Opinion
C. A. 6:24-cv-05459-DCC-KFM
10-25-2024
Michael Alonza Rufus, Petitioner, v. Director Raleigh Residential Reentry Management Office, Respondent.[1]
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald, United States Magistrate Judge
The petitioner, a federal prisoner in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for habeas relief. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
ALLEGATIONS
Petitioner's Conviction and Sentence
On April 28, 2003, the petitioner pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. See United States v. Rufus, C/A No. 3:02-cr-00550-MGL, at doc. 69 (D.S.C.). The petitioner was sentenced to a total of ninety-seven months' imprisonment, with thirty-seven months for conspiracy to possess 500 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to distribute followed by a consecutive sixty month sentence for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, to be followed by eight years of supervised release. Id. at 79. The petitioner appealed, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the petitioner's conviction and sentence. See United States v. Rufus, 114 Fed.Appx. 56 (4th Cir. 2004).
The petitioner began serving his supervised release sentence on July 8, 2010. United States v. Rufus, C/A No. C/A No. 3:02-cr-00550-MGL, at doc. 143. On April 4, 2012, an arrest warrant was issued for the petitioner based upon his new criminal conduct (among other alleged supervised release violations). Id. at doc. 144. On December 20, 2021, the petitioner was found guilty of multiple violations of his supervised release conditions and sentenced to forty-six months imprisonment. Id. at docs. 263; 264.
Petitioner's Prior Collateral Attacks
On November 24, 2004, the petitioner filed his first § 2255 motion. Rufus v. United States, C/A No. 3:04-cv-23082-MJP, at doc. 1 (D.S.C.). The petitioner's motion asserted ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) based on plea counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress, misleading the court regarding the petitioner's mandatory minimum sentence, and allowing the judge to depart from the sentencing guidelines. Id. The motion was denied on April 4, 2007. Id. at doc. 35. The petitioner appealed and his appeal was dismissed. Id. at doc. 59; see United States v. Rufus, 293 Fed.Appx. 210 (4th Cir. 2008).
During this same time, the petitioner then filed another motion pursuant to § 2255, again arguing IAC of plea counsel. Id. at doc. 166. The petitioner's motion was denied as successive and time-barred on April 8, 2015. Id. at doc. 183. The petitioner has filed other motions seeking to have his sentence reduced, but they have been denied and his appeals have been unsuccessful. Id. at docs. 270; 272; 296; 300; 307; 310; 318.
Recently, the petitioner filed an action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. See Rufus v. Dir. of Geo Residential Reentry Ctr., C/A No. 8:24-cv-01799-SDM-CPT, 2024 WL 4475610 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2024), appeal pending. In that action, he sought release to home confinement for the last portion of his sentence, and his petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust. Id. The petitioner appealed that dismissal and that appeal remains pending at this time. Petitioner's Present Action
In the instant matter, the petitioner's only ground for relief is that his placement at the Alston Wilkes Society is retaliation (doc. 1 at 6). The petitioner contends that he was denied the ability to be released to home confinement in retaliation for filing a habeas action in Florida (doc. 1-1 at 1-2). The petitioner contends that he has been wrongfully applied the status of “community corrections component duration (“CCC”) due to a “public safety factor” (“PSF”), which limits his ability to have social passes or home passes while at the Alston Wilkes Society (id. at 2-4). The petitioner contends that he did not have the PSF label while in home confinement in Florida, only when he was transferred to South Carolina (id. at 3-4). For relief, the petitioner requests that the court “relieve him of the retaliatory actions” of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida (doc. 1 at 7).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The undersigned has reviewed the petition pursuant to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214; and other habeas corpus statutes. As a pro se litigant, the petitioner's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The mandated liberal construction means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the petitioner could prevail, it should do so. However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the petitioner filed this action seeking relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. However, for the reasons that follow, his case is subject to summary dismissal. Although the petitioner appears in custody for purposes of § 2241 in the District of South Carolina at the Alton Wilkes Society, his BOP custodian (and the proper respondent in this action) is Director at Raleigh Residential Reentry Management Office (see doc. 1). See Federal Bureau of Prisons Inmate Search, https://www.bop.gov/ inmateloc/ (enter the petitioner's BOP number 99284-071) (last visited October 24, 2024). For purposes of this report and recommendation, although the petitioner's BOP custodian is technically not within this judicial district, the undersigned finds the petitioner's § 2241 petition properly under consideration by this court. As noted above, here, liberally construed, the petitioner seeks to have the alleged retaliatory PSF label removed from his BOP records (docs. 1; 1-1).
As an initial matter, the undersigned will address whether this claim is properly before this court pursuant to § 2241. Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus and civil rights complaints. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579 (2006). In Preiser v. Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court recognized that “the essence of habeas corpus” in both federal statute and common law “is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 411 U.S 475, 484 (1973). However, the Supreme Court did not specifically decide whether a prisoner could bring a habeas claim for alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Id. at 499-500.
As recognized by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, since Preiser, a circuit split has developed, with seven of the ten circuits finding (in published opinions) that conditions of confinement claims cannot be brought in a habeas petition. See Wilborn v. Mansukhani, 795 Fed.Appx. 157, 163-64 (4th Cir. 2019) (unpublished per curiam opinion) (collecting cases noting that while the First and Second Circuits recognize conditions of confinement claims under § 2241, the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits do not). Although the Fourth Circuit has not issued a published decision on the matter, several unpublished Fourth Circuit decisions have held that conditions of confinement claims are not cognizable in habeas proceedings. Id. (collecting unpublished cases holding that conditions of confinement claims are not cognizable in habeas proceedings). Accordingly, the petitioner may not seek relief pursuant to § 2241 for conditions of confinement claims.
Here, as noted above, the petitioner has filed this § 2241 petition seeking to have the PSF designation removed from his BOP custody status so he can enjoy the full experience of the home incarceration program (see docs. 1; 1-1). However, courts within this circuit have consistently held that custody classification challenges (such as to a PSF designation) cannot be challenged through § 2241. See Brewer v. Andrews, C/A No. 2:20-cv-00605, 2021 WL 4143926, at *4 (E.D. Va. June 16, 2021) (collecting cases from the Fourth Circuit recognizing that federal prisoners cannot challenge their custody classifications in petitions brought pursuant to § 2241). Indeed, as the United States Supreme Court has recognized, an individual's “conviction has sufficiently extinguished the [individual's] liberty interest to empower the State to confine him in any of its prisons.” Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976). As such, because the instant matter involves the petitioner's custody classification - a matter inappropriate for habeas review - the instant matter should be dismissed.
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is recommended that the petitioner's § 2241 petition be dismissed without requiring the respondent to file a return. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action without prejudice, without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 2022 WL 3590436 (4th Cir. Aug. 17, 2022) (mem.) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”). The petitioner's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Room 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).