Rudd v. Electrolux Corp.

26 Citing cases

  1. Nix v. The Chemours Co. FC

    7:17-CV-189-D (E.D.N.C. Oct. 4, 2023)

    Under North Carolina law, stigma damages can be “one of the factors which may be utilized in determining market price” in cases of “permanent nuisance which involves a diminution of value, regardless of the outcome of remediation.” Rudd v. Electrolux Corp., 982 F.Supp. 355, 372(M.D. N.C. 1997); see Appeal of Camel City Laundry Co., 123 N.C. App.210,217,472S.E.2d402, 406-07 (1996).

  2. Nix v. Chemours Co. FC, LLC

    456 F. Supp. 3d 748 (E.D.N.C. 2019)   Cited 5 times
    Dismissing an unjust enrichment claim based on the theory that the plaintiffs conferred a benefit on the defendant by allowing the defendants to discharge chemicals on the plaintiffs' property without incurring additional costs of containing and properly disposing of waste

    (1) a duty created by a statute or ordinance; (2) that the statute or ordinance was enacted to protect a class of persons which includes the plaintiff; (3) a breach of the statutory duty; (4) that the injury sustained was suffered by an interest which the statute protected; (5) that the injury was of the nature contemplated in the statute; and (6) that the violation of the statute proximately caused the injury.Rudd v. Electrolux Corp., 982 F. Supp. 355, 365 (M.D.N.C. 1997) ; see Baldwin v. GTE S., Inc., 335 N.C. 544, 546–47, 439 S.E.2d 108, 109–10 (1994) ; Hardin v. York Mem'l Park, 221 N.C. App. 317, 326, 730 S.E.2d 768, 776 (2012). As for plaintiffs' claim based on an alleged violation of the CWA and defendants' NPDES permit, even assuming that North Carolina courts recognize a right to sue in negligence based on a violation of a NPDES permit see Biddix v. Henredon Furniture Indus. Inc., 76 N.C. App. 30, 40–41, 331 S.E.2d 717, 724 (1985) ; Brinkman v. Barrett Kays & Assocs., P.A., 155 N.C. App. 738, 741, 575 S.E.2d 40, 43 (2003) ; cf. Springer v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 510 F.2d 468, 472 (4th Cir. 1975), plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege that defendants violated the NPDES permit and the CWA.

  3. Brown v. Corteva, Inc.

    7:23-CV-1409-D (E.D.N.C. Sep. 18, 2024)

    Rudd v. Electrolux Corp., 982 F.Supp. 355, 365 (M.D. N.C. 1997); see Nix, 456 F.Supp.3d at 761;

  4. J&P Dickey Real Estate Family Ltd. P'ship v. Northrop Grumman Guidance & Electronics Co.

    2:11cv37 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 19, 2012)

    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-215.83. A "hazardous substance" within the meaning of the OPHSCA includes any of the chemicals included on the list of hazardous substances set out in 40 C.F.R. § 116.4. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-215.77A; 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(A); 40 C.F.R. § 116.4; Rudd v. Electrolux Corp., 982 F. Supp. 355, 362 (M.D.N.C. 1997). The OPHSCA defines "discharge" as:

  5. B S K Enters., Inc. v. Beroth Oil Co.

    246 N.C. App. 1 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 8 times

    North Carolina law bars recovery for stigma damages when damages relate to temporary or abatable nuisances. Rudd v. Electrolux Corp., 982 F.Supp. 355, 372 (M.D.N.C.1997) ; see also Appeal of Camel City Laundry Co., 123 N.C.App. 210, 215–16, 219, 472 S.E.2d 402, 406, 408 (1996) (affirming the calculation of the "impaired value" of property, which included factoring in stigma associated with the property's contamination and remediation efforts). Defendant argues that the award of $108,500.00 to plaintiffs constitutes stigma damages because it relates to a temporary, abatable nuisance that is currently being remedied and that, therefore, any diminution in value to plaintiffs' property is temporary.

