Opinion
CIVIL 1:20-cv-01461
06-22-2021
CLEO RUFFIN, Plaintiff, v. GOVERNOR TOM WOLF, et al., Defendants.
Jones, Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Susan E. Schwab, United States Magistrate Judge
I. Introduction.
The plaintiff, Cleo Ruffin (“Ruffin”), filed the instant complaint against the defendants, Governor Tom Wolf, Secretary of Health and Human Services Rachel Levine, Secretary of Corrections John Wetzel, and SCI-Huntingdon Superintendent Kevin Kauffman. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss Ruffin's complaint for failure to state a claim. We ordered Ruffin to file a brief in opposition to the defendants' motion. Throughout this case, mail sent to Ruffin was returned to the court as undeliverable. Because Ruffin has failed to file a brief in opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss, to keep us informed of his current address, or to comply with our order, it appears that he has abandoned this action. Accordingly, after analyzing the applicable factors, we recommend that the case be dismissed.
II. Background and Procedural History.
Ruffin, proceeding pro se, began this action on August 17, 2020, while incarcerated at State Correctional Institution Huntingdon. Doc. 1 at 1. Ruffin contends that the Department of Corrections failed to adequately mitigate the spread of Covid-19 within SCI Huntingdon. Id. at 3. Ruffin alleges he was exposed to the virus due to the defendants' “deliberate indifference” regarding the lack of preventative measures and the defendants' refusal to conduct universal Covid-19 testing within the prison. Id. Ruffin filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and we granted that motion on August 31, 2020. Docs. 2, 7. Ruffin filed another motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on September 2, 2020. Doc. 9. Because we had already granted Ruffin's first motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on August 31, 2020, we will recommend that his second motion be dismissed as moot. On October 27, 2020, defendants filed a motion to dismiss Ruffin's complaint for failure to state a claim. Doc. 15 at 1. We ordered Ruffin to file a brief in opposition to the defendants' motion on or before November 10, 2020. Doc. 17. Ruffin then filed a motion for extension of time to file a brief in opposition to defendants' motion. Doc. 18. We granted the motion and ordered Ruffin to file his brief in opposition on or before December 10, 2020. Doc. 19. Ruffin failed to file a brief in opposition by the December 10, 2020, deadline. On March 15, 2021, mail sent to Ruffin was returned to the court as undeliverable. Doc. 21. On April 12, 2021, we ordered Ruffin to show cause on or before April 23, 2021, as to why his case should not be dismissed for failure to comply with court orders, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). Doc. 22. Our order was returned to the court as undeliverable on April 21, 2021. Doc. 23. The order was resent and again returned to the court as undeliverable. Doc. 24. Ruffin has failed to file a brief in opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss, to keep us informed of his current address in accordance with Local Rule 83.18, or to respond to our order to show cause, and the time to do so has long since passed.
M.D. Pa. L.R. 83.18 (“Whenever a party by whom or on whose behalf an initial paper is offered for filing is not represented in the action, such party shall maintain on file with the clerk a current address at which all notices and copies of pleadings, motions or papers in the action may be served upon such party. Service of any notices, copies of pleadings, motions or papers in the action at the address currently maintained on file in the clerk's office by a party shall be deemed to be effective service upon such party.”).
III. Discussion.
By failing to file a brief in opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss, to inform us of his current address, or to respond to our order to show cause, it appears that Ruffin has abandoned this action. Thus, we recommend that the court dismiss this action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). Accordingly, we also recommend that the defendants' motion to dismiss be denied as moot.
The court may dismiss an action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) if the plaintiff fails to prosecute a case or to comply with court rules or court orders. Even though dismissal is an available sanction, it is a drastic sanction that “should be reserved for those cases where there is a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff.” Donnelly v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 677 F.2d 339, 342 (3d Cir. 1982). In other words, “cases should be decided on the merits barring substantial circumstances in support of the contrary outcome.” Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cnty., 923 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2019).
Decisions regarding dismissal of actions for failure to prosecute rest in the sound discretion of the court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002). But that discretion, while broad, is governed by the following factors, commonly referred to as the Poulis factors, which the court must balance in deciding whether to dismiss a case:
(1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984). No. single factor is dispositive, Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 263 (3d Cir. 2008), and each factor need not be satisfied for the court to dismiss an action, Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2003). In this case, an assessment of the Poulis factors weighs in favor of dismissing this action.
The first Poulis factor is the extent of the party's personal responsibility. A pro se litigant is personally responsible for failure to comply with the court's rules and orders, including filing a brief in opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss and responding to the court's orders to show cause. In this case, because Ruffin is proceeding pro se, he is responsible for his failure to file a brief in opposition and for his failure to respond to the show cause order.
The second Poulis factor is prejudice to the adversary. Examples of prejudice are “the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable dimming of witnesses' memories, or the excessive and possibly irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing party.” Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871, 876 (3d Cir. 1984). Prejudice for purposes of the Poulis analysis, however, does not mean irremediable harm. Ware, 322 F.3d at 222. “[T]he burden imposed by impeding a party's ability to prepare effectively a full and complete trial strategy is sufficiently prejudicial.” Id. In this case, Ruffin's failure to respond to our order to show cause frustrates and delays resolution of this action. Going forward, such failure to litigate would prejudice the defendants, who without timely responses by Ruffin could not seek a timely resolution of the case.
The third Poulis factor is a history of dilatoriness. While “conduct that occurs one or two times is insufficient to demonstrate a ‘history of dilatoriness, '” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 261, “[e]xtensive or repeated delay or delinquency constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such as consistent non-response to interrogatories, or consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.” Adams v. Trs. of N.J. Brewery Emps.' Pension Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 874 (3d Cir. 1994). A “party's problematic acts must be evaluated in light of [his] behavior over the life of the case.” Id. at 875. In this case, we ordered Ruffin to file a brief in opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss, but he failed to do so even after we granted him an extension of time to file the brief. Additionally, Ruffin has failed to respond to our order to show cause and the time to do so has passed. Thus, Ruffin has a history of dilatoriness.
The fourth Poulis factor is whether the conduct was willful or in bad faith. “Willfulness involves intentional or self-serving behavior.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 875. Here, Ruffin's failure to respond to our order to show cause and his failure to file a brief in opposition to defendants' motion leads to an inference that he has willfully abandoned this case.
The fifth Poulis factor is the effectiveness of alternate sanctions. Dismissal is a sanction of last resort, and it is incumbent upon a court to explore the effectiveness of lesser sanctions before ordering dismissal. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868. Ruffin, filing pro se, filed two motions to proceed in forma pauperis, in which he indicated that did not have the financial means to pay court filing fees. Docs. 2, 9. Therefore, monetary sanctions would not be effective in this case. Moreover, Ruffin's failure to respond to our order to show cause leads to an inference that further orders to him would not be effective. In this case, no sanction short of dismissal would be effective.
The sixth and final Poulis factor is the meritoriousness of the claim. In this inquiry, a claim will be deemed meritorious when the allegations of the complaint, if established at trial, would support recovery. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 870. Here, assuming for the sake of argument that Ruffin's claim has merit, consideration of this factor cannot save his case, since he is now wholly noncompliant with his obligations as a litigant.
In sum, the Poulis factors weigh heavily in favor of dismissal. Ruffin has abandoned this case. Thus, we will recommend that the court dismiss the case.
IV. Recommendations.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the court DISMISS this action in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b).
In accordance with above, IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the court DENY the defendants' motion to dismiss as moot.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 22nd day of June, 2021.