¶ 39. “It is clear the statutory phrase ‘at different times' refers, albeit redundantly, to the incidents giving rise to the previous charges, and not to the date of conviction.” Rushing v. State, 461 So.2d 710, 713 (Miss.1984) (emphasis added). The defendant was presently charged with burglary and had two prior convictions of burglary.
Finally, Griffin contends that the lower court's ruling as to the habitual offender status should be reversed because the previous convictions occurred on the same day and were based on guilty pleas. Rushing v. State, 461 So.2d 710 (Miss. 1984) and Presley v. State, 498 So.2d 832 (Miss. 1986), however, are directly on point and provide no relief for Griffin. "Appellant's argument that the statute does not apply where the convictions, though arising out of separate incidents, occurred on the same day is completely without merit and should be rejected."
It was against this backdrop that this Court affirmed his conviction. In Rushing v. State, 461 So.2d 710 (Miss. 1984), also relied on by the dissent, "the narrow question presented by [the appellant was] whether or not possession of stolen property one month after the burglary is `recent' under Mississippi law, so as to give rise to a presumption of guilt on the part of the accused." Id. at 712.
1982) (there all charges arose out of one incident). In Rushing v. State, 461 So.2d 710 (Miss. 1984), as here, certified copies of Rushing's two prior burglary convictions were introduced. Unlike here, both convictions were on the same date but the crimes were not committed on the same date. Contention was made that the statutory phrase "at different times" refers to the times of prior convictions. The Court, in disposing of the matter, said the following:
" Id. To determine whether the possession of the stolen items was recent, we look at whether the interval between the time of the theft and the known possession by the accused is short enough to render it "morally or reasonably certain that there could have been no intermediate change of possession." Rushing v. State, 461 So.2d 710, 712 (Miss. 1984). There is undisputed evidence that Jones possessed some of the stolen items on or about November 12, two days before the burglary was discovered.
Id. at 177, 333 N.W.2d 391 (White, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Watson v. State, 392 So.2d 1274, 1279 (Ala.Crim.App.1980) ; Linn v. State, 658 P.2d 150, 152 (Alaska Ct.App.1983) ; Knight v. State, 277 Ark. 213, 215–216, 640 S.W.2d 442 (1982) ; Stradt v. State, 608 N.W.2d 28, 29–30 (Iowa 2000) ; Rushing v. State, 461 So.2d 710, 713 (Miss.1984). I would not infuse our analysis with hindsight doubts about whether the statute has served as an effective deterrent, or whether it might seemingly prove unduly harsh in some circumstances.
¶ 25. “Under Mississippi law, possession of recently stolen property is a circumstance which may be considered by the jury and from which, in the absence of a reasonable explanation, the jury may infer guilt.” Rushing v. State, 461 So.2d 710, 712 (Miss.1984). “In order to give rise to an inference of guilt from the fact of possession, the State has the burden of proving possession by the accused of stolen property to have been personal, recent, unexplained, and exclusive.”
¶25. "Under Mississippi law, possession of recently stolen property is a circumstance which may be considered by the jury and from which, in the absence of a reasonable explanation, the jury may infer guilt." Rushing v. State, 461 So. 2d 710, 712 (Miss. 1984). "In order to give rise to an inference of guilt from the fact of possession, the State has the burden of proving possession by the accused of stolen property to have been personal, recent, unexplained, and exclusive."
McFarlane's involvement in buying and selling snowmobiles can, at best, be characterized as incidental. The events of this theft took place in a fairly compact area within Weston County, and any doubt that the jury might have harbored, or that we might harbor, is not a reasonable one. See generally, Annotation, What Constitutes `Recently' Stolen Property Within Rule Inferring Guilt from Unexplained Possession of Such Property, 89 A.L.R.3d 1202 (1979 Supp. 2000); and see Rogers v. State, 185 Ga. App. 211, 363 S.E.2d 846, 848-49 (Ga. 1987) (two months not too remote); People v. Panus, 76 Ill.2d 263, 391 N.E.2d 376, 379 (Ill. 1979) (four months not too remote); Rushing v. State, 461 So.2d 710, 712-13 (Miss. 1984) (one month not too remote); Marbles v. State, 874 S.W.2d 225, 227-28 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994) (two and a half months not too remote); and Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 269 S.E.2d 352, 353 (Va. 1980) (four weeks not too remote). [¶ 12] The Judgment and Sentence of the district court is affirmed.
Id. at fn. 2. As for Rushing v. State, 461 So.2d 710 (Miss. 1984), this Court noted that the issue there raised concerned the definition of "recent" within the doctrine giving inferential weight to "recent possession." Id.