Opinion
No. 4-823 / 03-1775
Filed July 13, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Dale E. Ruigh, Judge.
Michael Ron Runyan appeals from denial of his application for postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
John G. Martens, Ames, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Tabor, Assistant Attorney General, and Stephen Holmes, County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan, Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ., and Nelson, S.J.
Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2005).
Michael Ron Runyan appeals an order of the district court dismissing his application for postconviction relief based on ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel. We affirm the ruling of the district court.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
Michael Ron Runyan was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder during the fall of 1997 following a multi-day trial. He was sentenced on November 17, 1997, to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. He appealed his conviction, alleging that the trial court had improperly limited his cross-examination of co-defendant Luke Abrams in regard to Mr. Abrams's plea agreement. The conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals. See State v. Runyan, 599 N.W.2d 474, 481 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999).
The circumstances surrounding the crime were described by our court as follows:
On April 20, 1997, youthful revelry took a tragic turn when nineteen-year-old Uri Sellers was fatally stabbed by twenty-year-old Michael Runyan during Iowa State University's annual "Veisha" celebration. The stabbing occurred at approximately 2:30 a.m. outside the Adelante Fraternity house on Welch Avenue in Ames where a party was in progress. Defendant turned himself in to the police a few days later, and on May 5, was formally charged with first-degree murder. Defendant admitted the stabbing but claimed he acted with justification, and did not intend to seriously injure the victim. Following trial, a jury found Runyan guilty of first-degree murder as charged.
In his original application, the defendant urged a number of grounds in seeking to establish ineffective assistance of trial counsel. These grounds include insufficient support of defendant's motion for change of venue, failure to obtain removal of three specific persons from the jury panel, inadequate preparation of the defendant's testimony, inadequate cross-examination of Luke Abrams, failing to object to portions of the State's closing argument, inadequate closing argument by his counsel, improper agreement to evidentiary stipulation, failure to object to portions of Ames Police Officers' testimony concerning witnesses' bad character, failure to question DCI agents Seward and Knippel effectively concerning their initial interview of defendant after he voluntarily surrendered to law enforcement officials in Fort Dodge, and failure to appeal denial of motions for judgment of acquittal. Regarding appeal, the defendant contends appellate counsel was ineffective in limiting his appeal to the one issue, limitation of cross-examination of Mr. Abrams.
The district court considered each of the issues set out above and denied the postconviction application in its entirety. On appeal, the defendant's brief concentrates on three of the above issues: change of venue, jury selection, and preparation of defendant to testify. These three issues will be specifically addressed with facts intertwined as needed.
Review of postconviction proceedings is de novo when constitutional issues are involved. State v. Berryhill, 603 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Iowa 1999), citing Key v. State, 577 N.W.2d 637, 639 (Iowa 1998). The test to be considered is whether counsel's performance was reasonably effective. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984). To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, the applicant must show (1) trial counsel neglected an essential duty, and (2) prejudice resulted. Id.
With respect to the three alleged shortcomings referenced above, the applicant does not contend his counsel did not move for a change of venue, did not challenge jurors, or did not prepare him for testimony, but that she did not receive what he considered the optimum result.
Change of Venue.
Regarding the change of venue issue, applicant's counsel made the motion, supporting it with three evidentiary exhibits: (1) a collection of newspaper articles, (2) a videotape of broadcasts aired on local television stations, and (3) a written report entitled, "Veisha 1997; a report of the Veisha Advisory Council and the office of the Vice-President for Student Affairs." (Exhibits A, B, and C). The applicant complains, however, that counsel did not conduct a public opinion survey and present the results thereof in support of her motion. Obviously, applicant can cite no law or case which even suggests, much less requires, a public opinion survey in support of a motion for change of venue. In actuality, the Veisha study contained a view of the community's attitude toward Sellers's death. It was, in effect, a public opinion survey. See generally State v. Green, 457 N.W.2d 20, 23 (Iowa 1990).
Applicant's counsel timely filed the motion for change of venue, properly supplemented it with exhibits, and argued the motion. The fact that the motion was not granted is not indicative of ineffective assistance. See Osborn v. State, 573 N.W.2d 917, 924 (Iowa 1999).
Jury Selection.
With respect to the time regarding jury selection, the applicant contends ineffective assistance was rendered because two of three individually-identified jurors were not removed from the initial panel. The three include Wayne Clinton and Jason Schmidt, who ultimately served on the jury, and Dana Lee-Inbody, who was selected as an alternate but did not participate. Mr. Schmidt was challenged for cause, but the challenge was overruled. Obviously, neither was peremptorily challenged. The transcript discloses both Mr. Schmidt and Mr. Clinton were extensively questioned concerning their qualifications and information about the case. None of their answers indicated they could not or would not serve as fair and impartial jurors.
The fact that defendant's counsel elected not to challenge Mr. Schmidt peremptorily after the challenge for cause was overruled does not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Simmons, 454 N.W.2d 866, 868 (Iowa 1990).
Preparation of Defendant to Testify.
The applicant contends he was inadequately prepared to testify. No specific examples of inadequate preparation were pointed out by applicant. Applicant's trial counsel disputes the allegation of inadequate preparation. She testified she reviewed potential cross-examination questions, questions regarding his self-defense claims, applicable principles of law including the jury instructions, and cautioned him about his demeanor on the stand.
Claiming counsel should have done a better job is not enough; specific ways in which counsel was inadequate are required. Dunbar v. State, 515 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa 1994).
The postconviction trial court correctly concluded that Mr. Runyan demonstrated no breach of prejudice resulting from lack of preparation for his testimony.
Ineffective Appellate Counsel.
Finally, applicant contends his appellate counsel was ineffective because he failed to raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in the original appeal. However, the ineffective assistance claims were considered by the postconviction trial court and are before this court on review. Those issues have been considered.
The postconviction trial court concluded its opinion with the following summary, which accurately reflects our conclusion:
The court has concluded that neither Mr. Runyan's trial counsel nor appellate counsel breached any essential duties in representing him at trial or on appeal. Even if the Court had concluded that counsel breached one or more essential duties, the overall record clearly shows that no prejudice resulted warranting postconviction relief. That is, despite any possible errors by trial or appellate counsel, no reasonable likelihood exists that the outcome of the trial would have been different, but for the errors. The evidence of Mr. Runyan's guilt presented to the jury was overwhelming. That evidence included the testimony of several people who actually witnessed the acts leading to Mr. Sellers' death. Mr. Runyan acknowledged to police officers that he had stabbed Mr. Sellers. Any errors by counsel, either individually or collectively, do not undermine confidence in the outcome of Mr. Runyan's trial. His request for postconviction relief must be denied.
For all the reasons set out herein, the decision of the postconviction court is affirmed.