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Ruiz v. Kirkland

United States District Court, E.D. California
Feb 27, 2006
No. CV F 05-1222 REC DLB HC, [Doc. 1] (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2006)

Opinion

No. CV F 05-1222 REC DLB HC, [Doc. 1].

February 27, 2006


FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS


Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on September 28, 2005. On December 13, 2005, the Court issued Findings and Recommendations recommending that the instant petition be dismissed as a successive petition. Petitioner filed objections on January 17, 2006. By order of January 31, 2006, the Findings and Recommendations were not adopted as the prior petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust the state court remedies and, therefore, did not bar the instant petition.

The Findings and Recommendations were based on the prior action filed in Ramiro Gonzalez Ruiz v. Steven Cambra, CV-F-97-5654 REC HGB HC.

Upon further review of the petition and this Court's docket, Petitioner's petition is, in fact, a successive petition based on the prior action, Ramiro Ruiz Gonzalez v. James Gomez, CV-F-00-6098 DLB HC, of which the Court takes judicial notice.

A Court may take judicial notice of court records. See MGIC Indem. Co. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th cir. 1980).

In the instant petition, Petitioner contends that there is a newly discovered ground of prosecutorial misconduct revealing that he did not receive a fair trial.

DISCUSSION

Because the current petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) apply to Petitioner's current petition.Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). A federal court must dismiss a second or successive petition that raises the same grounds as a prior petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). The court must also dismiss a second or successive petition raising a new ground unless the petitioner can show that 1) the claim rests on a new, retroactive, constitutional right or 2) the factual basis of the claim was not previously discoverable through due diligence, and these new facts establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B). However, it is not the district court that decides whether a second or successive petition meets these requirements, which allow a petitioner to file a second or successive petition.

Section 2244(b)(3)(A) provides: "Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application." In other words, Petitioner must obtain leave from the Ninth Circuit before he can file a second or successive petition in district court. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 656-657 (1996). This Court must dismiss any second or successive petition unless the Court of Appeals has given Petitioner leave to file the petition because a district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a second or successive petition. Pratt v. United States, 129 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 1997); Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1277 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 794 (1997); Nunez v. United States, 96 F.3d 990, 991 (7th Cir. 1996).

A second or successive petition for habeas corpus is not considered "successive" if the initial habeas petition was dismissed for a technical or procedural reason versus on the merits. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 485-87 (2000) (holding that a second habeas petition is not successive if the initial habeas petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust); Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 643-45 (1998) (a second habeas petition is not successive if the claim raised in the first petition was dismissed by the district court as premature.)

Unlike the prior petition in CV-F-97-5654 REC HGB HC, the prior petition in CV-F-00-6098 DLB HC, was dismissed as time-barred by the statute of limitations. Although a dismissal based on the statute of limitations does not include an examination of the merits of the petition, it nonetheless operates and is equivalent to a final judgment on the merits. See e.g. Ellingson v. Burlington Northern Inc., 653 F.2d 1327, 1330 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1981) ("[a] judgment based on the statute of limitations is `on the merits', citing Mathis v. Laird, 457 F.2d 926, 927 5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 871 (1972)); In re Marino, 181 F.3d 1142, 1144 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that "for res judicata purposes a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds can be treated as a dismissal on the merits.") A dismissal based on untimeliness under the statute of limitations bars further review of the action. Therefore, because the prior petition was adjudicated "on the merits", the instant petition is a "second or successive petition" under § 2244(b).

Petitioner makes no showing that he has obtained prior leave from the Ninth Circuit to file his successive petition attacking the conviction. That being so, this Court has no jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's renewed application for relief from that conviction under Section 2254 and must dismiss the petition.See Greenawalt, 105 F.3d at 1277; Nunez, 96 F.3d at 991. If Petitioner desires to proceed in bringing this petition for writ of habeas corpus, he must file for leave to do so with the Ninth Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)(3).

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be DISMISSED, without prejudice, as a successive petition.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the assigned United States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge's ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.


Summaries of

Ruiz v. Kirkland

United States District Court, E.D. California
Feb 27, 2006
No. CV F 05-1222 REC DLB HC, [Doc. 1] (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2006)
Case details for

Ruiz v. Kirkland

Case Details

Full title:RAMIRO GONZALEZ RUIZ, Petitioner, v. RICHARD KIRKLAND, WARDEN, Respondent

Court:United States District Court, E.D. California

Date published: Feb 27, 2006

Citations

No. CV F 05-1222 REC DLB HC, [Doc. 1] (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2006)