Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-1911, SECTION "L" (3)
November 7, 2003
ORDER REASONS
Before the Court is the Plaintiff's motion to remand. For the following reasons, the motion to remand is DENIED.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case arises from an auto accident that occurred on August 22, 2001 when Defendant Stephen Dell allegedly backed into Plaintiff Katherine Russell's vehicle. According to the plaintiff, Dell was in the course and scope of his employment with Longmile Trucking Company at the time of the accident. Plaintiff filed suit in Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, naming as defendants Stephen Dell, Longmile Trucking Company ("Longmile"), Home State County Mutual Insurance Company ("Home State"), insurer of Longmile, and Government Employees Insurance Company ("GEICO"), plaintiffs uninsured motorist carrier. Plaintiff sought damages for mental pain and suffering, medical expenses, and physical pain and suffering. In accordance with Louisiana law, plaintiff did not allege a specific dollar amount of damages in her state court petition. La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 893 (West 2003).
Defendant Home State first removed the case to this Court on November 21, 2002. In its Notice of Removal, Home State indicated that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), it received "other paper" that revealed the matter in controversy met the amount required to establish federal diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Counsel for the defendant sent a letter to the plaintiff's attorney on November 7, 2002, wherein he attached a stipulation stating that the plaintiff's damages did not exceed $75,000. The letter indicated that he would remove the case to federal court if he did not receive the signed stipulation by November 12, 2002. Plaintiffs counsel did not sign or return the stipulation. Accordingly, defendant argued that plaintiff's failure to return the stipulation qualified as "other paper" such that removal was proper.
Plaintiff filed a timely motion to remand arguing that the "other paper" exception did not apply. This Court agreed with plaintiff and granted the motion to remand, finding that plaintiffs failure to return the stipulation provided by defendant did not constitute a "voluntary act" necessary to convert the letter from defense counsel into "other paper" under the statute. Russell v. Home State County Mut. Ins. Co., 244 F. Supp.2d 669, 671-72 (E.D. La. 2003) (citing Addo v. Globe Life Accident Ins. Co., 230 F.3d 759, 762 (5th Cir. 2000) and S.W.S. Erectors, Inc. v. Infax, Inc., 72 F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 1996)).
On July 2, 2003, Defendant Home State removed the action to this Court a second time. In its Notice of Removal, Home State asserts that "new information has surfaced which now indicates that the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs, such that this action has now become removable." (Record Doc. No. 1). Specifically, this new information consists of a settlement demand from plaintiff dated June 4, 2003 requesting $150,000 to settle all claims. According to Home State, this new information qualifies as "other paper" under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), and its removal is timely because it was filed within thirty (30) days from the receipt of this "other paper."
Plaintiff again filed a motion to remand claiming that the removal is defective on several counts. Namely, plaintiff argues that: 1) the settlement demand is not tantamount to the value of the case; 2) defendant's Notice of Removal was not timely; and, 3) defendant did not have the consent of all other defendants to remove the action to this Court. Thus, the issues before the Court are whether the plaintiffs settlement demand is sufficient to establish jurisdictional amount and whether defendants' notice of removal was filed timely. For reasons set forth below, plaintiffs motion for remand is DENIED.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR REMOVAL
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, Chadwick v. Shell Oil Co., 828 F. Supp. 26, 27 (E.D. La., 1993). Absent another basis for federal jurisdiction, a case may be removed to federal court when the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, and the parties are citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). It is well established that the jurisdiction of a federal court sitting in diversity is determined at the time the complaint is filed. Saunders v. Rider, 805 F. Supp. 17, 18 (E.D. La. 1992). When, as in this case, the plaintiff has not pleaded with certainty a request for monetary damages, as is permissible in Louisiana (La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 893), federal jurisdiction is determined at the time of removal. Id. The removing party bears the burden of proving to a legal certainty that the plaintiffs claim satisfies the requisite jurisdictional amount. Id. Without more compelling evidence, the defendant's "mere assertions" as to the value of a plaintiffs claim cannot meet the legal certainty standard. Id. at 19. Evidence of the jurisdictional amount must be clear and convincing. Id. at 18.
