Stripped away of the above and other conclusory allegations, the TAC merely alleges a “single instance” of constitutional deprivation, which is insufficient to support a claim of a municipal policy. See Ruane v. County of Suffolk, 2015 WL 2337329, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2015).
Further, Plaintiff alleges that the County has a policy and procedure of requiring conditions of payment and/or general releases before releasing seized vehicles to Plaintiff, as a lienholder. See, e.g., Fasciana v. County of Suffolk, 996 F.Supp.2d 174, 181 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (Seybert, J.) (concluding that a vehicle owner stated a due process claim based on allegations that the County “maintained a practice under which, at the conclusion of retention hearings within which the County does not satisfy the Krimstock three prong test, its hearing officers essentially order the County to retain continuing possession of seized vehicles indefinitely, unless and until each respective owner signs a General Release in favor of the County” (emphases in original)); see also Ruane v. County of Suffolk, No. 12-CV-1658, 2015 WL 2337329, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2015) (granting the County's motion for summary judgment, finding that the evidence did not support a finding that the County “has a policy or practice of requiring a general release from the vehicle owner when the forfeiture court has dismissed the forfeiture proceeding and ordered the vehicle returned to the owner[.]”