`It seems to us that the proper construction is to hold that an accused, regardless of his guilt or innocence, has the right to insist that there be substantial compliance with [the statute], and if these provisions are not substantially complied with, his substantial rights are harmed.['] Rudd v. State, (1952) 231 Ind. 105, 111, 107 N.E.2d 168, 170. Furthermore, Judge Emmert noted that:
We have held that where there has been substantial compliance with the statutes directing selection and calling of jurors, minor irregularities in compliance with the statutes will not create prejudice to the defendant's substantial rights. Shack, supra; Harrison v. State, (1952) 231 Ind. 147, 106 N.E.2d 912; Rudd v. State, (1952) 231 Ind. 105, 107 N.E.2d 168. Our statutory method for drawing juries was devised for the purpose of putting selection beyond suspicion of advantage or favoritism and making the selection, as nearly as possible, random.
We now must look to whether the procedure followed in the case at bar amounts to substantial compliance with the statutory requirements. Rudd v. State, (1952) 231 Ind. 105, 107 N.E.2d 168; Shack v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 450, 288 N.E.2d 155. In State v. Bass, (1936) 210 Ind. 181, 1 N.E.2d 927, we said:
There is no element of bad faith here, nor do we believe the substantial rights of the appellant were harmed. We have examined the case of Rudd v. State (1952), 231 Ind. 3. 105, 107 N.E.2d 168, cited by appellant, and find an entirely different set of facts existing in that case. There, the jury box was not emptied before names were placed therein for the ensuing year; not all names drawn from the box were listed and recorded; the security provisions for keeping the jury box locked and in other particulars were not followed.
The second alleges a failure to comply with certain of the requirements of Burns' 1946 Repl., § 4-3301. The appellant cites and relies upon Walter R. Rudd v. State of Indiana (1952), 231 Ind. 105, 107 N.E.2d 168. That case does not govern this one, however, for there we were dealing with a factual situation as developed by a trial of the issues presented by the plea in abatement. The legal sufficiency of the plea in abatement filed in that case was neither questioned nor considered.
As the Court of Appeals recognized, this Court has repeatedly emphasized that compliance with the statutory procedures for the selection of jury venire serves the vital purposes of guaranteeing the impartiality of jurors and eliminating any cause for suspicion about the selection process. Cross v. State, (1979) Ind., 397 N.E.2d 265; Owen v. State, (1979) Ind. 396 N.E.2d 376; Shack v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 450, 288 N.E.2d 155; Rudd v. State, (1952) 231 Ind. 105, 107 N.E.2d 168. The former aim, of course, is constitutionally required as basic to our system of jurisprudence and the principles of law of our republic. Smith v. Texas, (1940) 311 U.S. 128, 61 S.Ct. 164, 85 L.Ed. 84; Brewer v. State, (1969) 253 Ind. 154, 252 N.E.2d 429. The latter purpose — removing any specter of arbitrariness from the selection process — is vital to the effective administration of justice, for it perpetuates society's confidence that the system yields convictions justly secured.
Nevertheless, a grand jury which is not organized substantially in accordance with the statutory requirements is held to be an unlawful jury, and an indictment returned by such a grand jury will be dismissed. Rudd v. State, (1952) 231 Ind. 105, 107 N.E.2d 168. See State v. Bass, (1936) 210 Ind. 181, 1 N.E.2d 927, overruled in part, State ex rel. Brune v. Vanderburgh Circuit Court, (1971) 255 Ind. 505, 265 N.E.2d 524.
`It seems to us that the proper construction is to hold that an accused, regardless of his guilt or innocence, has the right to insist that there be substantial compliance with [the statute], and if these provisions are not substantially complied with, his substantial rights are harmed.['] Rudd v. State, (1952) 231 Ind. 105, 111, 107 N.E.2d 168, 170. Furthermore, Judge Emmert noted that: `The only way this court has to enforce substantial compliance with the statutes on juries is to reverse when the issue is properly presented in the trial court and here.' 231 Ind. at 113, 107 N.E.2d at 171.
The unlawful selection of juries is, of course, more than an irregularity. Rudd v. State, 231 Ind. 105 ( 107 N.E.2d 168). "Grand jurors who have not been lawfully impaneled or sworn have no more authority to find indictments than the same number of citizens outside of the courthouse — they are not a grand jury in law." Tompkins v. State, 138 Ga. 465, 467, supra; accord Glass v. State, 109 Ga. App. 353, 354, supra; Ludden v. State, 109 Ga. App. 745, supra.
Where there has been substantial compliance with the statutes directing the selection and calling of jurors, minor irregularities will not constitute reversible error unless there is substantial prejudice to the defendant's rights as a result of such irregularities. Shack v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 450, 457, 288 N.E.2d 155, 161; Harrison v. State, (1952) 231 Ind. 147, 165, 106 N.E.2d 912, 921; Rudd v. State, (1952) 231 Ind. 105, 111, 107 N.E.2d 168, 170-71. There is no showing here that appellant was in any way prejudiced by any irregularity in the method of composing or calling the jury.