Opinion
01 Civ. 2622 (RWS)
July 24, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Theodore Rozsa ("Rozsa") has moved pursuant to Local Rule 6.3 and Rule 15(a), Fed.R.Civ.P., for reconsideration of the opinion and order of this Court of February 13, 2002, dismissing his first amended complaint against defendant SG Cowen Securities Corp. ("SG Cowen"). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.
Prior Proceedings
This action was commenced on March 27, 2001, by the filing of a complaint which alleged claims of RICO violations against certain defendants, a breach of fiduciary duty claim against SG Cowen and others, a breach of contract claim against defendant May Davis Group, Inc. and SG Cowen, and a claim for conversion. These claims arose out of an alleged scheme to defraud Rozsa of $5 million which he was led to believe would be employed in virtually riskless "program trading" involving foreign bank instruments that would return a profit of 15% per trade.
By decision and order dated August 1, 2001, Rozsa's initial complaint against SG Cowen was dismissed and this Court permitted him to replead.Rozsa v. May Davis Group, Inc., 152 F. Supp.2d 526 (S.D.N.y. 2001) ("Rozsa I"). Rozsa then filed an amended complaint which was dismissed by decision and order on February 13, 2002, with prejudice. Rozsa v. May Davis Group, Inc., 187 F. Supp.2d 123 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Rozsa II")
The instant motion to reconsider Rozsa II was marked fully submitted on April 10, 2002.
The Standard To Be Applied
Local Civil Rule 6.3 states that motions for reconsideration must "set forth concisely the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked." To succeed on a motion to reconsider, a moving party must demonstrate that "the Court overlooked controlling decisions or factual matters that were put before it on the underlying motion." Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 322, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd in Part, vacated in Part on other grounds, 246 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2001) and which, had they been considered, "might reasonably have altered the result before the court." Consolidated Gold Fields v. Anglo American Corp., 713 F. Supp. 1457, 1476 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Local Civil Rule 6.3 is generally "narrowly construed and strictly applied so as to avoid repetitive arguments on issues that have been considered fully by the Court." Davidson v. Scully, 172 F. Supp.2d 458, 462 (S.D.N.y. 2001). The policy underlying these principles is to ensure finality and to prevent losing parties from raising matters that already have been rejected. Range Road Music, Inc. v. Music Sales Corp., 90 F. Supp.2d 390, 392 (S.D.N.y. 2000); Carolco Pictures Inc. v. Sirota, 700 F. Supp. 169, 170 (S.D.N.y. 1988).
No controlling decisions have been cited by Rozsa as having been overlooked.
No Factual Matters Were Overlooked
Rozsa on this motion urges not that a factual matter was overlooked but rather incorrectly interpreted. It appears that Rozsa now asserts as a factual matter that the documents considered in Rozsa II constituted the opening of an account at SG Cowen, and that Rozsa was a customer of SG Cowen. The account statements on which this argument is advanced were not overlooked, nor were the disclosure election and taxpayer identification forms. A new argument addressed to these events does not warrant reconsideration.
New Evidence Does Not Warrant Reconsideration
Rozsa has submitted as an exhibit to the instant motion a letter from SG Cowen containing the salutation "Dear Correspondent Client," along with an attached document entitled "Important Information for Correspondent Customers." This material was not previously submitted, and has been newly acquired by counsel to Rozsa. As such, it was not overlooked in Rozsa II and fails to demonstrate that this Court overlooked any matters that were before it in reviewing the amended complaint. Even if leave were granted upon reconsideration to permit an amendment to include this SG Cowen form, it would fail to alter SG Cowen's status as a clearing broker and to create duties which would give rise to liability.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to reconsider Rozsa II is denied.
It is so ordered.