Opinion
No. 05-05-00507-CV
Opinion Filed March 16, 2006.
On Appeal from the 298th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 03-03674-M.
Order Vacated; Affirmed As Modified.
Before Justices MORRIS, MOSELEY, and FITZGERALD.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Douglas Russell appeals the trial court's order imposing a $1000 sanction against him for having "no good faith argument to bring an action against" McBride Electric, Inc. Russell contends the trial court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions because, inter alia, McBride presented no evidence to support the grounds for or the amount of the sanctions. The background of the case and the proceedings in the trial court are well known to the parties; thus, we do not recite them here in detail. Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(a), 47.4. We vacate the trial court's order imposing sanctions, modify the final judgment to the extent the sanctions order was merged into it, and affirm the judgment as modified.
McBride initially argues that we do not have jurisdiction over this appeal because the order imposing sanctions is not a final judgment. After this appeal was filed, however, the trial court signed a final judgment disposing of all issues and parties in the underlying case. We thus conclude that we have jurisdiction of the appeal of the sanction order. See Tex.R.App.P. 27.1(a) (premature notice of appeal is effective); see also Webb v. Jorns, 488 S.W.2d 407, 408-09 (Tex. 1972) (interlocutory order merges into final judgment and becomes final for purposes of appeal).
The record reflects the sanctions order arose from some unusual procedures. McBride filed a "motion for assessment of fees and costs" that did not mention the word "sanctions" and cited only "C.R.P.C § 13001(2)" as authority for McBride's request for fees and costs. At the hearing on the motion, the trial court made clear it was not ordering the payment of fees or costs. The order recites that the trial court is sanctioning Russell because he "had no good faith argument to bring an action against McBride, even after admitting he knew McBride did not belong in this case." However, the trial court's order does not identify any specific rule or statutory authority for imposing sanctions.
McBride contends that Russell did not perform a reasonable investigation before filing claims against McBride. At oral argument, counsel for McBride argued the sanctions were authorized by chapter 10 of the civil practice and remedies code regarding the signing of a pleading or motion after a reasonable inquiry. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 10.001 (Vernon 2002). However, it is undisputed that Russell, who was represented by counsel, did not sign either petition asserting claims against McBride.
In his third issue, Russell argues the trial court abused its discretion in imposing sanctions against him because no evidence was offered to support the grounds for or the amount of the sanction. We agree. No evidence was presented at the hearing on McBride's motion. The trial court's order recites that the court reviewed the pleadings and heard the arguments of counsel, but does not state that the court considered evidence. The record also indicates that on Russell's objection, the trial court refused to consider an affidavit filed by McBride's attorney the morning of the hearing. The trial court also stated on the record that it was not awarding attorney's fees, but was imposing a sanction of $1000.
A monetary fine is arbitrary if "it is unrestrained by law or statute and unrelated to any damages or expenses incurred by the injured party." Ford Motor Co. v. Tyson, 943 S.W.2d 527, 534-35 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, orig. proceeding), mand. granted in part on other grounds, In re Ford Motor Co., 988 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. 1998). The record here is utterly devoid of any evidence to support the sanction of $1000. As such, the sanction amounts to a monetary fine and, by its very nature, is arbitrary. See id.
We conclude the trial court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions against Russell. Because we resolve Russell's third issue in his favor, we need not reach his other issues. We vacate the trial court's order imposing sanctions against Russell and modify the final judgment to delete the sanctions order to the extent it was merged into the judgment. No other issue being brought against the final judgment, we affirm the judgment as modified. See Tex.R.App.P. 43.2(b).