We also said: "It is just as true in criminal cases as in civil cases, and as true in appeals as it is in motions to reopen judgments, that parties will not be relieved from free, calculated, deliberate choices they have made [ City of Wahpeton v. Drake-Henne, Inc., 228 N.W.2d 324 (N.D. 1975); Schnell v. Schnell, 252 N.W.2d 14 (N.D. 1977)] and that it is not our function to allow second-guesses on trial strategy [ Waletzko v. Herdegen, 226 N.W.2d 648 (N.D. 1975); Rummel v. Rummel, 234 N.W.2d 848 (N.D. 1975)]." Stella raises four issues on appeal. She contends that
We have held that § 28-27-02, N.D.C.C., authorizes appeals from orders which either grant or deny a new trial. See Rummel v. Rummel, 234 N.W.2d 848, 851 (N.D. 1975), and Grenz v. O'Rourke, 235 N.W.2d 881, 884 (N.D. 1975). In the Federal courts, only in very unusual circumstances are orders granting or denying motions for new trial appealable.
A new trial will not be granted to enable the movant to present her case under a different theory than she adopted at trial. Rummel v. Rummel, 234 N.W.2d 848, 853 (N.D. 1975). [¶ 33] We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Shelly Evenson's post-trial motion.
Courts encourage settlements in divorce actions. Fleck v. Fleck, 337 N.W.2d 786 (N.D. 1983). Contractual stipulations in divorce proceedings are governed by the law of contracts. Clement v. Clement, 325 N.W.2d 262 (N.D. 1982); Galloway v. Galloway, 281 N.W.2d 804 (N.D. 1979); Rummel v. Rummel, 234 N.W.2d 848 (N.D. 1975). The interpretation of a contract is a matter of law for a court to decide.
"2. Where the trial court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties to an action, the judgment entered in such action may not be attacked collaterally by any of the parties thereto, or by those in privity with them."See also Bridgeford, supra 281 N.W.2d at 587; Rummel v. Rummel, 234 N.W.2d 848, 851 (N.D. 1975). We have also held that where a judgment is entered pursuant to a contractual stipulation, the party challenging the judgment has an additional burden of showing that under the law of contracts [Title 9, N.D.C.C.], there is justification for setting the contract aside.
This Court has held that stipulations such as the one entered in this case are contractual in nature. Galloway v. Galloway, 281 N.W.2d 804 (N.D. 1979); Rummel v. Rummel, 234 N.W.2d 848 (N.D. 1975). The interpretation of a contract is a question of law for the court to decide.
The cross-appeal also attempted to appeal from a "portion of the memorandum decision" and from a "portion of the order for judgment." Neither the memorandum decision nor the order for judgment are final orders and are thus not appealable. Rummel v. Rummel, 234 N.W.2d 848 (N.D. 1975); Chas. F. Ellis Agency, Inc. v. Berg, 214 N.W.2d 507 (N.D. 1974); 4 C.J.S. Appeal Error § 153. Because there is a cross-appeal from a part of the judgment relating to attorney's fees only, the principle that any error made below and preserved by appropriate objection is reviewable does not apply to the Bank in this case. See Applegren v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 268 N.W.2d 114 (N.D. 1978).
That case involved no motion for modification of a judgment but rather an interpretation of the agreement as contained in the judgment. Decisions such as Rummel v. Rummel, 234 N.W.2d 848 (N.D. 1975), and Lawrence v. Lawrence, 217 N.W.2d 792 (N.D. 1974), may also be distinguished on the facts and issues involved therein. "That following the commencement of the trial of this action the plaintiff and defendant verbally entered into a Property Settlement Agreement which was put on the record before the court on the 4th day of February, 1980, by which all matters relating to alimony, child support and division of both real and personal property has been settled; that the provisions of said agreement are fair and reasonable under the facts and circumstances, and are approved and adopted by the court; that the provisions of said agreement are as follows:
However, when this court understands from the findings the factual basis for the trial court's determination, the findings are adequately specified. Rummel v. Rummel, 234 N.W.2d 848 (N.D. 1975). Upon reviewing the findings of fact in accordance with our interpretation of the legal effect of the stipulation entered into by the parties, we affirm the trial court's legal conclusion that PVM had failed in the presentation of its proof in showing that items of reimbursement for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1977, fell within the boundaries of the stipulation.
" [Emphasis added.] Ordinarily, appeals can be taken only from judgments or orders made appealable by statute. See e. g., Crandall v. N.D. High School Activities Ass'n, 261 N.W.2d 921 (N.D. 1978), and Rummel v. Rummel, 234 N.W.2d 848 (N.D. 1975). Because the only appeal from the judgment is taken by the City, we will consider the merits of the City's argument first.