Opinion
A109768
12-6-2006
JOSEPH RUMIE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SOLEDAD MARTINUS et al., Defendants and Respondents.
In a second appeal from an adverse judgment in this action, petitioner and appellant Joseph Rumie (appellant or Rumie) attempts to resurrect his case against defendants and respondents An Van Vuong, Nu To Vuong, and Hau Quoc Vuong (the Vuongs), and Gary Ji Wei Hall and Joanna Look (the Hall-Looks) for money damages for fraud and breach of trust. We conclude that the action against respondents was previously concluded by final judgments in their favor, and they are not proper parties to this appeal. We therefore affirm the judgment.
We will refer to the Hall-Looks and the Vuongs collectively as respondents although they are not proper respondents in this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Much of our recitation of the underlying pertinent facts will be taken from our prior opinion in this case (Rumie v. Martinus (Feb. 2, 2006, A108711) [nonpub. opn.]), of which we take judicial notice (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 459). With a request filed in this court on August 23, 2006, appellant has asked that we take judicial notice of a supplemental declaration and request for judicial notice filed in the trial court in this action. Rather than take judicial notice as appellant has requested, we augment the record on appeal with those documents. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 12.)
When Rumie was arrested on February 23, 1984, on charges of sexually molesting the three minor daughters of respondent Soledad Martinus, he owned two parcels of residential real property in San Francisco: one located at 2 Santa Ynez Avenue (the Santa Ynez property); the other at 510 Andover Street (the Andover property). Shortly after his arrest, Rumie gave Martinus a general power of attorney that was recorded on March 12, 1984. Thereafter, the conveyance by Martinus of the two properties precipitated the present dispute. The Vuongs entered into an agreement with Martinus to assume appellants loan and deed of trust to the Santa Ynez property on May 8, 1984, and received a grant deed to the property, bearing Rumies signature, which was recorded on June 1, 1984. On October 25, 1984, the day before Rumie entered state prison to serve a 13-year sentence for the molestation offenses, he gave Martinus a quitclaim deed to the Andover property, which was recorded on January 25, 1985. Approximately a year later Martinus conveyed the property to Jeff Gomez and Charlie Moore by grant deed. They, in turn, conveyed the property to the Hall-Looks by a grant deed recorded on June 10, 1986. Rumie was released from state prison on January 1, 1991.
On December 9, 2002, Rumie filed a petition entitled In re LeRue Grim Revocable Intervivos Trust in the probate department of San Francisco Superior Court, which designated as respondents Martinus, the Vuongs, the Hall-Looks, Gomez, Moore, and others alleged to have a connection with the trust or conveyances from the trust. The petition alleges that in 1984 Rumie entered into "an oral inter vivos trust agreement" with Martinus "to possess and hold in trust" the Santa Ynez and Andover properties "while petitioner was incarcerated in correctional facilities in California." Rumie gave Martinus possession of the two properties and executed "a special power of attorney" naming her as his agent. The petition further alleges that Martinus forged Rumies signature on a grant deed to the Santa Ynez property conveying title to the Vuongs. Similarly, Martinus forged Rumies signature on a quitclaim deed in her favor to the Andover property, which was recorded on January 25, 1985. According to the petition, Martinus subsequently sold the property to intermediate parties who then conveyed title to the Hall-Looks. The petition seeks actual and exemplary damages and restoration of the properties to Rumies ownership and possession through causes of action for breach of trust, constructive trust, elder abuse, injunctive relief, to cancel deeds, quiet title, and conduct an accounting.
In their answers to the petition, the Vuongs and the Hall-Looks both alleged the affirmative defenses of the statute of limitations and laches. In addition, they filed cross-complaints seeking to quiet title to their respective properties on the ground of adverse possession. Following discovery proceedings, the Vuongs and Hall-Looks each filed motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication on the ground that the undisputed evidence established the defenses of laches and the statute of limitations, and seeking judgment for quiet title on their cross-complaints. Rumie responded that the statute of limitations had been tolled by reason of his incarceration and mental incapacity, relying on the declaration of a psychiatrist.
The trial court excluded appellants expert declaration and granted both motions for summary judgment. On November 18, 2004, the court entered judgment in favor of the Vuongs which ordered that appellant "recover nothing" on his petition and that title to the Santa Ynez property be quieted in An Van Vuong and Nu To Tang, husband and wife. The same day, the court entered an identical judgment in favor of the Hall-Looks on appellants petition and quieted title in them to the Andover property. The first appeal was taken by Rumie from the judgment that dismissed his petition to recover title and possession of two parcels of real property, and quieted title to the properties in the Vuongs and the Hall-Looks.
Meanwhile, Rumie continued to proceed against Martinus. He obtained a default against Martinus on May 21, 2003. At a scheduled "prove-up hearing" on December 3, 2003, the hearing on the default was taken off calendar and Rumie was instructed to "conduct the prove-up against Respondents at the time of trial in this matter," or upon renewed request for entry of default judgment.
