Opinion
2014 CA 0263
09-19-2014
R.P. ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILD, JANE DOE v. WEST FELICIANA PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, WEST FELICIANA MIDDLE SCHOOL, WEST FELICIANA PARISH PARKS AND RECREATION DEVELOPMENT, LOUISIANA PUBLIC SCHOOLS RISK MANAGEMENT AGENCY, AND HARRY HAILE, SR., INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF HIS MINOR CHILD, JOHN DOE
Tony Clayton Michael P. Fruge Port Allen, Louisiana Plaintiff/Appellant, R.P. on behalf of her minor child, Jane Doe Harry Haile, Sr. Clinton, Louisiana Defendant/Appellee, Pro Se
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION On Appeal from the 20th Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of West Feliciana State of Louisiana
No. 20500
The Honorable William G. Carmichael, Judge Presiding Tony Clayton
Michael P. Fruge
Port Allen, Louisiana
Plaintiff/Appellant,
R.P. on behalf of her minor child,
Jane Doe
Harry Haile, Sr.
Clinton, Louisiana
Defendant/Appellee,
Pro Se
BEFORE: GUIDRY, THERIOT, AND DRAKE, JJ.
DRAKE, J.
Plaintiff-appellant, R.P., on behalf of her minor child, Jane Doe, appeals the dismissal of her claims against defendant-appellee, Harry Haile, Sr., following a trial on the merits. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case involves the rape of a minor, Jane Doe, while at school on February 28, 2008. R.P., the mother of Jane Doe, brought suit against numerous defendants, including Harry Haile, Sr., the father of John Doe, who Jane Doe alleged raped her. All of the defendants were dismissed before the trial of the merits except Haile. On the date of the trial, Haile did not appear even though he had been noticed for the trial. R.P. presented her case, which consisted of the testimony of Jane Doe, the minor, and R.P., the minor's mother, the deposition testimony of Haile, and the notices sent to Haile of the trial date. The trial court took the matter under advisement and ordered R.P. to file a post-trial memorandum supporting her claims against Haile.
R.P. filed a post-trial memorandum, which contained very similar arguments to those raised in this appeal. The trial court rendered judgment on October 24, 2013, dismissing all claims against Haile with prejudice. It is from this judgment that R.P. appeals.
The trial court dismissed R.P.'s claims against Haile pursuant to an exception of no cause of action, which was raised by the trial court on its own motion at the conclusion of the trial.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court of appeal may not overturn a judgment of a trial court unless there is an error of law or a factual finding that is manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Morris v. Safeway Ins. Co. of Louisiana, 03-1361 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/17/04), 897 So. 2d 616, 617, writ denied, 04-2572 (La. 12/17/04), 888 So. 2d 872. The Louisiana Supreme Court has posited a two-part test for the appellate review of facts in order to affirm the factual findings of the trier of fact: (1) the appellate court must find from the record that there is a reasonable factual basis for the finding of the trier of fact; and (2) the appellate court must further determine that the record establishes that the finding is not clearly wrong (manifestly erroneous). See Mart v. Hill, 505 So. 2d 1120, 1127 (La. 1987). Thus, if there is no reasonable factual basis in the record for the trier of fact's finding, no additional inquiry is necessary to conclude there was manifest error. However, if a reasonable factual basis exists, an appellate court may set aside a factual finding only if, after reviewing the record in its entirety, it determines the factual finding was clearly wrong. See Stobart v. State, through Dep't of Tramp, and Dev., 617 So. 2d 880, 882 (La. 1993); Moss v. State, 07-1686 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/8/08), 993 So. 2d 687, 693, writ denied, 08-2166 (La. 11/14/08), 996 So. 2d 1092. If the trial court's factual findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the court of appeal may not reverse those findings, even though convinced that, had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. LeBlanc v. Appurao, 13-0491 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/13/14), 138 So. 3d 1, 4-5, writ denied, 14-0498 (La. 4/17/14), 138 So.3d 632. Where there is conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, even when the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable. Robinson v. North American Salt Co., 02-1869 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/27/03), 865 So. 2d 98, 105, writ denied, 03-2581 (La. 11/26/03), 860 So. 2d 1139. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, a fact finder's choice between them can never be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Dubuisson v. Amclyde Engineered Products Co., Inc., 12-0010 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/31/12), 112 So. 3d 891, 895.