  6. Whiteside Estates Inc., v. Highlands Cove, L.L.C

    146 N.C. App. 449 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 50 times
    Holding that when a plaintiff's "claims arise from the same nucleus of operative facts and each claim was 'inextricably interwoven' with the other claims . . . apportionment of the fees [becomes] unnecessary and unrealistic"

    Once plaintiff establishes that the invasion or intrusion is unreasonable, plaintiff must prove the invasion caused substantial injury to its property interest. Watts, 256 N.C. at 619, 124 S.E.2d at 814; Rudd v. Electrolux Corp., 982 F. Supp. 355 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (need to install wells to monitor water quality presented jury question whether defendant's invasion was substantial). "An upper riparian landowner's unreasonable use of water quantity or diminution of its quality permits a lower riparian owner to maintain a civil action in nuisance or trespass to land."

  7. McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC

    980 F.3d 937 (4th Cir. 2020)   Cited 68 times
    Concluding that parent company's financials were relevant to defendant's ability to abate a nuisance when defendant admitted parent's involvement was necessary to do so but excluding that evidence as to the amount of punitive damages

    This without question would strip plaintiffs in pending suits of vested rights to damages noted even in Appellant's authorities, such as "reasonable costs of replacement or repair [and] restoration of the property to its prenuisance condition; and other added damages for incidental losses." Rudd v. Electrolux Corp. , 982 F. Supp. 355, 372 (M.D.N.C. 1997). Further, policy and justice concerns weigh against allowing retroactive amendments to alter the damages available in pending suits.

  8. Winter v. Bluewater Assocs. of Emerald Isle

    4:23-CV-101-BO-RN (E.D.N.C. Apr. 1, 2024)

    To demonstrate that a defendant has engaged in negligence per se under North Carolina law, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) a duty created by a statute or ordinance; (2) that the statute or ordinance was enacted to protect a class of persons which includes the plaintiff; (3) a breach of the statutory duty; (4) that the injury sustained was suffered by an interest which the statute protected; (5) that the injury was of the nature contemplated in the statute; and, (6) that the violation of the statute proximately caused the injury.” Rudd v. Electrolux Corp., 982 F.Supp. 355, 365 (M.D. N.C. 1997) (citation omitted). In his complaint, plaintiff relies on North Carolina's Vacation Rental Act (“VRA”), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42A-1, et seq, to support his negligence per se claim. Plaintiff alleges that Bluewater Associates was under an affirmative duty under the VRA to “[o]ffer vacation rental property to the public for leasing in compliance with all applicable federal and State laws, regulations, and ethical duties, including but not limited to, those prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, handicapping condition, or familial status.”

  9. Ozier v. Lidl U.S. Operations, LLC

    Civil Action TDC-22-2396 (D. Md. Sep. 8, 2023)

    To constitute a trespass, “it is enough that an act is done with knowledge that it will to a substantial certainty result in the entry of the foreign matter.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158(a) cmt. I (Am. L. Inst. 1965); see Hanna v. ARE Acquisitions. LLC, 929 A.2d 892, 897 (Md. 2007) (stating that one is subject to liability for a trespass when one intentionally causes a thing or a third person to enter land which is in the possession of another); see also Rudd v. Electrolux Corp. 982 F.Supp. 355, 370 (M.D. N.C. 1997) (stating that a defendant may be liable for a trespass when contaminants will, to a substantial certainty, reach the plaintiff s property)

  10. Priselac v. The Chemours Co.

    7:20-CV-190-D (E.D.N.C. Mar. 28, 2022)

    Trespass requires showing that "the defendant himself, or an object under his control, voluntarily entered, caused to enter or remained present upon plaintiffs properly." Rudd v. Electrolux Corp.. 982 F.Supp. 355, 370 (M.D. N.C. 1997); see Jordan. 116 N.C.App. at 166-67, 447 S.E.2d at 498. Here, Priselac plausibly alleges that McGaughy and Johnson controlled operations at the Fayetteville Works Site and, by extension, controlled the chemicals allegedly dumped from the site into the Cape Fear Paver.