Following the entry of the judgments in favor of the Hall-Looks and the Vuongs, Rumie again pursued entry of default judgment against Martinus. At a hearing on March 3, 2005, counsel for Rumie advised the court that "the only party" remaining in the case was Martinus, and the only purpose of the proceeding was to "prove up as to" her. The court then decided to "go forward against defaulted" Martinus. The court declined to grant any equitable relief to Rumie in light of the prior judgments in favor of respondents, and proceeded solely upon a claim of compensatory damages against Martinus. At a subsequent hearing after presentation of evidence, the trial court found that Rumie brought the action against Martinus based upon the forged deeds within the period of limitations, which had been tolled by Rumies incarceration and mental incapacity. The court further found that the conveyances of the Santa Ynez and Andover properties were procured by the fraud, breach of trust, and undue influence of Martinus. The court therefore entered a default judgment that awarded Rumie damages from Martinus in the amount of $1,232,000, but expressly refused to set aside or vacate the deeds to the Hall-Looks and the Vuongs or take any other action with respect to the prior judgments in favor of respondents. This second appeal now before us, filed on March 10, 2005, has been taken from the default judgment and challenges "the refusal of the Superior Court . . . to enter a proposed Judgment by Default by Court in favor of Joseph Rumie against Soledad Martinus" declaring the conveyances of the Santa Ynez and Andover properties to respondents by Martinus void.
The trial court declined Rumies request to stay the judgments in favor of the Hall-Looks and the Vuongs pending conclusion of the prove-up proceedings.
In an opinion on the first appeal (A108711) filed on February 2, 2006, this court concluded "that the trial court properly granted summary judgment based on the defense of the statute of limitations to the Vuong defendants and the Hall-Look defendants." We further concluded that "the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the Hall-Look and Vuong defendants on their cross-complaints to quiet title to the Andover and Santa Ynez properties, respectively." The judgments in favor of respondents were affirmed, and are now final.
We declined to consolidate the appeals.
DISCUSSION
Appellant argues that the default judgment entered against Martinus "impliedly vacated" the prior summary judgments in favor of respondents. He maintains that respondents are "jointly and severally liable" to him, along with Martinus, for the "indivisible injury" that resulted from the fraudulent conveyances of the Andover and Santa Ynez properties, and the prior summary judgments are "no bar" to his claim for money damages against them. Appellant therefore asks us to vacate the "interlocutory summary judgments entered in November 2004 . . . as to the remaining money damage claims only," and remand the case to the trial court with directions to "adjudicate the remaining money damage claims based on fraud, and determine the question whether a joint and several judgment should be entered against all Respondents for $1,232,000."
Appellant concedes that the "judgment quieting title to Santa Ynez and Andover" in favor of respondents is final and binding.
The record before us clearly demonstrates that appellants arguments are devoid of merit. First, appellant has failed to bring before us any proper respondents in this appeal. The present appeal is from the default judgment sought and entered solely against Martinus. The named respondents were not parties to the default judgment proceedings, and were not impacted by the judgment against Martinus. Moreover, the action against all of the named respondents had already been resolved in their favor when the default judgment against Martinus was entered. Appellant cannot by the artifice of a default judgment entered against Martinus force respondents to become parties to the appeal now before us. The default judgment against Martinus adjudicated nothing as between appellant and respondents, and is not appealable against those who are not proper parties. (See Evans v. Dabney (1951) 37 Cal.2d 758, 759; Kennedy v. Owen (1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 517, 520.) We cannot undertake to inquire into the validity of the judgment or make any determination detrimental to the rights of those who are not parties to this appeal. (See Gonzales v. R. J. Novick Constr. Co. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 798, 806; American Enterprise, Inc. v. Van Winkle (1952) 39 Cal.2d 210, 218.)
We note that appellant failed to provide in the Civil Case Information Statement a list of all parties and their attorneys of record who will participate in the appeal. However, a proof of service was attached showing service on parties who had previously been dismissed from the case or who had judgments previously entered in their favor against appellant.
The only appearance made in the default proceeding was by attorneys for Moore and Gomez, who have also filed a respondents brief in this appeal. As counsel for appellant acknowledged at the default prove-up hearing, the actions against Gomez and Moore were separately dismissed, so they were neither proper parties in the default proceeding nor are they proper respondents in this appeal.
We point out that merely by filing protective briefs respondents did not make some form of general appearance, concede that they are proper respondents in this appeal, or submit to the jurisdiction of this court. Rather, in their briefs respondents have challenged their status as proper parties to this appeal and the subject matter jurisdiction of the appeal. Respondents have not recognized the authority of this court to proceed against them. (Cf., Code Civ. Proc., § 410.50, subd. (a); Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127, 1147; Pease v. City of San Diego (1949) 93 Cal.App.2d 706, 711-712; Frohman v. Bonelli (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 285, 291; Brock v. Fouchy (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 363, 370.)
Second, appellant has requested that we vacate a prior judgment which was the subject of a separate appeal. The scope of the review in this appeal is limited to the default judgment from which the appeal has been taken.