With regard to questions of law, appellate review is simply a review of whether the trial court was legally correct or legally incorrect. Hidalgo v. Wilson Certified Exp., Inc., 94-1322 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/14/96), 676 So. 2d 114, 116. On legal issues, the appellate court gives no special weight to the findings of the trial court, but exercises its constitutional duty to review questions of law and render judgment on the record. In re Mashburn Marital Trust, 04-1678 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/29/05), 924 So. 2d 242, 246, writ denied, 06-1034 (La. 9/22/06), 937 So. 2d 384.
DISCUSSION
R.P. claimed that Haile was vicariously liable for the damage occasioned by his minor child, both individually and as the administrator of the estate of his minor child. In its order for a post-trial memorandum from R.P., the trial court noted the facts as determined from the evidence. Haile was previously married to John Doe's mother, Sharon Emery. However, at the time of his deposition in 2012, Haile was remarried to Shunda Haile, with whom he had an eleven year old daughter born of that marriage. Therefore, the trial court surmised that Emery and Haile were divorced at the time of the incident. At the time of the incident in 2008, involving Jane Doe, John Doe was living with Emery in St. Francisville. Additionally, at the time of his deposition, Haile was living with Shunda Haile and his daughter in Clinton, Louisiana, where he had lived for eighteen years.
Louisiana Civil Code article 2318 provides, in part:
The father and the mother are responsible for the damage occasioned by their minor child, who resides with them or who has been placed by them under the care of other persons, reserving to them recourse against those persons.
Based on La. C.C. art. 2318, the trial court found that Haile was not liable for the actions of John Doe, who did not reside with him at the time of the incident. R.P. relied upon Guidry v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 201 So. 2d 534 (La. App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 203 So. 2d 557 (La. 1967), which held that the father was liable for the acts of a minor child while the father was alive unless the mother and father were divorced or legally separated and the custody of the minor had been awarded to the mother or the mother was appointed as tutrix for the child.
As noted by the trial court, Guidry was decided in 1967. Louisiana Civil Code article 2318 was amended and reenacted by La. Acts 1984, No. 578, Sec. 1 to provide that both the mother and father were liable for the acts of their minor children when residing with them. The enabling language of the Act specifically states:
To amend and reenact Civil Code art. 2318, relative to offenses and quasi offenses; to provide that both parents ... are responsible for the damages occasioned by their minor or unemancipated children.Article 2318, both in 1984 and currently, requires the minor child to be residing with a parent for liability to attach. R.P. cites no cases which hold that a father is liable for the acts of a minor child who is not residing with him since the 1984 amendment. R.P. offered no evidence that Haile was awarded custody of John Doe following his divorce from Emery, nor that at the time of the incident John Doe was residing with Haile. The only evidence in the record is that John Doe lived with Emery, who had been divorced from Haile for a number of years.
The trial court also considered that La. C.C.P. art. 732(C) provides that the father is a proper party defendant as the administrator of the estate of a minor child if the parents are living and not divorced or judicially separated. Although the trial court noted that there was no direct evidence that John Doe's mother and father were divorced, the circumstantial evidence that Haile was remarried with an eleven year old daughter tended to show that the parents were, in fact, divorced.
After a review of the entire record, we find the trial court's factual finding that the parents of John Doe were divorced to be reasonable. A divorced father is only liable for the actions of a minor child with whom he resides. Therefore, the trial court did not commit manifest error in dismissing the claims of R.P. with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of the appeal are assessed against R.P.
AFFIRMED.