Ruoff v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue

8 Citing cases

  1. Hafften v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue

    76 T.C. 831 (U.S.T.C. 1981)   Cited 1 times

    Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572, 577 (1970); United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963). Petitioners maintain that the instant case is factually equivalent to Ruoff v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 222 (3d Cir. 1960), revg. 30 T.C. 204 (1958). In that case, the taxpayer's property had been seized under the Trading with the Enemy Act.

  2. Cruttenden v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

    70 T.C. 191 (U.S.T.C. 1978)   Cited 1 times
    In Cruttenden v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. No. 18 (May 8, 1978) — cited by plaintiff as a decision in which legal fees paid to facilitate the return of property (securities) were held deductible — there was no hint of a challenge to any title or legal interests of those taxpayers (the Cruttendens) but merely a failure, for economic and financial reasons, to return the property on time.

    The law is settled that expenses (including legal expenses) paid or incurred to perfect or defend title are not currently deductible but constitute a part of the cost of the property. Boagni v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 708 (1973); Reed v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 32 (1970); Spangler v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1963); cf. Ruoff v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 204 (1958), revd. 277 F.2d 222 (3d Cir. 1960). However, the facts in the instant case demonstrate that the legal expenses paid by petitioners in no manner related to the title of the securities lent to Command.

  3. Cruttenden v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue

    70 T.C. 191 (U.S.T.C. 1978)

    The law is settled that expenses (including legal expenses) paid or incurred to perfect or defend title are not currently deductible but constitute a part of the cost of the property. Boagni v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 708 (1973); Reed v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 32 (1970); Spangler v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1963); cf. Ruoff v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 204 (1958), revd. 277 F.2d 222 (3d Cir. 1960). However, the facts in the instant case demonstrate that the legal expenses paid by petitioners in no manner related to the title of the securities lent to Command.

  4. Davis v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue (In re Estate of Davis)

    79 T.C. 503 (U.S.T.C. 1982)   Cited 6 times

    The line of demarcation between currently deductible and capital expenditures is often a shadowy one and “It would be idle to suggest that all the authorities in this field can be reconciled.” Ruoff v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 204, 208 (1958), revd. on other grounds 277 F.2d 222 (3d Cir. 1960). For guidance in drawing the line with respect to litigation expenses in cases involving the acquisition, retention, or disposition of capital assets, the origin and character of the claim, not the purpose for which the claim is prosecuted, are the controlling criteria.

  5. Madden v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue

    57 T.C. 513 (U.S.T.C. 1972)   Cited 9 times

    They rely on our opinion in L. B. Reakirt, 29 B.T.A. 1296 (1934), affirmed per curiam 84 F.2d 996 (C.A. 6, 1936). Alternatively, petitioners assert that the legal expenses in question are deductible under section 212(2) because they ‘related to the protection or preservation of income-producing property, ‘ citing Ruoff v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 222 (C.A. 3, 1960), reversing 30 T.C. 204 (1958). To the contrary, respondent contends that the legal fees relating to the condemnation of the orchard property do not come within the ambit of deductibility provided by either section 162(a) or section 212.

  6. Bessenyey v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue

    45 T.C. 261 (U.S.T.C. 1965)   Cited 74 times
    In Bessenyey v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 261, 274 (1965), affd. 379 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1967), we noted that a record of continuing losses is an important factor in determining the taxpayer's true intentions.

    The cases dealing with the question whether legal expenses incurred in obtaining the return of property seized by the Alien Property Custodian are to be regarded as capital costs and therefore not deductible as ‘expenses' (see O.D. 1048, 5 C.B. 127; A.R.R. 2318, II-1 C.B. 82) have reached results that are often difficult to reconcile with one another. For example, compare Spangler v. Commissioner, supra, with Ruoff v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 222 (C.A. 3), reversing 30 T.C. 204. However, we need not enter that thicket, for the $25,000 bequest in the present case, unlike Spangler and Ruoff, involves cash alone.

  7. Zietz v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue

    34 T.C. 369 (U.S.T.C. 1960)   Cited 3 times

    As we said in the Goldberg case (p. 268), we do not think the facts of the instant case bring it within the rule of those cases decided in this Court which have held ‘that expense incurred in the defense of title must be capitalized.’ This case is distinguishable from Hermann F. Ruoff, 30 T.C. 204, revd. 277 F.2d 222, and cases there cited. Decision will be entered for the petitioners.

  8. Goldberg v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue

    31 T.C. 258 (U.S.T.C. 1958)   Cited 1 times

    What we do decide is that petitioner is entitled to deduct under the provisions of section 23(a) (2) the $2,500 retainer fee which she paid to attorney Case in 1953. We think that Herman F. Ruoff, 30 T.C. 204, is not controlling here because we think it is distinguishable on its facts. In the Ruoff case, the taxpayers were the owners of property which had been seized by the Alien Property Custodian and which the taxpayers sought to recover by a civil suit.