Rushing v. State

22 Citing cases

  1. Drummer v. State

    167 So. 3d 1180 (Miss. 2015)   Cited 11 times
    Finding no error in giving a flight instruction where the defendant's "proffered explanation that he fled to avoid a ticket for running a stop sign was not legally sufficient in light of the facts"

    ¶ 39. “It is clear the statutory phrase ‘at different times' refers, albeit redundantly, to the incidents giving rise to the previous charges, and not to the date of conviction.” Rushing v. State, 461 So.2d 710, 713 (Miss.1984) (emphasis added). The defendant was presently charged with burglary and had two prior convictions of burglary.

  2. Griffin v. State

    607 So. 2d 1197 (Miss. 1992)   Cited 94 times
    Sleeping during voir dire race-neutral reason

    Finally, Griffin contends that the lower court's ruling as to the habitual offender status should be reversed because the previous convictions occurred on the same day and were based on guilty pleas. Rushing v. State, 461 So.2d 710 (Miss. 1984) and Presley v. State, 498 So.2d 832 (Miss. 1986), however, are directly on point and provide no relief for Griffin. "Appellant's argument that the statute does not apply where the convictions, though arising out of separate incidents, occurred on the same day is completely without merit and should be rejected."

  3. Murphy v. State

    566 So. 2d 1201 (Miss. 1990)   Cited 79 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the trial court may refuse an instruction which is without foundation in the evidence, incorrectly states the law, or is provided in another instruction

    It was against this backdrop that this Court affirmed his conviction. In Rushing v. State, 461 So.2d 710 (Miss. 1984), also relied on by the dissent, "the narrow question presented by [the appellant was] whether or not possession of stolen property one month after the burglary is `recent' under Mississippi law, so as to give rise to a presumption of guilt on the part of the accused." Id. at 712.

  4. Burt v. State

    493 So. 2d 1325 (Miss. 1986)   Cited 58 times
    Holding as separate crimes two felony convictions proved by indictments showing different dates for prior burglary offenses, as well as two different dwellings and victims, even though the date of the conviction was the same

    1982) (there all charges arose out of one incident). In Rushing v. State, 461 So.2d 710 (Miss. 1984), as here, certified copies of Rushing's two prior burglary convictions were introduced. Unlike here, both convictions were on the same date but the crimes were not committed on the same date. Contention was made that the statutory phrase "at different times" refers to the times of prior convictions. The Court, in disposing of the matter, said the following:

  5. Jones v. State

    2007 KA 928 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 6 times
    In Jones, James Earl Jones challenged his conviction for burglary of a dwelling based on the legal sufficiency and weight of the evidence.

    " Id. To determine whether the possession of the stolen items was recent, we look at whether the interval between the time of the theft and the known possession by the accused is short enough to render it "morally or reasonably certain that there could have been no intermediate change of possession." Rushing v. State, 461 So.2d 710, 712 (Miss. 1984). There is undisputed evidence that Jones possessed some of the stolen items on or about November 12, two days before the burglary was discovered.

  6. Commonwealth v. Resende

    474 Mass. 455 (Mass. 2016)   Cited 28 times
    In Resende, 474 Mass. at 469, 52 N.E.3d 1016, we concluded that § 10G requires separate and sequential prosecutions in order to count prior convictions individually; however, § 25 (a) and § 10G stand on very different footing.

    Id. at 177, 333 N.W.2d 391 (White, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Watson v. State, 392 So.2d 1274, 1279 (Ala.Crim.App.1980) ; Linn v. State, 658 P.2d 150, 152 (Alaska Ct.App.1983) ; Knight v. State, 277 Ark. 213, 215–216, 640 S.W.2d 442 (1982) ; Stradt v. State, 608 N.W.2d 28, 29–30 (Iowa 2000) ; Rushing v. State, 461 So.2d 710, 713 (Miss.1984). I would not infuse our analysis with hindsight doubts about whether the statute has served as an effective deterrent, or whether it might seemingly prove unduly harsh in some circumstances.

  7. Seales v. State

    90 So. 3d 37 (Miss. 2012)   Cited 5 times

    ¶ 25. “Under Mississippi law, possession of recently stolen property is a circumstance which may be considered by the jury and from which, in the absence of a reasonable explanation, the jury may infer guilt.” Rushing v. State, 461 So.2d 710, 712 (Miss.1984). “In order to give rise to an inference of guilt from the fact of possession, the State has the burden of proving possession by the accused of stolen property to have been personal, recent, unexplained, and exclusive.”

  8. Seales v. State

    NO. 2010-KA-01525-SCT (Miss. Mar. 29, 2012)

    ¶25. "Under Mississippi law, possession of recently stolen property is a circumstance which may be considered by the jury and from which, in the absence of a reasonable explanation, the jury may infer guilt." Rushing v. State, 461 So. 2d 710, 712 (Miss. 1984). "In order to give rise to an inference of guilt from the fact of possession, the State has the burden of proving possession by the accused of stolen property to have been personal, recent, unexplained, and exclusive."

  9. McFarlane v. State

    2001 WY 10 (Wyo. 2001)   Cited 9 times

    McFarlane's involvement in buying and selling snowmobiles can, at best, be characterized as incidental. The events of this theft took place in a fairly compact area within Weston County, and any doubt that the jury might have harbored, or that we might harbor, is not a reasonable one. See generally, Annotation, What Constitutes `Recently' Stolen Property Within Rule Inferring Guilt from Unexplained Possession of Such Property, 89 A.L.R.3d 1202 (1979 Supp. 2000); and see Rogers v. State, 185 Ga. App. 211, 363 S.E.2d 846, 848-49 (Ga. 1987) (two months not too remote); People v. Panus, 76 Ill.2d 263, 391 N.E.2d 376, 379 (Ill. 1979) (four months not too remote); Rushing v. State, 461 So.2d 710, 712-13 (Miss. 1984) (one month not too remote); Marbles v. State, 874 S.W.2d 225, 227-28 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994) (two and a half months not too remote); and Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 269 S.E.2d 352, 353 (Va. 1980) (four weeks not too remote). [¶ 12] The Judgment and Sentence of the district court is affirmed.

  10. Shields v. State

    702 So. 2d 380 (Miss. 1997)   Cited 55 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Affirming the defendant's conviction where the supreme court found that factors 1, 2, and 4 "lend[ed] strength" to the inference that the defendant was guilty, but "the third factor detract[ed] from the inference"

    Id. at fn. 2. As for Rushing v. State, 461 So.2d 710 (Miss. 1984), this Court noted that the issue there raised concerned the definition of "recent" within the doctrine giving inferential weight to "recent possession." Id.