Prior to the enactment of G.L.c. 209C, a putative father could seek an adjudication of paternity under the general equity jurisdiction of the Probate Court. See R.R.K. v. S.G.P., 400 Mass. 12 (1987); Normand v. Barkei, 385 Mass. 851 (1982). The putative father's argument in this case assumes that the Legislature's enactment of c. 209C precludes him from bringing such an action.

ion of the child's interests in order to resolve disputes in circumstances like these. Ban v. Quigley, 168 Ariz. 196, 199, 812 P.2d 1014, 1017 (App. 1990) (to avoid harmful adjudications, best interests considered before blood testing); In re Marriage of Ross, 245 Kan. 591, 602, 783 P.2d 331, 339 (1989) (best interests consideration employed before choosing to use blood test evidence); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wn.2d 299, 309-13, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (trial court must consider best interest of child before putative father is allowed to bring action); see Mary K. Kisthardt, Of Fatherhood, Families and Fantasy. The Legacy of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 65 Tul. L.Rev. 585, 592, 628-31 (1991) (discussing relationship of child's interests to decision on competing presumptions); see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 134, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 2348, 105 L.Ed.2d 91 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) (considering child's best interests in determining putative father's visitation rights); R.R.K. v. S.G.P., 400 Mass. 12, 21, 507 N.E.2d 736, 741-42 (1987) (Liacos, J., concurring) (putative father's right to visit child depends on factual determination of child's best interests). We note the prior holding of this court that under some circumstances parentage may be adjudicated without first determining whether the determination offends the child's best interests.

Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are liberally construed, physical examinations should be ordered only upon a discriminating application of the limitations of the Rule. Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 121, 85 S.Ct. at 244; accordCody v. Marriott Corp., 103 F.R.D. 421, 422 (D.Mass.1984); R.R.K. v. S.G.P., 400 Mass. 12, 507 N.E.2d 736, 740 (1987). " [S]weeping examinations of a party who has not affirmatively put into issue his own mental or physical condition are not to be automatically ordered merely because the person has been involved in an accident...." Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 121, 85 S.Ct. at 244; accordCody, 103 F.R.D. at 422.

In other words, "[t]he existence or nonexistence of a substantial relationship between the putative [parent] and child is relevant in evaluating both the rights of the parent and the best interests of the child." Id. at 690, 550 N.E.2d 365, quoting R.R.K. v. S.G.P., 400 Mass. 12, 21, 507 N.E.2d 736 (1987) (Liacos, J., concurring).

See C.C. v. A.B., 406 Mass. 679, 684, 686, 690–691, 550 N.E.2d 365 (1990). See also R.R.K. v. S.G.P., 400 Mass. 12, 15, 507 N.E.2d 736 (1987). The presumption has endured, but the strength of the presumption has diminished.

In the few instances where we have seen fit to transpose the standard into the civil realm, it has been to achieve one or the other of these goals. See, e.g., R.R.K. v. S.G.P., 400 Mass. 12, 15 (1987) (presumption that child was fathered by husband of mother only may be overcome on showing of proof to contrary beyond reasonable doubt); Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v. Hagberg, 374 Mass. 271, 276 (1978) (commitment to mental health facility under G. L. c. 123); Andrews, petitioner, 368 Mass. 468 (1975) (commitment of sexually dangerous persons). Cf. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 374 Mass. 181, 190 (1978) (use of proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard in presumption of statute's constitutionality, recognizing wide discretion of Legislature).

The judge's conclusion that, confronted with a disruptive move to a new home hundreds of miles away, it is in Tamika's best interests to maintain contact with her de facto parent and family, is fully supported. See C.C. v. A.B., 406 Mass. 679, 690 (1990), quoting R.R.K. v. S.G.P., 400 Mass. 12, 21 (1987) (Liacos, J., concurring) ("existence or nonexistence of a substantial relationship between the putative father and child is relevant in evaluating both the rights of the parent and the best interests of the child"); Adoption of Lars, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 30, 33 (1998) (limited postadoptive visitation held to be in best interests of children given "ongoing relationship and bonding between the [biological] mother and each of the children"); Cennami v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 403, 409 (1977), quoting Petition of the New England Home for Little Wanderers to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 367 Mass. 631, 645 n.12 (1975) ("duration of . . . custody as it bears on 'the putative emotional shock to the child of transfer may be an important factor in the calcul[ation]' of the best interests of the child"). As to the scope of the visitation, the judge considered the nature and the duration of the relationship between Tamika and the aunt.

Harvard Law Sch. Coalition for Civil Rights v. President Fellows of Harvard College, 413 Mass. 66, 71 (1992), quoting Independence Park, Inc. v. Board of Health of Barnstable, 403 Mass. 477, 482 (1988). See R.R.K. v. S.G.P., 400 Mass. 12, 13 (1987). The complaint did not allege that the plaintiff is the biological father of the child.

The presumption flows from the strong public policy interest in affording legitimacy to children. P.B.C. v. D.H., supra at 73. R.R.K. v. S.G.P., 400 Mass. 12, 16 (1987) (Liacos, J., concurring). The "presumption of legitimacy may not be rebutted, even in a civil case, 'except on facts which prove, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the husband could not have been the father.'"

"[T]he existence or nonexistence of a substantial relationship between the putative father and child is relevant in evaluating both the rights of the parent and the best interests of the child." C.C. v. A.B., 406 Mass. at 690, quoting from R.R.K. v. S.G.P., 400 Mass. 12, 21 (1987) (Liacos, J., concurring). Additionally, the incorrect interlocutory decision of an issue that is so connected to the ongoing merits of the case does the defendant no harm until entry of judgment, since merely causing a party to be subjected to the delay and expense inherent in further litigation does not make such an order "effectively unreviewable" under Borman v. Borman, 378 Mass. at 780.