Opinion
A20-0839
02-16-2021
Faron Wayne Ruel, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.
ORDER OPINION
Polk County District Court
File No. 60-CR-12-2741 Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Florey, Judge; and Frisch, Judge.
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. In September 2014, a jury found appellant Faron Wayne Ruel guilty of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. We affirmed Ruel's conviction on direct appeal. See State v. Ruel, No. A15-0152, 2016 WL 363407, at *1-5 (Minn. App. Feb. 1, 2016), review denied (Minn. Apr. 19, 2016).
2. Ruel then filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, bias in the jury pool, and a failure of the prosecution to disclose evidence. The district court denied the petition following an evidentiary hearing in February 2017. We affirmed. See Ruel v. State, No. A18-0577, 2019 WL 418528, at *1-6 (Minn. App. Feb. 4, 2019), review denied (Minn. Apr. 24, 2019).
3. Ruel brought a second petition for postconviction relief in 2020, asserting that newly discovered evidence derived from the February 2017 evidentiary hearing merits relief. The district court denied his second petition as time-barred and, alternatively barred under State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976). Ruel now appeals.
4. "We review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion." Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017). The postconviction court abuses its discretion if its ruling was arbitrary or capricious, if its decision was based on an erroneous view of the law, or if it made clearly erroneous factual findings. Id. As part of this review, we review legal issues de novo. Id.
5. The district court determined that Ruel's second petition was time-barred because such a petition must be filed no more than two years after "an appellate court's disposition of petitioner's direct appeal." Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)(2) (2018). Because Ruel directly appealed his conviction, this two-year period began to run on April 19, 2016—the date the supreme court denied his petition for review. The second petition for postconviction relief was filed in 2020, almost four years after the direct appeal. The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the petition was time-barred.
6. Ruel argues that newly discovered evidence justifies consideration of his petition. This exception is only available if "the petitioner alleges the existence of newly discovered evidence . . . that could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence by the petitioner or petitioner's attorney within the two-year time period for filing a postconviction petition," the evidence is not cumulative or for impeachment purposes, and the evidence "establishes by a clear and convincing standard that the petitioner is innocent." Id., subd. 4(b)(2) (2018).
7. Ruel asserts that a narrative report from a law-enforcement officer outlining a conversation the officer had with Ruel during the investigation into the crime in 2012 is newly discovered evidence because he only learned of the report at the February 2017 evidentiary hearing.
8. The narrative report is not newly discovered evidence. It was disclosed to Ruel and his counsel in January 2013 as part of the prosecution's pretrial disclosures. Moreover, Ruel's trial counsel was aware of the report during the trial and testified about the report at the 2017 evidentiary hearing. The narrative report was thus ascertained by Ruel or his attorney well within the statutory limitations period, and it therefore does not constitute newly discovered evidence.
9. Because the petition was not timely filed and was not based on newly discovered evidence, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the second postconviction petition was time-barred pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 590.01 (2018).
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order denying Ruel's second petition for postconviction relief is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
Dated: 2/16/2021
BY THE COURT
/s/_________
Judge Jennifer L. Frisch