Except in a case alleging a claim for latent disease (Jones v. United States, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119840 (E.D.N.C., Nov. 9, 2010)), this statute of repose has been consistently interpreted by state and federal courts to bar personal injury and property damages claims based on groundwater contamination filed more than ten years after a defendant’s last act or omission. See, e.g., Rudd v. Electrolux Corp, 982 F. Supp. 355 (M.D.N.C. 1997); Hodge v. Harkey, 178 N.C. App. 222 (2006). In accord with this interpretation, in 2012 the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina dismissed a nuisance claim brought more than ten years after the last act or omission of the defendant that caused contamination of property near Asheville.

Other jurisdictions addressing stigma claims have required proof of permanent physical injury before the landowner could recover stigma damages. See e.g., Bradley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 130 F.3d, 168, 176 (5th Cir. 1977); Bartleson v. U.S., 96 F.3d 1270, 1275 (9th Cir. 1996); Mehlenbacher v. Akzo Nobel Salt, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 2d 179, 188 (W.D.N.Y. 1999), vacated on other grounds 216 F.3d 291 (2nd Cir. 2000); Rudd v. Electrolux Corp., 982 F. Supp. 355, 372 (M.D.N.C. 1997); Santa Fe P'ship v. ARCO Prods. Co., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 214, 214 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Stevinson v. Deffenbaugh Indus., Inc., 870 S.W.2d 851, 856 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Yadkin Brick Co. v. Materials Recovery Co., 529 S.E.2d 764, 768 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000). This case presents an issue of first impression in Texas, and has the potential to set precedent for many other states that may view this decision in this case as persuasive, especially in those states that have not yet decided whether such a right to seek stigma damages exists.