The City argues Ruf v. Honolulu Police Department, 89 Hawai'i 315, 972 P.2d 1081 (1999), bars the negligence claim because the Hawai'i Supreme Court in that case held that “‘the duty provided by the special relationship in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319 is not extended to the general public when the police department releases a criminal from custody . . .” [Motion, Mem. in Supp. at 20-21 (quoting Maho Wada v. Aloha King, LLC 154 F.Supp.3d 981, 998 (D. Haw. 2015) (citing Ruf v. Honolulu Police Dept., 89 Haw. 315, 972 P.2d 1081, 1095-96 (Haw. 1999))).
Hawaii courts generally do not recognize a duty of police departments to provide police protection to individuals. Ruf v. Honolulu Police Dep't, 972 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Haw. 1999) (quoting Freitas v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 574 P.2d 529, 532 (Haw. 1978)). An exception, however, applies to plaintiffs who allege that "police action has increased the risk of harm and there is negligence in providing protection against the enhanced danger."
In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the [circuit] court is required to view the facts presented in the pleadings and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ruf v. Honolulu Police Dep't, 89 Hawai'i 315, 319, 972 P.2d 1081, 1085 (1999) (brackets in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). On appeal, this court reviews de novo the circuit court's order granting the motion.
Hawaii law is well settled that "'[t]he failure of the police to provide protection against harm from third parties is ordinarily not actionable,' unless there is some 'special relationship' between the police officers (or the municipality) and the member of the public that was harmed." Ikeda, 2019 WL 4684455, at *8 (quoting Ruf v. Honolulu Police Dep't, 89 Haw. 315, 322-23, 972 P.2d 1081, 1088-89 (1999)) (some brackets omitted)). "But an exception to this rule exists 'where police action has increased the risk of harm and there is negligence in providing protection against the enhanced danger.'"
This district court has stated: the general rule is that "[t]he failure of the police to provide protection [against harm from third parties] is ordinarily not actionable," Ruf v. Honolulu Police Dep't, 972 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Haw. 1999) (quoting Freitas v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 574 P.2d 529, 532 (1978)), unless there is some "special relationship" between the police officers (or the municipality) and the member of the public that was harmed. Id. at 1089.
Such a notion is absurd under the facts alleged. Of course, the general rule is that "[t]he failure of the police to provide protection [against harm from third parties] is ordinarily not actionable," Ruf v. Honolulu Police Dep't, 972 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Haw. 1999) (quoting Freitas v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 574 P.2d 529, 532 (1978)), unless there is some "special relationship" between the police officers (or the municipality) and the member of the public that was harmed. Id. at 1089.
This court reviews a circuit court's order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings de novo. See Hawai‘i Med. Ass'n v. Hawai‘i Med. Serv. Ass'n, Inc., 113 Hawai‘i 77, 91, 148 P.3d 1179, 1193 (2006) (citing Ruf v. Honolulu Police Dep't, 89 Hawai‘i 315, 319, 972 P.2d 1081, 1085 (1999) ). In a motion for judgment on the pleadings under HRCP Rule 12(c), the movant must clearly establish that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that [they are] entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
On appeal, we reviewde novothe trial court's order granting the motion.Ruf v. Honolulu Police Dep't, 89 Haw. 315, 319, 972 P.2d 1081, 1085 (1999) (citations and brackets omitted) (emphases added). Barnett is appealing the court's final order.
Id. at 820-21.Id. at 821 (quoting Ruf v. Honolulu Police Dep't, 972 P.2d 1081, 1093 (Haw. 1999)).Id. at 822 (citing Vermont's statutory scheme for juvenile corrections and noting express purposes of rehabilitation and reintegration with society).
1986), 719 P.2d 643.{¶ a} See, e.g., Williams v. State (1983), 34 Cal.3d 18, 192 Cal.Rptr. 233, 664 P.2d 137; Shore v. Stonington (1982), 187 Conn. 147, 444 A.2d 1379; Morgan v. Dist. of Columbia (D.C.App. 1983), 468 A.2d 1306; Ruf v. Honolulu Police Dept. (1999), 89 Haw. 315, 972 P.2d 1081; Kolbe v. State (Iowa 2001), 625 N.W.2d 721; Fudge v. Kansas City, 239 Kan. 369, 720 P.2d 1093; Cracraft v. St. Louis Park (Minn. 1979), 279 N.W.2d 801; State ex rel. Barthelette v. Sanders (Mo. 1988), 756 S.W.2d 536; Coty v. Washoe Cty. (1992), 108 Nev. 757, 839 P.2d 97; Cuffy v. New York City, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 513 N.Y.Supp.2d 372, 505 N.E.2d 937; Catone v. Medberry (R.I. 1989), 555 A.2d 328; Steinke v. South Carolina Dept. of Labor (1999), 336 S.C. 373, 520 S.E.2d 142; Tipton v. Tabor (S.D. 1997), 567 N.W.2d 351; Rollins v. Petersen (Utah 1991), 813 P.2d 1156; Chambers-Castanes v. King Cty. (1983), 100 Wn.2d 275, 669 P.2d 451; Benson v. Kutsch (1989), 181 W. Va. 1, 380 S.E.2d 36. {¶ b} Five other states — Georgia, Indiana, Michigan, North Carolina, and Vermont — have applied the public-duty rule in a more limited fashion.