Third, and perhaps of greatest consequence here, the prior judgment in favor of respondents has become final, and law of the case. Our opinion in A108711, filed after the present appeal was taken, but before the filing of appellants opening brief, affirmed the judgments which granted dismissal of appellants action against respondents. Appellants claim that the prior "interlocutory summary judgments" in favor of respondents, which failed to dispose of the action against Martinus, were not final, appealable judgments, is patently wrong. "Despite the language of Code of Civil Procedure section 579 (judgment may be entered `against one or more defendants), the section has been consistently construed as authorizing entry of judgment in favor of one or more defendants. . . . `It is well settled that where, as here, there is a judgment resolving all issues between a plaintiff and one defendant, then either party may appeal from an adverse judgment, even though the action remains pending between the plaintiff and other defendants. [¶] Moreover, Code of Civil Procedure section 579 is preceded by section 578, which states, `Judgment may be given for or against one or more of several plaintiffs, and for or against one or more of several defendants; and it may, when the justice of the case requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side, as between themselves. This section has been construed to mean that `judgment may be given for or against one or more of several defendants. [Citation.] Thus, there is ample authority for the proposition that the trial court, in its discretion, may enter judgment in favor of one or more defendants when all issues between those defendants and the plaintiff have been adjudicated, even though the action remains pending against those defendants who have not obtained adjudication of all issues." (Oakland Raiders v. National Football League (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 572, 577-578, italics omitted, quoting from Estate of Gonzalez (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1598, 1601-1602 and Martin v. Cinelli (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 509, 512.) "There is no doubt, of course, that an order dismissing fewer than all defendants from an action is a `final judgment as to them, and is thus appealable." (Hydrotech Systems, Ltd. v. Oasis Waterpark (1991) 52 Cal.3d 988, 993, fn. 3.) The judgments in favor of respondents not only quieted title to the properties in them, but also unambiguously stated: "Joseph Rumie shall recover nothing against" respondents. Nothing is left to be resolved in appellants action against respondents. The prior judgments became final. Appellant appealed from those judgments, and the judgments were affirmed by this court prior to filing of appellants opening brief in this appeal.
Our opinion in A108711 that affirmed the judgments in favor of respondents is law of the case and binding upon appellant in the appeal now before us and any further proceedings in this action. " ` "The decision of an appellate court, stating a rule of law necessary to the decision of the case, conclusively establishes that rule and makes it determinative of the rights of the same parties in any subsequent retrial or appeal in the same case." [Citation.] [Citation.]" (Shelton v. Rancho Mortgage & Investment Corp. (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1347; see also Syufy Enterprises v. City of Oakland (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 869, 879.) Law of the case is a doctrine of procedure founded upon the concepts of judicial economy and the finality of court rulings. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 786; George Arakelian Farms, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1279, 1291; Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 425, 435.) "Application of the rule is now subject to the qualifications that `the point of law involved must have been necessary to the prior decision, that the matter must have been actually presented and determined by the court, and that application of the doctrine will not result in an unjust decision. [Citations.]" (People v. Shuey (1975) 13 Cal.3d 835, 842; see also Salazar v. Eastin (1995) 9 Cal.4th 836, 859; People v. Pacini (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 877, 883.)
Nothing in the default judgment against Martinus "impliedly vacated the interlocutory summary judgment" entered in favor of respondents, as claimed by appellant. The default judgment granted appellant recovery of compensatory damages from Martinus only. The trial court properly declined to readjudicate any claims against respondents as to the property or compensatory damages owed to appellant, and correctly so, as those claims had already been dismissed.
We note that the record indicates that the trial court denied appellants request to amend the default judgment against Martinus to add the Vuongs, Gomez and Moore, and imposed monetary sanctions against appellants counsel.
The opinion in A108711 thus conclusively resolved and established that respondents have legal title to the Andover and Santa Ynez properties, and appellant cannot proceed against them on any basis or for any relief sought in his petition. Appellant misinterprets the effect and scope of the prior judgments by asserting that nothing more was done than to quiet title to the Santa Ynez and Andover properties in respondents, leaving him free to seek "money damages stemming from the property stolen" from him by the "indivisible acts of all Respondents." The prior judgments in favor of respondents are abundantly clear; they not only quieted title to the property in the respondents, they also specifically provided that appellant "shall recover nothing" from them. Appellants convoluted and marginal argument completely ignores the language of the prior final judgments.
We previously issued a notice pursuant to rule 27(e)(3) of the California Rules of Court, that this court was considering imposing monetary sanctions against appellant for filing a frivolous appeal. Although we find appellants arguments to be without merit, upon consideration of the unusual procedural posture of this case, sanctions will not be imposed.
DISPOSITION
Appellant has failed to raise any issues concerning the default judgment entered against Martinus from which he has appealed. Accordingly the judgment is affirmed.
We concur:
STEIN, Acting P. J.
MARGULIES, J.