Opinion
No. 1D10–6522.
2014-02-17
Lester RUSHING, former Husband, Appellant, v. Rebecca RUSHING, former Wife, Appellee.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Santa Rosa County. Thomas R. Santurri, Judge. Sharon Delene Regan of Regan & Roark, Pensacola, for Appellant. Daniel W. Uhlfelder of Daniel W. Uhlfelder, P.A., Grayton Beach, for Appellee.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Santa Rosa County. Thomas R. Santurri, Judge.
Sharon Delene Regan of Regan & Roark, Pensacola, for Appellant. Daniel W. Uhlfelder of Daniel W. Uhlfelder, P.A., Grayton Beach, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
This appeal is from a post-judgment order finding the former husband in contempt in a dissolution of marriage case. We dismiss the appeal because the order contemplates further judicial action to resolve the contempt claim fully. See Caribbean Fire & Assocs., Inc. v. Coastal Constr. Gr. of S. Fla., 985 So.2d 1197, 1199 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); Grafman v. Grafman, 488 So.2d 115 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). This dismissal is without prejudice to the filing of a timely appeal once the judicial labor on the former wife's motion for contempt and enforcement is complete. As a result of the dismissal, all pending motions are denied.
DISMISSED. THOMAS and RAY, JJ., concur; WETHERELL, J., concurs with Opinion.
WETHERELL, J., concurring.
I agree that the challenged order is not “final” and, thus, we lack jurisdiction to 924review the order at this time. That said, because of the additional delays and expense that resulted from this court's denial of Appellee's February 2012 motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction, I would have been inclined to exercise our discretion under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110( l ) to permit the trial court to render a final order if review of the challenged order were governed by rule 9.110. However, review of the challenged order is governed by rule 9.130(a)(4), not rule 9.110, and there is no corollary to rule 9.110( l ) in rule 9.130. Accordingly, notwithstanding the prior ruling on jurisdiction, I agree that we are compelled to dismiss this appeal as premature.