 S.E.2d 319) (1984) ("A judgment of contempt regarding a domestic relations decree is appealable only by application for discretionary appeal.").

Appeals from orders in domestic relations cases must be pursued by discretionary application. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2), (b); see also Russo v. Manning, 252 Ga. 155, 156 (312 S.E.2d 319) (1984) ("A judgment of contempt regarding a domestic relations decree is appealable only by application for discretionary appeal.").

OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2). Here, to challenge the order finding him in contempt of his divorce decree or the subsequent incarceration order, the husband was required to file an application for discretionary appeal pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2); Russo v. Manning, 252 Ga. 155, 155-156 (312 S.E.2d 319) (1984) (holding that order finding party in contempt of divorce decree and ordering him incarcerated was appealable only by application for discretionary appeal).

Where the issue on appeal is child support, the case is a domestic relations case within the meaning of the statute. See Booker v. Ga. Dept. of Human Resources, 317 Ga.App. 426, 427 (731 S.E.2d 110) (2012) (an action in which the "underlying subject matter is [the] obligation to provide child support" is "a domestic relations case subject to review only by application"); see also Russo v. Manning, 252 Ga. 155, 156 (312 S.E.2d 319) (1984) ("A judgment of contempt regarding a domestic relations decree is appealable only by application for discretionary appeal.").

Where the issue on appeal is child support, the case is a domestic relations case within the meaning of the statute. See Booker v. Ga. Dept. of Human Resources, 317 Ga.App. 426, 427 (731 S.E.2d 110) (2012) (an action in which the "underlying subject matter is [the] obligation to provide child support" is "a domestic relations case subject to review only by application"); see also Russo v. Manning, 252 Ga. 155, 155 (312 S.E.2d 319) (1984) ("A judgment of contempt regarding a domestic relations decree is appealable only by application for discretionary appeal."). Although OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11) permits a direct appeal from an order holding a party in contempt of certain child custody rulings, the contempt order here was based solely on failure to pay child support and thus may not be appealed directly.