OCGA § 16-5-21 (b) (4). Discharging a gun is one means of using a deadly weapon. See Rushin v. State , 180 Ga.App. 276, 276 (1), 348 S.E.2d 910 (1986) ("The term ‘shooting’ ... clearly denotes the use of a deadly weapon."). Count 9 required proof of something Count 8 did not: that Adkins shot a gun from a moving vehicle, toward a person or persons, without legal justification.
[Cits.]" Rushin v. State, 180 Ga. App. 276 (1) ( 348 SE2d 910) (1986). Thus, those counts would not have been subject to a demurrer, even if the appointed attorney had filed one. Compare Smith v. Hardrick, 266 Ga. 54 ( 464 SE2d 198) (1995) (aggravated assault by use of hands, which, unlike guns, are not per se deadly weapons); Youngblood v. State, supra.
The informant's statement about the getaway car did not identify McCord or otherwise implicate him in the crimes charged, other admissible evidence included a description of the getaway car and showed that McCord had stolen a car, and the witnesses who directly implicated McCord were available to and did testify at trial. Peterkin v. State, 222 Ga. App. 329, 330 (2) ( 474 S.E.2d 231) (1996); Poole v. State, 193 Ga. App. 122, 123 (2) ( 387 S.E.2d 48) (1989) Rushin v. State, 180 Ga. App. 276, 277 (3) ( 348 S.E.2d 910) (1986). Therefore, we find the error in admitting Beach's testimony to be harmless.
Griffin v. State, 241 Ga. App. 783, 786(6) ( 527 S.E.2d 577) (1999).Rushin v. State, 180 Ga. App. 276(1) ( 348 S.E.2d 910) (1986). For the reasons stated above, we find that the trial court erred in quashing Count 2 of the indictment charging Tate with aggravated assault.
See King v. State, 178 Ga. App. 343, 344 (1) ( 343 S.E.2d 401) (1986). See Rushin v. State, 180 Ga. App. 276 (1) ( 348 S.E.2d 910) (1986) (indictment alleging aggravated assault by "shooting" charged defendant with violating OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) — assault with deadly weapon). OCGA § 16-5-20 (a).
]" Teague v. State, supra at 537. See also Rushin v. State, 180 Ga. App. 276 (3) ( 348 S.E.2d 910) (1986); Simmons v. State, 174 Ga. App. 906, 907 (2) ( 331 S.E.2d 923) (1985). 2.
It is unclear from this enumeration exactly how it is that appellant contends the trial court erred. The record shows that appellant filed neither a pre-trial demurrer to the indictment nor a post-judgment motion in arrest of the judgment of conviction. Compare Phillips v. State, 240 Ga. 453 ( 241 S.E.2d 203) (1978); Rushin v. State, 180 Ga. App. 276 (1) ( 348 S.E.2d 910) (1986); Ponder v. State, 121 Ga. App. 788 ( 175 S.E.2d 55) (1970); Martin v. State, 96 Ga. App. 557, 558 (1) ( 100 S.E.2d 645) (1957). Accordingly, appellant's contention presumably is that it was error for the trial court to charge on aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as a lesser included offense of malice or felony murder.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in overruling the demurrer. See OCGA § 17-7-54; Rushin v. State, 180 Ga. App. 276 (1) ( 348 S.E.2d 910) (1986). 3.