"It is a reasonable inference from the facts reported that the libellee's persistence in her wrongful conduct over the protests of her husband caused injury to him . . . as a natural consequence of her deliberate and persistent misconduct. Rudnick v. Rudnick, 288 Mass. 256, 257." Brown v. Brown, 323 Mass. 332, 334.
Freeman v. Freeman, 238 Mass. 150, 160. Rudnick v. Rudnick, 288 Mass. 256, 257. In Freeborn v. Freeborn, 168 Mass. 50, a school teacher was so persistently nagged by his wife that he was affected nervously and his health was disturbed.
The facts reported by the judge were sufficient to support his conclusion that the libellee had been guilty of cruel and abusive treatment of his wife. See Freeman v. Freeman, 238 Mass. 150; Curtiss v. Curtiss, 243 Mass. 51; Steere v. Steere, 265 Mass. 317; Rudnick v. Rudnick, 288 Mass. 256; Mooney v. Mooney, 317 Mass. 433; Reddington v. Reddington, 317 Mass. 760. Compare Vergnani v. Vergnani, 321 Mass. 703; Hamilton v. Hamilton, 325 Mass. 278. Condonation by her of prior ill treatment could have been found to have been conditioned on better treatment in the future and his conduct on March 24, 1951, after the reconciliation to have been a breach of the condition which vitiated the condonation.
The foregoing findings are supported by the evidence and are sufficient, we think, to justify the decree of divorce. Curtiss v. Curtiss, 243 Mass. 51. Rudnick v. Rudnick, 288 Mass. 256. Mooney v. Mooney, 317 Mass. 433. Reddington v. Reddington, 317 Mass. 760. Flavell v. Flavell, 324 Mass. 362. The findings here go beyond those in Vergnani v. Vergnani, 321 Mass. 703, and Hamilton v. Hamilton, 325 Mass. 278, on which the libellee relies. The libellee, who pleaded condonation, argues that the evidence required a finding that this defence had been established.
Burke v. Burke, 270 Mass. 449, 454. Rudnick v. Rudnick, 288 Mass. 256, 257. Bradford v. Bradford, 296 Mass. 187, 189.
Burke v. Burke, 270 Mass. 449, 454. Rudnick v. Rudnick, 288 Mass. 256, 257. Bradford v. Bradford, 296 Mass. 187, 189-190.
Ed.) c. 208, ยง 1. In Rudnick v. Rudnick, 288 Mass. 256, at page 257, this court said, "It is settled law in this Commonwealth that cruelty sufficient to support a libel for divorce may exist without blows and is proved if the acts charged create danger to the person or health. It is also defined as acts which tend to bodily harm and in that manner render cohabitation unsafe.
Bailey v. Bailey, 97 Mass. 373, 380, 381. Where the acts and words of one spouse cause a serious impairment to the health of the other and they are done or spoken with an intent to cause such injury, a divorce for cruel and abusive treatment ought to be granted. Freeborn v. Freeborn, 168 Mass. 50, 52. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 229 Mass. 592. Curtiss v. Curtiss, 243 Mass. 51. It is a reasonable inference from the facts reported that the libelee's persistence in her wrongful conduct over the protests of her husband caused injury to him to the extent already described as a natural consequence of her deliberate and persistent misconduct. Rudnick v. Rudnick, 288 Mass. 256, 257. Upon the facts reported the libellant has established a case of cruel and abusive treatment and is as matter of law entitled to a decree for divorce. Waterhouse v. Waterhouse, 225 Mass. 228. Reddington v. Reddington, 317 Mass. 760. The decree entered in the Probate Court is reversed and a decree is to be entered granting a divorce for cruel and abusive treatment.
Upon the basic facts found, we find that the libellee was guilty of cruel and abusive treatment. Meader v. Meader, 252 Mass. 132. Katz v. Katz, 274 Mass. 77. Callan v. Callan, 280 Mass. 37. Rudnick v. Rudnick, 288 Mass. 256. Mooney v. Mooney, ante, 433. His violent acts were done in anger, not in sport.
"To establish cruel and abusive treatment it is not necessary to prove that the libellee had a malevolent intent to cause physical injury to the body or to the health of the libellant, it being sufficient to prove that such was the natural consequence of his conduct and that harm resulted or was reasonably likely to follow the acts of the libellee." Rudnick v. Rudnick, 288 Mass. 256, 257. There can be no question but that the conduct of the libellee that is complained of in the present case constitutes cruel and abusive treatment within the meaning of G.L. (Ter.