Opinion
No. CV07 400 82 48S
September 6, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS (#103)
This action arises out of workers' compensation payments paid by the plaintiff, Rudy's Limousine Service, Inc., on behalf of its defendant employee, Charles Aspinwall. The plaintiff filed a four-count complaint on June 11, 2007, seeking declaratory relief and damages for conversion against Aspinwall, his attorney, Donald McCarthy, and McCarthy's firm, McCarthy, Schuman Coombes. The plaintiff alleges the following facts.
On January 29, 2004, in the course of his employment with the plaintiff, Aspinwall slipped and fell on ice and snow in a parking lot controlled by Greenwich Cadillac-Oldsmobile, Inc. (Greenwich). Pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31-275 et seq., the plaintiff expended $28,904.32 for medical treatment and $51,929 in other compensation for the benefit of Aspinwall. Aspinwall, represented by McCarthy and the law firm, commenced an action against Greenwich; see Aspinwall v. Greenwich Cadillac-Oldsmobile, Inc., Docket No. AAN CV 05 5000109. This case was settled for $60,000, which amount was paid to the defendants in this case by Greenwich's insurer, Universal Underwriters. The plaintiff, pursuant to General Statutes § 31-293, sent certified lien letters to Greenwich on January 30, 2006, well in advance of the settlement. Despite repeated demands, however, the defendants have failed to reimburse the plaintiff for its compensation lien. The plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that it has valid liens on the settlement recovered by the defendants as well as damages for the sums it expended on Aspinwall's behalf.
On July 31, 2007, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff's claims are based upon a workers' compensation claim and, as such, the workers' compensation commissioner for the fourth district has exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. The motion was accompanied by a memorandum of law. The plaintiff filed an objection to the motion with a supporting memorandum on August 14, 2007.
"A motion to dismiss properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cox v. Aiken, 278 Conn. 204, 210-11, 897 A.2d 71 (2006). "Subject matter jurisdiction is the power [of the court] to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MBNA America Bank N.A. v. Boata, 283 Conn. 381, 389, 926 A.2d 1035 (2007).
The defendants move to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff's claims arise out of a workers' compensation claim pursuant to § 31-293 and, therefore, this court lacks jurisdiction over the matter, which has been exclusively statutorily prescribed under General Statutes § 31-278 to the workers' compensation commissioner. The plaintiff counters that the present action involves a request for a declaratory judgment and claims of conversion, which are legally distinct from the matters a commissioner may hear under § 31-278 and properly the province of the Superior Court. It also points out that the action includes claims against the employee's counsel, which do not fall within the commissioner's jurisdiction.
Section 31-293(a) provides in relevant part: "Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, when any injury for which compensation is payable under the provisions of this chapter has been sustained under circumstances creating in a person other than an employer who has complied with the requirements of subsection (b) of section 31-284, a legal liability to pay damages for the injury and the injured employee has received compensation for the injury from such employer . . . pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, the employer . . . shall have a lien upon any judgment received by the employee against the party or any settlement received by the employee from the party, provided the employer, insurance carrier or Second Injury Fund shall give written notice of the lien to the party prior to such judgment or settlement." (Emphasis added.)
Section 31-287 provides in relevant part: "Each commissioner shall, for the purposes of this chapter, have power . . . to certify to official acts and shall have all powers necessary to enable him to perform the duties imposed upon him by the provisions of this chapter. Each commissioner shall hear all claims and questions arising under this chapter in the district to which the commissioner is assigned . . ."
The plaintiff's claims, although incident to a workers' compensation claim filed by Aspinwall, do not "arise out of" the act in the manner urged by tile defendants. "A plain reading of [§ 31-278] suggests that the commissioner's subject matter jurisdiction is limited to adjudicating claims arising under the act, that is, claims by an injured employee seeking compensation from his employer for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment." (Emphasis added.) Stickney v. Sunlight Construction, Inc., 248 Conn. 754, 762, 730 A.2d 630 (1999).
See also Byrd v. Bechtel/Fusco, 90 Conn.App. 641, 644-45, 878 A.2d 1162, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 919, 888 A.2d 87 (2005), where the Appellate court opined that "[w]e have previously observed that the workers' compensation commission, like any administrative body, must act strictly within its statutory authority . . . It cannot modify, abridge, or otherwise change the statutory provisions under which it acquires authority unless the statutes expressly grant it that power . . . [I]t is settled law that the commissioner's jurisdiction is confined by the [Workers' Compensation Act] and limited by its provisions . . . The commissioner exercises jurisdiction only under the precise circumstances and in the manner particularly prescribed by the enabling legislation . . . The [act] is not triggered by a claimant until he brings himself within its statutory ambit." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The court in Byrd also quoted Stickney v. Sunlight Construction, Inc., supra, 248 Conn. 762, for the proposition that the commissioner's jurisdiction is limited to claims by an injured employee against his employer under the act. Byrd v. Bechtel/Fusco, supra, 90 Conn.App. 647.
The plaintiff's claims in this action are not that of an employee seeking compensation from his employer under the act, but of an employer seeking to recover amounts it has expended on behalf of the employee under the act. That is, the claims do not "stem from an accident" but from the defendants' alleged retention of moneys to which the plaintiff is legally entitled. While the plaintiff's claimed lien on the defendants' settlement proceeds derives from § 31-293, the plaintiff's present causes of action for declaratory relief and common-law conversion are not enumerated among the commissioner's powers under the act and are properly before this court.
See General Statutes § 52-29(a): "The Superior Court in any action or proceeding may declare rights and other legal relations on request for such a declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. The declaration shall have the force of a final judgment."
Cf. Nicolelli v. Continental Casualty Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. 414441 (October 13, 1999, Levin, J.) [25 Conn. L. Rptr. 497] ("The plaintiff's lawsuit here is based on breach of contract and CUTPA, two causes of action which the worker' compensation commissioner did not have jurisdiction to entertain and in fact did not entertain").
The defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.