Rubio v. Mason Cnty.

Full title: BRANDON J. RUBIO, Plaintiff, v. MASON COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

Court: United States District Court, Western District of Washington

Date published: Dec 11, 2023

No. C23-5435-JLR-SKV (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2023)

Opinion

C23-5435-JLR-SKV

12-11-2023

BRANDON J. RUBIO, Plaintiff, v. MASON COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

S. KATE VAUGHAN United States Magistrate Judge.

ORDER RE: MOTIONS TO APPOINT COUNSEL

S. KATE VAUGHAN United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis (IFP) in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action relating to his confinement at Mason County Jail. Plaintiff filed two motions to appoint counsel. Dkts. 24 & 27. Having now considered those motions, the Court finds as follows:

(1) There is no right to have counsel appointed in cases brought under § 1983. Although the Court, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), can request counsel to represent a party proceeding IFP, it may do so only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both the likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the individual to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. Id.

In his motions, Plaintiff describes his extensive, but unsuccessful efforts to obtain counsel. Dkts. 24 & 27. He asserts his belief that his claims are complex and meritorious, states that his imprisonment will greatly limit his ability to litigate, and notes that he has limited access to the law library and limited knowledge of the law. Id.

The Court, however, finds that the record in this case is not yet sufficiently developed for the Court to make a determination as to either the likelihood of success on the merits or Plaintiff's ability to articulate his claims pro se. Based on the information available at this juncture, the Court concludes Plaintiff has not demonstrated that his case involves exceptional circumstances warranting the appointment of counsel. Plaintiff's motions for the appointment of counsel, Dkts. 24 & 27, are therefore denied. The denial is without prejudice to the renewal of the request at a later date.

(2) The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Order to the parties and to the Honorable James L. Robart.