Procedural law and rules do not generally implicate a substantive choice of law. Rungee v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 92 Idaho 718, 722, 449 P.2d 378, 382 (1968). This language indicates that the clause is meant as a choice of forum clause, not a choice of law clause.
Barber v. State Farm Mut. Ins., 931 P.2d, 1195, 1199 (Idaho 1997). See also Grover v. Isom, 53 P.3d 821 (Idaho 2002); Rungee v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 449 P.2d 378 (Idaho 1968); DeMeyer v. Maxwell, 647 P.2d 783 (Idaho Ct.App. 1982). "The goal of this test is to identify the state most significantly related to a particular issue and to apply its law to resolve that issue."
See, e.g., Clark v. Saint Paul Property Liab. Ins. Cos., 102 Idaho 756, 757, 639 P.2d 454, 455 (1981) (citations omitted). Although never adopted in full, this Court has opted in favor of applying the most significant relationship test set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (the Restatement). E.g., Johnson v. Pischke, 108 Idaho 397, 700 P.2d 19 (1985) (adopting § 145 of the Restatement); Rungee v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 92 Idaho 718, 449 P.2d 378 (1968) (adopting the proposed official draft of what became § 188 of the Restatement). The goal of this test is to identify the state most significantly related to a particular issue and to apply its law to resolve that issue.
Id. at § 98. In Rungee v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 92 Idaho 718, 449 P.2d 378 (1968), our Supreme Court adopted the "most significant relationship" test for determining the applicable law in contract dispute cases. 92 Idaho at 722-23, 449 P.2d at 382-83.
Idaho has adopted the Restatement rule that the law governing interpretation of a contract is the local law of the state that has "the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties." Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188(1) (1971) (hereinafter cited as Rest. 2d); Rungee v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 92 Idaho 718, 449 P.2d 378, 382-83 (1968). The relevant contacts include:
Barber v. State Farm Mut. Ins., 931 P.2d, 1195, 1199 (Idaho 1997). See also Grover v. Isom, 53 P.3d 821 (Idaho 2002); Rungee v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 449 P.2d 378 (Idaho 1968); DeMeyer v. Maxwell, 647 P.2d 783 (Idaho Ct.App. 1982). "The goal of this test is to identify the state most significantly related to a particular issue and to apply its law to resolve that issue." Suebert Excavators Inc. v. Anderson Logging Co., 889 P.2d. 82, 85 (Idaho 1995).
Relying on the Supreme Court's holding in Harris, state courts in Oklahoma, Idaho, Nevada, and Oregon have also determined that a generally applicable attorney's fee statute is not preempted by the Carmack Amendment. See AME, Inc. v. Consolidated Freightways, 783 P.2d 499 (Okla.Civ.App.1989); Pac. Intermountain Express Co. v. Leonard E. Conrad, Inc., 88 Nev. 569, 502 P.2d 106 (1972); Rungee v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 92 Idaho 718, 449 P.2d 378 (1968); Troute v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., Inc., 78 Or.App. 564, 718 P.2d 745 (1986).The analysis becomes more muddled by a series of decisions involving a Texas statute, which ironically was a successor to the statute found to be not preempted by the Supreme Court in Harris.
Oregon, Nevada, Florida, and Idaho have ruled that state attorney fees statutes are not preempted by Carmack. See Troute v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 78 Or.App. 564, 718 P.2d 745 (1986); Pacific Intermountain Express, Co. v. Conrad, Inc., 88 Nev. 569, 502 P.2d 106 (1972); Allied Van Lines, Inc. v. Brewer, 258 So.2d 496 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1972); and Rungee v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 92 Idaho 718, 449 P.2d 378 (1968). However, Nebraska and Texas have refused to apply their state statutes to interstate carriers on preemption grounds.
Marshall then argues that, while "[t]he Seventh Circuit has not squarely addressed whether a Wisconsin common law bad faith denial of an insurance claim is preempted by the Carmack Amendment . . . other courts have held that such claims are not preempted." (Pl.'s Br. at 4) (citing Rungee v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 92 Idaho 718, 449 P. 2d 378 (1968); Farina v. United Parcel Serv, Inc., Nos. M-21-84, MDL-1339, 00-CIV-3811; 02-CIV-2703, 2002 WL 1766554 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2002)). First of all, Rungee is a decision of the Idaho Supreme Court and is of limited, if any, precedential weight in this federal district court.
The Idaho Supreme Court has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws ("Restatement") "most significant contacts" test. See Rungee v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 92 Idaho 718 (1968); DeMeyer v. Maxwell, 103 Idaho 327 (Ct.App. 1982); and Grover v. Isom, 137 Idaho 770 (2002). The goal of this test is to identify the state most significantly related to a particular issue and apply its law to resolve that issue.