Georgia recognizes, and this Court has expressly adopted, the concept of conspiracy jurisdiction. Rudo v. Stubbs, 221 Ga. App. 702, 703-704 (1) (a) ( 472 SE2d 515) (1996). "A conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons to accomplish an unlawful end or to accomplish a lawful end by unlawful means."

Georgia law recognizes "conspiracy jurisdiction," a doctrine under which jurisdiction is conferred over a non-resident defendant not by its own actions, but by the actions of a co-conspirator. See Hyperdynamics Corp. v. Southridge Capital Mgmt., LLC, 699 S.E.2d 456, 466 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); Rudo v. Stubbs, 472 S.E.2d 515, 516-17 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). For conspiracy jurisdiction to obtain, a plaintiff does not have to assert an underlying claim for "conspiracy" but must allege facts sufficient to show a conspiracy between the non-resident defendant and a co-conspirator over whom the court has independent jurisdiction.

" In Georgia, "the in-state acts of a resident co-conspirator may be imputed to a non-resident co-conspirator to satisfy jurisdictional requirements under some circumstances." Rudo v. Stubbs, 472 S.E.2d 515, 516 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis added); see also Hyperdynamics Corp. v. Southridge Capital Management, LLC, 699 S.E.2d 456, 466 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). Under a theory of subsection (2) conspiracy jurisdiction, due process requirements must still be satisfied as to the non-resident defendant.

Hyperdynamics Corp. v. Southridge Capital Mgmt., LLC, 305 Ga. App. 283, 294 (2010). See also Rudo v. Stubbs, 221 Ga. App. 702, 703 (1996)("we agree with the many courts which have held that the in-state acts of a resident co-conspirator may be imputed to a non-resident co-conspirator to satisfy jurisdictional requirements under some circumstances"); Earthlink, Inc. v. Pope, Civil Action No. 1:03-cv-2559-JOF, 2006 WL 2583066 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 31, 2006)(Forrester, J.)(applying conspiracy jurisdiction). Under Georgia law, "[t]he essential element of the alleged conspiracy is proof of a common design establishing 'that two or more persons in any manner, either positively or tacitly, arrive at a mutual understanding as to how they will accomplish an unlawful design.'" Tyler v. Thompson, 308 Ga. App. 221, 225 (2011)(quoting Parrish v. Jackson W. Jones, P.C., 278 Ga. App. 645, 649 (2006)).

Metzler v. Love, 207 Ga. App. 447, 449 ( 428 S.E.2d 384) (1993) citing Coopers Lybrand v. Cocklereece, 157 Ga. App. 240, 246 ( 276 S.E.2d 845) (1981). Compare Rudo v. Stubbs, 221 Ga. App. 702 ( 472 S.E.2d 515) (1996) (conspiracy to commit an intentional tort against a Georgian is imputable to non-resident for purposes of long-arm jurisdiction). There is no evidence in this case that Franks targeted a Georgian in a conspiracy to defraud.

Accordingly, this court concludes that exercise of personal jurisdiction over Berger Singerman pursuant to Georgia's long-arm statute is not warranted. Admitting as much, the plaintiff relies almost entirely on Georgia's "conspiracy jurisdiction" under Rudo v. Stubbs, 221 Ga. App. 702 (1996). In that case, the court established that exercise of personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants may be proper based only on their involvement in a conspiracy.

Thus, this Court holds that there is insufficient basis for finding it unconstitutional at this time. See e.g., Textor v. Bd. of Regents of N. Ill. Univ., 711 F.2d 1387, 1393 (7th Cir. 1983) (actions by one conspiracy participant in Illinois "provide the requisite minimum contacts between the remaining members of the conspiracy and the [forum state]"); Zivitz v. Greenburg, No. 98C5350, 1999 WL 984397, at *6 (N.D. III. Oct. 25, 1999) (exercise of conspiracy jurisdiction in forum state over nonresident defendants comports with due process); Rudo v. Stubbs, 472 S.E.2d 515, 517 (Ga.Ct.App. 1996) (imputation of in-state acts of co-conspirators to defendants under Georgia long-arm statute does not violate duo process). Generally, under the conspiracy theory, jurisdiction may be exercised over a defendant in a forum if: (1) the defendant and one or more persons conspired to do something; (2) that they could reasonably expect to lead to consequences in a particular forum; (3) one co-conspirator commits overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy and (4) those acts are a type which, if committed by a nonresident, would subject the nonresident to personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute of the forum state.Cawley v. Bloch, 544 F. Supp. 133, 135 (D. Md. 1982).

We note, however, that more than a mere allegation of conspiracy with a Georgia resident is required to support personal jurisdiction under the Act. Compare Rudo v. Stubbs, 221 Ga. App. 702, 704 ( 472 SE2d 515) (1996). 3.

948 F. Supp. at 664 (quoting Thompson Trading Ltd. v. AlliedLyons PLC, 124 F.R.D. 534, 535 (D.R.I. 1989)). In Rudo v. Stubbs, 221 Ga. App. 702, 472 S.E.2d 515 (Ct.App. Ga 1996), plaintiff brought suit alleging a conspiracy to commit fraud. The Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the nonresident defendant's motion to dismiss.

It is beyond cavil that the exercise of personal jurisdiction in Georgia requires a court to find that at least one prong of the long-arm statute is satisfied. See Rudo v. Stubbs, 221 Ga.App. 702, 472 S.E.2d 515, 516 (1996). Innovative Clinical clarified that to satisfy the long-arm statute, a nonresident defendant must "do certain acts within the state of Georgia."