It is thus proper to bring out on cross-examination the number of times a witness testifies in court, or is involved in particular types of cases. See Rumptz v Leahey, 26 Mich. App. 438; 182 N.W.2d 614 (1970). In DeHaan v Winter, 262 Mich. 192; 247 N.W. 151 (1933), (After Remand) 265 Mich. 101; 251 N.W. 391 (1933), our Court held that permitting cross-examination of an expert witness concerning his interest in the event of suit was not error.
"The general rule, well established, is that when a jury requests that testimony be read back to it both the reading and extent of reading is a matter confided to the sound discretion of the trial judge. See Klein v Wagenheim, 379 Mich. 558, 561 [ 153 N.W.2d 663] (1967); People v Walker, 371 Mich. 599, 610 [ 124 N.W.2d 761] (1963); Rumptz v Leahey, 26 Mich. App. 438, 443 [ 182 N.W.2d 614] (1970). "In Klein v Wagenheim, supra, p 561, the Michigan Supreme Court considered and rejected the argument that it is not proper to read any testimony, unless all the testimony is read, because otherwise there would be a tendency to emphasize what is read.
The court's response was complete and fair to both parties and did not mislead the jurors into believing that no evidence of the policy was admitted at trial. See Rumptz v Leahey, 26 Mich. App. 438, 444; 182 N.W.2d 614 (1970). VI
In addition, Michigan courts have consistently recognized that the fact of insurance or noninsurance should not have the effect of creating a cause of action where none existed before; the injection of insurance coverage is not only an immaterial issue but has also been deemed to be highly prejudicial. See Benmark v Steffen, 374 Mich. 155; 132 N.W.2d 48 (1965), Darr v Buckley, 355 Mich. 392; 94 N.W.2d 837 (1959), Felice v Weinman, 372 Mich. 278; 126 N.W.2d 107 (1964), Rumptz v Leahey, 26 Mich. App. 438; 182 N.W.2d 614 (1970). In light of this strict adherence to the rule that insurance does not create liability, the existence of insurance in the instant case should not be employed as a controlling factor in determining the liability of the defendant-parents.
"` The general rule, well established, is that when a jury requests that testimony be read back to it both the reading and extent of reading is a matter confided to the sound discretion of the trial judge. See Klein v. Wagenheim, 379 Mich. 558, 561; 153 N.W.2d 663 (1967); People v. Walker, 371 Mich. 599, 610; 124 N.W.2d 761 (1963); Rumptz v. Leahey, 26 Mich. App. 438, 443; 182 N.W.2d 614 (1970). "`In Klein v. Wagenheim, supra, p 561, the Michigan Supreme Court considered and rejected the argument that it is not proper to read any testimony, unless all the testimony is read, because otherwise there would be a tendency to emphasize what is read.
"`The general rule, well established, is that when a jury requests that testimony be read back to it both the reading and extent of reading is a matter confided to the sound discretion of the trial judge. See Klein v Wagenheim, 379 Mich. 558, 561 [ 153 N.W.2d 663] (1967); People v Walker, 371 Mich. 599, 610 [ 124 N.W.2d 761] (1963); Rumptz v Leahey, 26 Mich. App. 438, 443 [ 182 N.W.2d 614] (1970). "`In Klein v Wagenheim, supra, p 561, the Michigan Supreme Court considered and rejected the argument that it is not proper to read any testimony, unless all the testimony is read, because otherwise there would be a tendency to emphasize what is read.
Impeachment of a witness by showing interest or bias is proper. We find no error on the basis of Rumptz v Leahey, 26 Mich. App. 438; 182 N.W.2d 614 (1970). Plaintiff's claim of error regarding time limitations on final oral argument was not preserved for appeal and further, if error occurred, it was harmless.
Under either line of cases, an accidental or inadvertent disclosure of an insurance company's interest in a case does not require the retrial of the matter. Bunda v. Hardwick, 376 Mich. 640, 138 N.W.2d 305 (1965); Rumptz v. Leahey, 26 Mich. App. 438, 182 N.W.2d 614 (1970); Bishop v. Wolinski, 16 Mich. App. 753, 168 N.W.2d 651 (1969). The reason for this is that the Michigan statute and the common law rule both seek to prevent counsel from deliberately injecting prejudicial or irrelevant matters into the legal dispute.
The general rule, well established, is that when a jury requests that testimony be read back to it both the reading and extent of reading is a matter confided to the sound discretion of the trial judge. See Klein v. Wagenheim, 379 Mich. 558, 561 (1967); People v. Walker, 371 Mich. 599, 610 (1963); Rumptz v. Leahey, 26 Mich. App. 438, 443 (1970). In Klein v. Wagenheim, supra, p 561, the Michigan Supreme Court considered and rejected the argument that it is not proper to read any testimony, unless all the testimony is read, because otherwise there would be a tendency to emphasize what is read.
We find no abuse here. People v. Walker (1963), 371 Mich. 599, 610; Rumptz v. Leahey (1970), 26 Mich. App. 438, 443. Morrin also objects to the admission into evidence of a photograph depicting Abell's wounds.