Rudd v. Gonzalez

7 Citing cases

  1. Aragon v. Aragon

    513 S.W.3d 447 (Tenn. 2017)   Cited 9 times
    Holding that "the ‘reasonable purpose’ ground is not intended to be a guise under which the trial court may determine whether the parent's decision to relocate is wise"

    The petitioner—the parent opposing relocation—bears the burden of proving grounds for denying permission to relocate. Id. This allocation of the burden of proof has been recognized repeatedly by our Court of Appeals. See, e.g. , Rogers v. Rogers , No. W2006-00858-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 1946617, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 3, 2007) ; Redmon , 2014 WL 1694708, at *5 ; Rudd v. Gonzalez , No. M2012-02714-COA-R3CV, 2014 WL 872816, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2014) ; Lima v. Lima , No. W2010-02027-COA-R3CV, 2011 WL 3445961, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2011) ; In re Iyana R.W. , No. E2010-00114-COA-R3-JV, 2011 WL 2348458, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jun. 8, 2011) ; Webster , 2006 WL 3008019, at *13 ; Clark v. Clark , No. M2002-03071-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 23094000, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2003) ); Elder v. Elder , No. M1998-00935-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 1077961, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2001). In the instant case, in support of its holding that the proposed move had no reasonable purpose, the trial court commented that there was "no proof in this case that Mr. Aragon has better job opportunities, greater salary opportunities or career advancement opportunities in the Tucson area" and "no proof whatsoever with regard to Mr. Aragon's comparable job opportunities in the Middle Tennessee or Southern Kentucky area because he has not ... pursued such opportunities."

  2. Kinder v. Bryant

    No. E2017-01688-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May. 22, 2018)

    "In our view, the trial court's analysis was spot on." Rudd v. Gonzalez, No. M2012-02714-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 872816, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2014). --------

  3. Mouton v. Mouton

    No. E2016-00231-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2016)

    The farther the move, the more intense the opposition because of the move's effect on visitation and the ability of the other parent to foster and maintain an appropriate relationship with his or her child or children."Rudd v. Gonzalez, No. M2012-02714-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 872816, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2014) (quoting Collins v. Coode, No. M2002-02557-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 904097, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2004)). Our legislature has created a statutory framework to address parental relocation.

  4. Mackey v. Mayfield

    No. E2014-02052-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2015)   Cited 4 times
    Applying the previous statute when trial was held on June 25-27, 2014, the statute took effect on July 1, 2014, and the order was entered on July 25, 2014

    "There are no bright-line rules with regard to what constitutes a reasonable purpose for a proposed relocation." Rudd v. Gonzalez, No. M2012-02714-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 872816, at * 11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2014), no perm. app. filed. Instead, such determinations are fact-intensive and require a thorough examination of the unique circumstances of each case and the specific, factual rationales for the relocation.

  5. Sanko v. Sanko

    No. E2014-01816-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jun. 16, 2015)   Cited 3 times

    "We are not at liberty to broaden the definition of 'vindictive' provided by the legislature in the parental relocation statute." Rudd v. Gonzalez, No. M2012-02714-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 872816, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2014). In deciding that Mother's motive was vindictive, the court focused primarily on the timing of the relocation letter, her desire to gain the assets and not the liabilities from the marriage, her refusal to communicate with Father other than by electronic means, her enrollment of the Children in school without Father's permission, and the difficulties inherent in exercising co-parenting time as a result of the relocation.

  6. Heilig v. Heilig

    No. E2014-00586-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jun. 15, 2015)   Cited 3 times
    In Heilig, the mother filed her petition objecting to the father's relocation just two months before the hearing on the relocation took place.

    In this non-jury case, our standard of review is de novo upon the record of the proceedings below; however, the record comes to us with a presumption of correctness as to the trial court's factual determinations, a presumption we must honor unless the evidence preponderates against those findings. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Goddard v. Goddard, No. E2011-00777-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 601183 at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed Feb. 24, 2012); Rudd v. Gonzalez, No. M2012-02714-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 872816 at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. W.S., filed Feb. 28, 2014). "For questions of law, the standard of review is de novo without a presumption of correctness afforded to the lower court's conclusions of law."

  7. Aragon v. Aragon

    No. M2013-01962-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2014)   Cited 12 times

    2005).Rudd v. Gonzalez, No. M2012-02714-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 872816, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2014). Father's first issue concerns the trial court's determination that his move had no reasonable purpose.