Opinion
Civil Action 1:21-cv-00316
04-27-2022
JOHN RUSH, et al, Plaintiffs, v. JOHN E. WETZEL, et al., Defendants.
ECF No. 45
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Lisa Pupo Lenihan United States Magistrate Judge
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth herein, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiffs' Motion for Injunction (ECF No. 45) be denied.
II. REPORT
A. Background
This case has been filed by multiple Plaintiffs alleging that the policy at SCI-Forest of housing unvaccinated prisoners under segregation and away from vaccinated prisoners violates their constitutional rights to equal protection, places them under harsher restrictions, isolation and confinement, and is therefore cruel and unusual punishment. The restrictions include limited law library use, denial of contact visitation, shortened day room and yard privileges.
According to Defendants' Response to the Preliminary Injunction, 12 of the named Plaintiffs have now received the Covid-19 vaccine. ECF No. 71 fn.1. In addition, 2 were transferred and 2 paroled. Id. fn.2.
In addition, they allege that more than half of the prison officials are unvaccinated, and that the prison officials are causing these unvaccinated Plaintiffs to be exposed to COVID-19, also constituting cruel and unusual punishment.
Plaintiffs are seeking a preliminary injunction asking that “all prison officials, contractors and persons that are unvaccinated for COVID-19 not be aloud (sic) to enter the grounds of SCI Forest due to individuals living in congregate setting such as prisons are at a higher risk of contracting and spreading COVID-19.” ECF No. 45. Defendants filed a Response in opposition as well as a Supplemental Response. ECF Nos. 71 and 77.
B. Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 allows a court to enter a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, measures that the Supreme Court has described as “extraordinary remed[ies] never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). Because they are seeking injunctive relief, Plaintiffs have the burden of demonstrating: (1) a reasonable probability of success in the litigation; (2) irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) the possibility of harm to other interested persons from the grant or denial of the injunction; and (4) that the public interest would best be served by granting the injunction. Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Del. River Port Auth. v. Transamerican Trailer Transp., Inc., 501 F.2d 917, 919-20 (3d Cir. 1974)). Lane v. New Jersey, 725 Fed.Appx. 185 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004). The court in Reilly clarified that the burden rests on the moving party to prove the first two “most critical” factors. If this burden is carried, the court must then balance those two factors against whether there will be irreparable injury to the opposing party if the injunction is granted and whether public interest favors an injunction. Id. at 179.
In establishing a likelihood of success on the merits, the moving party must make “a showing significantly better than negligible but not necessarily more likely than not.” Id. As to the second element of irreparable harm, the moving party must “demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction,” not just that irreparable injury is possible. Winter, 555 U.S.at 22. Preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy and should be granted only in limited circumstances. Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004).
The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be fairly and fully litigated and determined by strictly legal proofs and according to the principles of equity. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980). Thus, ‘”the grant of injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in limited circumstances.”' American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1426-27 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Frank's GMC Truck Ctr., Inc. v. Gen. Motor Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988)), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1103 (1995).
Moreover, in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.'” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Where a plaintiff requests an injunction that would require the court to interfere with the administration of a prison, “appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the “operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974).
The Supreme Court of the United States has articulated that deference is given to the prison administration's procedures to effectively manage the detention facilities. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 (1979). The Third Circuit has articulated this deference “not merely because the administrator ordinarily will.. .have a better grasp of his domain than the reviewing judge, but also because the operation of our correctional facilities is peculiarly the province of the Legislative and Executive Branches of our Government not the Judicial.” Hope v. Warden York County Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 326-327 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing to Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548 (1979)). In Hope, the Third Circuit went on to explain:
The District Court correctly observed that COVID-19 presents “highly unusual and unique circumstances,” that have “radically transformed our everyday lives in ways previously inconceivable,” and have “altered [our world] with lightning speed ... and unprecedented [results.]” So we must evaluate the Government's response to the virus in that context. But the Court's orders do not indicate any serious consideration of the Government's recent efforts at York and Pike, save for a passing reference in the April 10 order that the Government had “ramped up [ ] sanitation protocols.”Hope v. Warden York County Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 330 (internal citations omitted).
Standards in prisons are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). Prison inmates retain certain constitutional rights does not mean that these rights are not subject to restrictions and limitations. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948). A “mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).
The two requirements for a violation of the Eighth Amendment are (1) the deprivation alleged must be “sufficiently serious” and (2) the prison officials must have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). In the present case, this is the state of mind of “deliberate indifference”. Id; Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993).
Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners violates the Eighth Amendment because it constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain contrary to contemporary standards of decency. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993). A prison official may be held liable for deliberate indifference only if inmates face a substantial risk and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 848 (1994). Courts should not deny an injunction to inmates who plainly proved an unsafe, life-threatening condition in their prison on the ground that nothing yet has happened to them. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). Deliberate indifference should be determined by the attitudes and conduct at the time suit is brought if risk of injury has not ripened into actual harm. Id. at 36.
Regarding the conditions of confinement, the same standard of “deliberate indifference” is used. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The question is whether the inmate was denied the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. Counterman v. Finley, 2021 WL 3811664, at *8 (M.D. Pa. April 27, 2021); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992); Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 345 (3d Cir. 2000). In Atkinson v. Taylor, the Third Circuit stated that:
The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments inconsistent with “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958)). Conditions of prison confinement violate the Eighth Amendment only if they “deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981).Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 272 (3d Cir. 2003).
In Ali v. Rivello, the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania wrote that Ali cannot refuse a vaccine that would largely ensure protection from COVID-19 and then allege that prison officials are failing to ensure his protection of safety. Ali v. Rivello, 2021 WL 5003406, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 28. 2021). By refusing a vaccine, he “dooms his Eighth Amendment claim”. Id. The Middle District cited to Fudge v. Finley, which states that an inmate “cannot refuse medical care and then cite the lack of such case as an Eighth Amendment violation.” Fudge v. Finley, 2021 WL 1978426, at *8 (M.D. Pa. April 28, 2021).
C. Discussion
Based on review of applicable caselaw, the Court finds that the reasonable probability of success on the merits is far from clear. The Plaintiffs' burden of proving deliberate indifference is high. The prison administration has tried to stop the spread of COVID-19 by segregating the vaccinated and unvaccinated inmates, even though some prison officials are unvaccinated. In addition, the DOC has and continues to employ various strategies to help protect its incarcerated population from contracting covid.
The cases cited above, Counterman v. Finley and Ali v. Rivello, concerned the issue of an inmate who refused to be vaccinated who feared contracting COVID-19. While the request in Counterman was to be released from prison, the reasoning is nonetheless applicable. The District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania found that Counterman and Ali had refused the care offered by not being vaccinated, which the Court found was a simple measure that Counterman could have taken to ensure his well-being. The Middle District went as far as to say that “[t]his dooms his Eighth Amendment claim. Ali cannot refuse a vaccine that would largely ensure his protection from COVID-19 and then allege that prison officials are failing to ensure his protection from COVID-19.” Ali, 2021 WL 5003406, at *3.
It is unclear why the Plaintiffs in the current action are not vaccinated, possibly for religious or medical reasons, but our sister Courts in the Middle District found that the measures taken by the prison officials relative to COVID-19 protections did not deprive those plaintiffs of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. In addition, the officials in the present action have not shown indifference to the petitioner's medical needs by segregating prison populations based on their vaccination status and not being vaccinated. Because new COVID-19 recommendations have been released, the prison administration is implementing changes to the previous rules. These changes include: (a) all inmates (regardless of vaccination status) will have 32 hours of out of cell time per week effective April 4, 2022; (b) unvaccinated inmates will be permitted in-person visits effective April 18, 2022; (c) unvaccinated inmates will be permitted to resume programming, activities and return to previously held jobs effective April 4, 2022; (d) the “unvaccinated unit” is no longer required to be housing for solely unvaccinated inmates and this is being done with the eventual goal of integrating all inmates. ECF No. 77, ¶6.
While there may be a risk posed by the prison officials who are unvaccinated, there are other procedures in place, such as mask-wearing, free vaccinations to prisoners and staff, and enhanced screening and temperature checks of individuals entering the facility. ECF No. 71, ¶10.
As to the second prong of the test, irreparable harm, the Court finds that the prison administration is acting within reasonable measures to abate the risk of serious harm to both vaccinated and unvaccinated inmates as set forth above.
The third prong involves the harm to others from the grant of the injunction. If the preliminary injunction was granted, there would not be enough staff to support the operations of the facility, which would hard the institution as well as the public. ECF No. 71, ¶11-12. Additionally as to the public interest prong, the Court finds that, in the interest of security of the general public, as well as obedience to case law, the Court should not interfere with the administration of a prison, (See Rizzo and Wolff, supra.) particularly where it appears that the administrative measures in question are reasonably protecting the prison population.
III. CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiffs' Motion for Injunction (ECF No. 45) be denied.
In accordance with the applicable provisions of the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)&(C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, Plaintiff shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of the service of this report and recommendation to file written objections thereto. Plaintiff's failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of his appellate rights.