Rullan v. New York City Department of Sanitation

7 Citing cases

  1. Doroz v. Deiorio's Foods, Inc.

    437 F. Supp. 3d 140 (N.D.N.Y. 2020)   Cited 6 times
    Collecting binding authorities

    The Court finds that the NYSDHR's determination and order is integral to the complaint of July 29, 2019, because it bears on whether his claims are timely in that it delineates the scope of the EEOC's right-to-sue letter, which is directly referenced in that complaint. Horsham v. Fresh Direct , 136 F. Supp. 3d 253, 259 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding that the NYSDHR's determination was a document integral to the complaint); Rullan v. New York City Dept. of Sanitation , 10-CV-8079, 2011 WL 1833335, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2011) (finding various documents, including the NYSDHR determination was integral to the complaint). Additionally, the Court is permitted to "take judicial notice of the records of state administrative procedures, as these are public records, without converting a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment."

  2. Maddison v. Comfort Sys. USA (Syracuse), Inc.

    5:17-CV-0359 (LEK/ATB) (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2018)   Cited 4 times
    Rejecting statute of limitations argument raised for the first time on a motion to dismiss reply brief and considering FLSA claims beyond three year statute of limitations

    Allen v. WestPoint Pepperell, Inc., 945 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1991). While Defendant correctly observes that "[t]he Court may take judicial notice of the records of an administrative agency," Mem. at 10 (citing Rullan v. New York City Dep't of Sanitation, No. 10-CV-8079, 2011 WL 1833335, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2011)), the Court may only take judicial notice of such records "to establish their existence and legal effect, or to determine what statements [they] contained . . . not for the truth of the matters asserted," Fine v. ESPN, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 3d 209, 223 (N.D.N.Y. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Liang v. City of New York, No. 10-CV-3089, 2013 WL 5366394, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2013)). Therefore, while the Court may take judicial notice of the fact that Defendant and several of its employees participated in an NYSDOL settlement, it may not take judicial notice of the NYSDOL records for the truth of the matter asserted in these records—that Plaintiff was compensated for his work at the Tompkins Site.

  3. Danon v. Vanguard Grp., Inc.

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-6864 (E.D. Pa. May. 23, 2016)   Cited 2 times

    Thus, due to the New York Supreme Court's ruling, Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from relitigating whether there was a causal connection between his activities and Defendant's decision to terminate him. Because this issue was necessarily decided under the NYFCA, the Court can apply it to the issue in Plaintiff's claims under SOX, Dodd-Frank, and Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law statutes. See, e.g., Barnes v. New York State Division of Human Rights, 2016 WL 110522, at *4-5 (finding that issues in Plaintiff's Title VII claims were collaterally estopped because the same issues were raised and decided in a state case under state law); Rullan v. New York City Dep't of Sanitation, 2011 WL 183335, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ("[I]f the allegedly discriminatory acts are prohibited by both federal and state law, then the issue is precluded even if it was first decided on state law alone."); Jeffrey M. Brown Associates, Inc. v. CRK Contracting of Suffolk, Inc., 100 F.Supp.2d 325 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (applying New York law and finding that "collateral estoppel may apply regardless of the types of relief sought and available in the first action"). All three causes of action alleged in this Complaint require a finding of a causal connection; thus, the application of issue preclusion renders all the claims in this Complaint meritless. As to SOX, "the elements of a § 806 retaliation claim are that (1) the employee engaged in protected activity, (2) the employer knew or suspected that the employee engaged in the protected activity, (3) the employee suffered an adverse action, and (4) the circumstances were sufficient to raise the inference that the protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action."

  4. Pierre v. Human Rights Div.

    15-CV-4881 (MKB) (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2016)   Cited 1 times

    To the extent Plaintiff is not asserting claims as to the process used by NYSDHR in reaching its decision, and is instead attempting to bring a claim for damages against NYSDHR, such a claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Rullan v. New York City Dep't of Sanitation, No. 10-CV-8079, 2011 WL 1833335, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2011) ("[C]laims against NYSDHR must also be dismissed because the Eleventh Amendment immunizes the agency from suit."); McPherson v. Plaza Athenee, NYC, No. 12-CV-0785, 2012 WL 3865154, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012) ("Federal civil rights lawsuits against the NYSDHR are barred by the Eleventh Amendment."), aff'd sub nom. McPherson v. Hotel Plaza Athenee, NYC, 538 F. App'x 109 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Mary Jo C. v. N.Y. State & Local Ret. Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 151-52 (2d Cir.) ("[T]he immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. dismissed, 133 S. Ct. 2823 (2013); In re Charter Oak Assocs., 361 F.3d 760, 765 (2d Cir. 2004) (The Eleventh Amendment "render[s] states and their agencies immune from suits brought by private parties in federal court.").

  5. Ortega v. Arnold & Marie Schwartz Hall of Dental Scis.

    No. 13-cv-9155 (RJS) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2016)   Cited 2 times
    Applying New York law

    Accordingly, since Plaintiff's claims against the NYU Defendants are based on the same set of facts underlying the prior state court proceeding against the College, res judicata bars this federal action with respect to the NYU Defendants, even though Plaintiff's claims against them contain new legal theories. See, e.g., Yong Chul Son v. Chu Cha Lee, 559 F. App'x 81, 83 (2d Cir. 2014) (affirming district court's dismissal of plaintiff's federal claims under Title VII and the ADA on the ground that they were barred by res judicata because of the New York State Supreme Court's prior order dismissing similar claims); Rullan v. N.Y.C. Dep'tof Sanitation, No. 10-cv-8079 (RPP), 2011 WL 1833335 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2011) (finding that plaintiff's Title VII and ADA claims were precluded by prior state court action brought under New York State Human Rights Law where federal litigation was based on the same factual allegations). C. State Law Claims

  6. Sahni v. Legal Servs. of the Hudson Valley

    14-cv-1616 (NSR) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2015)   Cited 4 times

    This includes court filings and records of administrative agency proceedings. See Rullan v. New York City Dept. of Sanitation, No. 10 Civ. 8079, 2011 WL 1833335, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2011); Evans v. New York Botanical Garden, No. 02 Civ. 3591, 2002 WL 31002814, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2002) ("A court may take judicial notice of the records of state administrative procedures, as these are public records, without converting a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment."). DISCUSSION

  7. Rullan v. N.Y.C. Sanitation Dep't

    13 Civ. 5154 (JGK) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2013)   Cited 6 times

    The plaintiff alleged that his employer, the New York City Department of Sanitation ("DOS"), and the New York State Division of Human Rights ("DHR") discriminated again him in violation of the ADA and Title VII. See Rullan v. New York City Dep't of Sanitation, No. 10 Civ. 8079, 2011 WL 1833335, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2011). By Order dated May 12, 2011, the Honorable Robert P. Patterson, Jr. granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the case.