Other decisions of this Court rejecting expert opinion evidence as a basis for granting a motion for new trial also did so on the grounds that the evidence was merely impeaching, without indicating that those opinions were related to new facts. See Ruger v. State, 263 Ga. 548, 551 (2) (c), 436 S.E.2d 485 (1993) (affirming denial of motion for new trial based on expert opinion that method employed by State's expert in conducting experiment about bloodprints was "scientifically unsound"; new opinion "tendered to disprove the facts on which the [testimony of the State's expert] was founded"); Wright v. State , 184 Ga. 62, 71 (9), 190 S.E. 663 (1937) (rejecting expert affidavit challenging State's testimony about substance found on pipes near defendant's workplace as basis for new trial, as it was "impeaching"). Rejecting a motion purportedly based on newly-discovered evidence on the ground that the expert opinion evidence at issue was "impeaching" — a problem that is at least potentially fatal under the Timberlake standard — is not the same as saying that expert opinion evidence can never support an extraordinary motion for new trial.
10. Whether courtroom demonstrations will be permitted rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Ruger v. State, 263 Ga. 548 (2) (b) ( 436 SE2d 485) (1993). We find no abuse of discretion here.
Such evidence would not even furnish a basis for granting a motion for new trial. See, e.g., Weems v. State, 268 Ga. 142, 143 (1) ( 485 S.E.2d 767) (1997); Ruger v. State, 263 Ga. 548, 551 (2) (c) ( 436 S.E.2d 485) (1993). Surely this evidence should not provide a basis for subsequent habeas relief when OCGA § 9-14-48 (d) imposes the stricter requirements of cause and prejudice or miscarriage of justice.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence.Ruger v. State, 263 Ga. 548, 550 (2) (b) ( 436 SE2d 485) (1993). See id.; Kilgore v. Gold Kist, Inc., 224 Ga. App. 394, 394-395 ( 480 SE2d 391) (1997).
Use of demonstrative evidence and conducting demonstrations during the course of a trial rest in the sound discretion of the trial judge. See Ruger v. State, 263 Ga. 548 ( 436 S.E.2d 485) (1993); Powell v. State, 226 Ga. App. 861 ( 487 S.E.2d 424) (1997); Atkinson v. State, 170 Ga. App. 260, 263 ( 316 S.E.2d 592) (1984). Although the old swing was available, the record shows that it was broken and it was not suitable for use to demonstrate how either Jones or McGee was thrown out of the swing.
Generally, whether courtroom demonstrations will be permitted rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Ruger v. State, 263 Ga. 548, 550 (2) (b) ( 436 S.E.2d 485) (1993). The weight of such evidence is for the jury, and varies according to the circumstances of similarity which they may find to exist between the experiments and the actual occurrence under investigation.
Fofar v. Williamson County Airport Authority, 125 Ill. App.3d 526, 80 Ill. Dec. 866, 466 N.E.2d 318, 320 (1984) (citations omitted). In Ruger v. State, 263 Ga. 548, 436 S.E.2d 485 (1993), the Supreme Court of Georgia rejected the contention that a murder defendant was entitled to a new trial in order to present an expert witness who would testify that the State had presented "scientifically unsound" evidence that a fingerprint made by appellant was discovered on a bloody plastic bag found near the murder scene. According to the Ruger Court: