In First Commodity Traders, Inc. v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 766 F.2d 1007, 1013 (7th Cir. 1985), we treated Larson as an authoritative exposition of Illinois law — fairly enough, since the only other modern cases in Illinois that discuss the doctrine describe and apply it similarly, and of the three decisions Larson contains the fullest discussion. Rural Electric Convenience Cooperative Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 118 Ill.App.3d 647, 653-54, 73 Ill.Dec. 951, 955, 454 N.E.2d 1200, 1204 (1983); IK Corp. v. One Financial Place Partnership, 200 Ill.App.3d 802, 815, 146 Ill.Dec. 198, 211, 558 N.E.2d 161, 170 (1990). The persistence of the doctrine, nineteenth-century phraseology and all, is not a peculiarity of Illinois jurisprudence.
Id. at 364. See Rural Electric Convenience Cooperative Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 118 Ill. App.3d 647, 652, 454 N.E.2d 1200, 1203-04, 73 Ill.Dec. 951, 954-55 (1983). In addition to noting the uncertainty surrounding the application of the "mend the hold" doctrine, Best Buy also argues that even if the doctrine were available, it would not have any impact on this case because Best Buy has not mended its hold outside the litigation.
This situation is much like the one that has led Illinois courts to adopt the doctrine that bars a litigant from "mending its hold": changing its litigation stance after its opponent has mustered and expended its own forces to counter the original theory. Indeed this case is startlingly similar to Rural Electric Convenience Co-operative Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 118 Ill. App.3d 647, 653-54, 73 Ill.Dec. 951, 955, 454 N.E.2d 1200, 1204 (4th Dist. 1983), where the litigant was not permitted to "mend its hold" by "chang[ing] its theory [of recovery] . . . after all the evidence in the case had been heard." One related issue also bears passing mention: Philko's attempted proof of damages on the purchase theory it now seeks to abandon, and its corresponding failure of proof on the security-interest theory it now seeks to embrace.
For this and other reasons, the court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. More recently, in Rural Electric Convenience Cooperative Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm., 118 Ill. App.3d 647, 73 Ill.Dec. 951, 454 N.E.2d 1200 (4th Dist. 1983), the RECC did not claim a particular right under its agreement with the Central Illinois Public Service Co. until all of the evidence in an administrative hearing had been heard. As in Larson, the appellate court concluded that allowing the RECC to "mend its hold" well into the litigation was inequitable and decided that the RECC's new claim should not have been considered by the trial court.
That motion is denied. See Rural Electric Convenience Cooperative Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n , 118 Ill. App. 3d 647, 652, 73 Ill.Dec. 951, 454 N.E.2d 1200 (1983) (declining to take judicial notice of an irrelevant exhibit). ¶ 26 Defendants raise a second argument that the cutoff date was arbitrary, i.e. , not rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
" Schuyler County v. Missouri Bridge & Iron Co., 256 Ill. 348, 353 (1912). Accord Trossman v. Philipsborn, 373 Ill. App. 3d 1020, 1042 (2007) (quoting Schuyler); see also Rural Electric Convenience Cooperative Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 118 Ill. App. 3d 647, 654 (1983) (where plaintiff's administrative complaint asserted a right to relief upon certain grounds, and plaintiff sought to introduce a new ground for relief after all evidence in the case had been heard, such change in position was barred by the mend-the-hold doctrine). This principle is typically applied in contract cases to prevent a party from trying to evade performance of his contractual duties for one reason, and then, in the middle of litigation, switching to another reason.
Moreover, this court may take judicial notice regardless of whether such notice was sought at the trial court level. Rural Electric Convenience Cooperative Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 647, 454 N.E.2d 1200. In this case, the August 15, 1990, letter reflects an official decision of an administrative tribunal and is part of the public record.
This court may take judicial notice of this publication as a public record ( Finish Line Express, Inc. v. City of Chicago (1978), 72 Ill.2d 131, 135-36, 379 N.E.2d 290, 291; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 116, par. 43.103); and we elect to do so in this case, given its relevance to the issue before us and despite the fact the Manual was apparently not relied upon by the parties or the Board in the proceedings below. RuralElectric Convenience Cooperative Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 647, 651, 454 N.E.2d 1200, 1202. In their briefs and at oral argument, the parties argued the local assessment procedure includes merely taking the certified soil productivity figures (subsection (1) of section 20e) and debasing these figures for slope and erosion, et cetera, to arrive at the equalized assessed value for a parcel of farmland.
• 8 Although a court reviewing a section 2-615 motion to dismiss is limited to considering only the factual allegations set out in the complaint (see Mason v. Rosewell (1982), 107 Ill. App.3d 943; Inland Real Estate Corp. v. Christoph (1981), 107 Ill. App.3d 183), an appellate court may, at any time, take judicial notice of records of proceedings in its own or other courts which contain easily verifiable, though not generally known, facts as an "aid in the efficient disposition of litigation." ( People v. Davis (1976), 65 Ill.2d 157, 165; Rural Electric Convenience Cooperative Co. v. Illinois Commerce Com. (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 647, 651-52.) To prevent the entirely unwarranted continuation of litigation in the present case, this court will take judicial notice of Weimann's arrest warrant, which clearly renders the Fulford and Hughes decisions inapplicable here.
Judicial notice may be taken of facts not in the record. ( Rural Electric Convenience Cooperative Co. v. Illinois Commerce Com. (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 647, 454 N.E.2d 1200.) To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual forms of evidence will be dispensed with if the fact is one which is commonly known or readily verifiable from sources of indisputable accuracy.