Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 00-2481-GTV
January 28, 2003.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
As explained in detail in a previous order of the court, Plaintiff Marc Ruggles brought this case against his former employer, seeking damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). The court granted summary judgment to Defendant Keebler Company. The case is before the court on Defendant's motion for attorney fees, costs, and expenses (Doc. 118). For the reasons stated below, the court denies Defendant's motion.
Defendant asserts that it is entitled to attorney fees on two bases: (1) Plaintiff's claims were frivolous; and (2) Plaintiff's attorneys engaged in discovery practices that unreasonably multiplied the proceedings. The court disagrees.
Under both the ADA and ADEA, a prevailing party may recover attorney fees, costs, and expenses if the other party's claims were "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith." 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (ADA); Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978) (Title VII); EEOC v. Hendrix Coll., 53 F.3d 209, 211 (8th Cir. 1995) (ADEA). Courts should exercise restraint, however, in making an award of attorney fees, costs, and expenses. As the Supreme Court noted in Christiansburg Garment,
it is important that a district court resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation. This kind of hindsight logic could discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success. No matter how honest one's belief that he has been the victim of discrimination, no matter how meritorious one's claim may appear at the outset, the course of litigation is rarely predictable.
Id. at 421-22.
In this case, the court granted summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff's ADA claim because Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination. The court assumed without deciding that Plaintiff established a prima facie case of age discrimination, but determined that Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendant's actions were pretextual. Plaintiff did offer evidence in opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment; the court merely deemed it unpersuasive, inadmissible, and/or irrelevant. As Judge Lungstrum stated in Ricks v. Xerox Corp., No. 93-2545-JWL, 1995 WL 522893, at *2 (D.Kan. Aug. 11, 1995), "Although the evidence was weak, the perceived evidence could have caused the plaintiff to believe that he had a stronger case than he actually did." The court concludes that, while Plaintiff's evidence may have been insufficient to survive summary judgment, it was not so lacking as to compel the conclusion that Plaintiff's case was frivolous.
Attorney fees, costs, and expenses may also be justified under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 if an attorney "multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously." Doyle v. Okla. Bar Ass'n, 998 F.2d 1559, 1571 (10th Cir. 1993). 28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
The Tenth Circuit has recognized that sanctions under § 1927 may be proper when a showing of bad faith has been made. Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 768 F.2d 1159, 1165 (10th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). "`[B]ad faith' may be found, not only in the actions that led to the lawsuit, but also in the conduct of the litigation." Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973).
Defendant claims that Plaintiff's attorneys vexatiously pursued excessive discovery, knowing that Plaintiff's claims were meritless. The issue of whether Plaintiff's discovery requests were reasonable has been resolved previously in this court. While Plaintiff's rummaging may have proved unproductive, the court declines to label it vexatious.
IT IS, THEREFORE, BY THE COURT ORDERED that Defendant's motion for attorney fees, costs, and expenses (Doc. 118) is denied.
Copies of this order shall be transmitted to counsel of record.