As a general proposition, removal is timely when filed within thirty (30) days of defendant's receipt of the initial pleading. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). However, when the case as stated in the initial pleading is not removable, the defendant may file a notice of removal within thirty (30) days after the defendant's receipt "of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may be first asserted that the case is one which is or may become removable." Id. (emphasis added). The removing party bears the burden of showing that federal jurisdiction exists. Saunders, 805 F. Supp. at 18.
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues that the demand letter offering to settle the case for $150,000.00 should not be construed as "other paper" under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) because the demand was "mere posturing" and does not reflect the honest value of the case. However, the Fifth Circuit has held that a demand letter from the plaintiff qualifies as other paper. Addo v. Globe Life and Accident Insurance Co., 230 F.3d 759 (5th Cir. 2000). In Addo, the plaintiff served a post-complaint demand letter on the defendant offering to settle the suit for an amount in excess of $75,000. Id. at 760. An issue of first impression before the court, the Fifth Circuit held that a post-complaint letter concerning settlement terms which is not plainly a sham may qualify as other paper within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Id. at 762. The Addo court based its decision on the fact that the demand letter resulted from a voluntary act of the plaintiff and gave the defendant notice of changed circumstances supporting federal jurisdiction. Id.
The question before this Court, then, is whether or not plaintiff's settlement demand is plainly a "sham." The Court finds that plaintiff's settlement demand is not plainly a sham and qualifies as other paper sufficient to establish jurisdictional amount under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). In a letter to opposing counsel dated, June 4, 2003, plaintiff offered to settle the case for $150,000.00. (Mem. in Opp. Ex. A). Plaintiff later states in a letter dated August 6, 2003, that he would prefer to litigate the case in state court where he has "gotten as much as $175,000.00" for injuries similar to the ones alleged in the instant matter. (Mem. in Opp. Ex. D). These letters indicate that plaintiff was not merely posturing, but was relaying an accurate reflection of what he believes the case to be worth. Indeed, at least one Louisiana court has awarded amounts in excess of the federal jurisdictional amount for similar injuries. Rollings v. Winn-Dixie of La., Inc., 439 So.2d 1132, 1336, n. 1 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1983) (awarding nearly $175,000 for an unoperated disc).
Furthermore, plaintiff in this case should have had a heightened awareness of the defendants' intention to remove to federal court should new information emerge establishing jurisdictional amount. Defendant removed this case once before on November 21, 2002. At that time, this Court found that the defendant could not bear its burden of proving that removal was proper. At this time, however, plaintiff provided defendant with sufficient information and removal is proper.
In the alternative, plaintiff argues that removal was untimely because the thirty (30) day time limit began to run when the plaintiff sent a medical report to the defendants on March 21, 2003. Plaintiff argues, then, that the medical report constitutes "other paper," not the settlement demand. However, when the complaint does not clearly reveal on its face the amount in controversy, "the information supporting removal in a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper must be `unequivocally clear and certain' to start the time limit running for a notice of removal under the second paragraph of section 1446(b)." Bosky v. Kroger Texas, LP, 288 F.3d 208, 210 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Chapman v. Powermatic Inc., 969 F.2d 160, 163 (5th Cir. 1992).
In this case, the medical report supplied by plaintiff is essentially a narrative of plaintiffs physical complaints and recent treatment. (Mtn. to Rem. Ex.II). It contains an invoice amounting to S630.00 and concludes with the doctor commenting that he needs more information to make a prognosis and recommendations for further treatment. The report, then, neither clearly nor certainly establishes jurisdictional amount. Thus, the clock did not begin running until defendant received the demand letter. Accordingly, removal was timely.
Lastly, plaintiff claims that the removal is defective because it lacks the consent of all the defendants. However, it is well settled that the consent of all defendants is not necessary when the non-consenting defendants have not been properly served. Miranti v. Lee, 3 F.3d 925, 928 (5th Cir. 1993); Jones v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 979 F.2d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir. 1992). As the other defendants named in the case have not been served, their consent is not required for removal.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs motion to remand is DENIED.