Rumptz v. Leahey

10 Citing cases

  1. Wilson v. Stilwill

    411 Mich. 587 (Mich. 1981)   Cited 68 times
    Concluding that the plaintiff in a medical malpractice claim had not established a prima facie case of negligence by the defendant hospital

    It is thus proper to bring out on cross-examination the number of times a witness testifies in court, or is involved in particular types of cases. See Rumptz v Leahey, 26 Mich. App. 438; 182 N.W.2d 614 (1970). In DeHaan v Winter, 262 Mich. 192; 247 N.W. 151 (1933), (After Remand) 265 Mich. 101; 251 N.W. 391 (1933), our Court held that permitting cross-examination of an expert witness concerning his interest in the event of suit was not error.

  2. People v. Howe

    392 Mich. 670 (Mich. 1974)   Cited 51 times
    Concluding that the trial court's abuse of discretion in rejecting a reasonable request from the jury required reversal of the defendant's conviction because there was no way to determine from the record the extent of the jury's confusion regarding the requested testimony

    "The general rule, well established, is that when a jury requests that testimony be read back to it both the reading and extent of reading is a matter confided to the sound discretion of the trial judge. See Klein v Wagenheim, 379 Mich. 558, 561 [ 153 N.W.2d 663] (1967); People v Walker, 371 Mich. 599, 610 [ 124 N.W.2d 761] (1963); Rumptz v Leahey, 26 Mich. App. 438, 443 [ 182 N.W.2d 614] (1970). "In Klein v Wagenheim, supra, p 561, the Michigan Supreme Court considered and rejected the argument that it is not proper to read any testimony, unless all the testimony is read, because otherwise there would be a tendency to emphasize what is read.

  3. McDonald v. Stroh Brewery Co.

    191 Mich. App. 601 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 13 times
    Holding that this Court did not have jurisdiction to review issues related to a prior order from which the plaintiffs did not appeal as of right

    The court's response was complete and fair to both parties and did not mislead the jurors into believing that no evidence of the policy was admitted at trial. See Rumptz v Leahey, 26 Mich. App. 438, 444; 182 N.W.2d 614 (1970). VI

  4. McCallister v. Sun Valley

    100 Mich. App. 131 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 24 times
    In McCallister v. Sun Valley Pools, Inc., 100 Mich. App. 131, 298 N.W.2d 687 (1980), the court stated that "the decision to purchase, maintain and instruct the family members as to the use of the family pool was within the management of family affairs," and thus, "involved an exercise of reasonable parental supervision over the child."

    In addition, Michigan courts have consistently recognized that the fact of insurance or noninsurance should not have the effect of creating a cause of action where none existed before; the injection of insurance coverage is not only an immaterial issue but has also been deemed to be highly prejudicial. See Benmark v Steffen, 374 Mich. 155; 132 N.W.2d 48 (1965), Darr v Buckley, 355 Mich. 392; 94 N.W.2d 837 (1959), Felice v Weinman, 372 Mich. 278; 126 N.W.2d 107 (1964), Rumptz v Leahey, 26 Mich. App. 438; 182 N.W.2d 614 (1970). In light of this strict adherence to the rule that insurance does not create liability, the existence of insurance in the instant case should not be employed as a controlling factor in determining the liability of the defendant-parents.

  5. People v. Richardson

    77 Mich. App. 411 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977)   Cited 5 times

    "` The general rule, well established, is that when a jury requests that testimony be read back to it both the reading and extent of reading is a matter confided to the sound discretion of the trial judge. See Klein v. Wagenheim, 379 Mich. 558, 561; 153 N.W.2d 663 (1967); People v. Walker, 371 Mich. 599, 610; 124 N.W.2d 761 (1963); Rumptz v. Leahey, 26 Mich. App. 438, 443; 182 N.W.2d 614 (1970). "`In Klein v. Wagenheim, supra, p 561, the Michigan Supreme Court considered and rejected the argument that it is not proper to read any testimony, unless all the testimony is read, because otherwise there would be a tendency to emphasize what is read.

  6. People v. Bloom

    76 Mich. App. 405 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977)   Cited 2 times

    "`The general rule, well established, is that when a jury requests that testimony be read back to it both the reading and extent of reading is a matter confided to the sound discretion of the trial judge. See Klein v Wagenheim, 379 Mich. 558, 561 [ 153 N.W.2d 663] (1967); People v Walker, 371 Mich. 599, 610 [ 124 N.W.2d 761] (1963); Rumptz v Leahey, 26 Mich. App. 438, 443 [ 182 N.W.2d 614] (1970). "`In Klein v Wagenheim, supra, p 561, the Michigan Supreme Court considered and rejected the argument that it is not proper to read any testimony, unless all the testimony is read, because otherwise there would be a tendency to emphasize what is read.

  7. Gutowski v. M R Plastics

    60 Mich. App. 499 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975)   Cited 11 times

    Impeachment of a witness by showing interest or bias is proper. We find no error on the basis of Rumptz v Leahey, 26 Mich. App. 438; 182 N.W.2d 614 (1970). Plaintiff's claim of error regarding time limitations on final oral argument was not preserved for appeal and further, if error occurred, it was harmless.

  8. Heuss v. Rockwell Standard Corporation

    495 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1974)   Cited 5 times

    Under either line of cases, an accidental or inadvertent disclosure of an insurance company's interest in a case does not require the retrial of the matter. Bunda v. Hardwick, 376 Mich. 640, 138 N.W.2d 305 (1965); Rumptz v. Leahey, 26 Mich. App. 438, 182 N.W.2d 614 (1970); Bishop v. Wolinski, 16 Mich. App. 753, 168 N.W.2d 651 (1969). The reason for this is that the Michigan statute and the common law rule both seek to prevent counsel from deliberately injecting prejudicial or irrelevant matters into the legal dispute.

  9. People v. Gregory Turner

    37 Mich. App. 162 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971)   Cited 5 times

    The general rule, well established, is that when a jury requests that testimony be read back to it both the reading and extent of reading is a matter confided to the sound discretion of the trial judge. See Klein v. Wagenheim, 379 Mich. 558, 561 (1967); People v. Walker, 371 Mich. 599, 610 (1963); Rumptz v. Leahey, 26 Mich. App. 438, 443 (1970). In Klein v. Wagenheim, supra, p 561, the Michigan Supreme Court considered and rejected the argument that it is not proper to read any testimony, unless all the testimony is read, because otherwise there would be a tendency to emphasize what is read.

  10. People v. Morrin

    31 Mich. App. 301 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971)   Cited 236 times
    In Morrin the court was confronted with and dealt exhaustively with the definitional aspects of both first and second degree murder, each of which required a showing of a homicide accompanied by malice aforethought.

    We find no abuse here. People v. Walker (1963), 371 Mich. 599, 610; Rumptz v. Leahey (1970), 26 Mich. App. 438, 443. Morrin also objects to the admission into evidence of a photograph depicting Abell's wounds.